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EDITORS’ NOTE
We must have faith in our craft. After all, it has brought us
this far in safety. What’s ahead isn’t doom, its just a little hump
that we can clear if we all just pedal a little harder. Then we’ll
soar into a glorious, endless future...But your craft isn’t going to
save you. Quite the contrary, it’s your craft that’s carrying you
toward catastrophe. DANIEL QUINN, ISHMAEL 109
(Bantam/Turner Book 1992).
This quote serves as a descriptive explanation of a commonly expressed
perspective towards climate change and its impact—the notion that as a
civilization we are traveling at an incredible rate towards an environmental
catastrophe—while some of the most influential players are ignorantly discounting the warning signs based on a blind faith that with extra effort any
obstacle can be overcome. Predictions regarding the effects of climate
change are often filled with discouraging rhetoric forecasting sea level rise,
climatic extremes, and massive species extinction. But despite the internationally recognized and accepted empirical evidence of global warming,
the current United States Administration steers away from substantively
addressing these issues.
This spring, the editors-in-chief chose “Business Responses to Climate
Change” as the theme for Sustainable Development Law & Policy, because
we want to share the success stories in the arena of climate change, specifically addressing an integral and influential player, the business community.
Despite the grim forecasts for our future environment, the conversation on
climate change does not have to be a recitation of pessimistic outcomes, but
rather one filled with optimism and possibilities for improvement.
There are increasing efforts by governments, civil society, the international community, and more recently the private sector to combat climate
change and its future impact. Historically, the private sector remained outside the debate on global warming. Recently, however, the private sector has
entered this conversation because profit margins, insurance rates, and corporate liability and risk are influenced by climate change. For example, major
corporations face the threat of liability, subsequent litigation, or higher insurance premiums as insurance companies encourage and at times require their
insurees to reduce their risk of climate litigation.
There are already identifiable business responses to climate change, a
handful recognized in this publication. The future impact of these business
community efforts is likely to include greater participation in emission
trading schemes, corporate self-auditing and monitoring of climate impact,
recognition of climate change as a profitable energy-saving incentive, and
opportunities for technological advancements.
We hope our publication helps illustrate the silver lining surrounding the
often cited dismal “climate science” by identifying the multitude of opportunities for corporations to take the lead in substantively addressing climate
change.

Melanie Nakagawa
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BUSINESS RESPONSES TO CLIMATE CHANGE:
OVERVIEW OF THIS ISSUE
By Perry Wallace*
limate change, whether taken as a scientific phenomenon, a political issue, a governmental or corporate
policy, or the rationale for an international legal framework, has continued to press its way into our lives. Indeed,
professionals in virtually all disciplines and laypersons alike
have found themselves more knowledgeable (and perhaps even
more concerned) than they might have ever imagined about
concepts such as “greenhouse gases,” the Kyoto Protocol,
“sinks,” and “carbon sequestration.”
This long march of climate change, from distant, exotic
notion to important modern concern, was by no means guaranteed. From its introduction into the broader arena of law and
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public policy at the 1992 United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development, doubt and resistance served to
limit the possibilities of a more affirmative response to a
phenomenon already well known in the scientific community.
Thus, the choice of a “framework” treaty model, specifically the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(“UNFCCC”), reflected, among other things, the daunting task
of gaining the support of the largest number of nations possible.
Hence, the UNFCCC structure, with provisions for subsequent
protocols and annexes, allowed a crucial first step in a long
process whose fundamental themes would always include not
only scientific justification, but also persistence and advocacy
balanced by flexibility and compromise.
Gradually, climate change appears to have prevailed as a
phenomenon that, along with its potential consequences, must
be taken seriously. Therefore, on February 16, 2005, the muchdebated Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC entered into effect.
Further, notwithstanding President George W. Bush’s rejection
of the Protocol as “fatally flawed,” progress in addressing
climate change issues has even occurred in the United States.
For example, several state governments have instituted
measures designed to address these issues, including litigation
seeking to force the United States Environmental Protection
Agency to reconsider its decision not to regulate greenhouse
gases. Non-governmental organizations have also mounted
climate change strategies, including initiatives directed at the
very corporate community responsible for an overwhelming
proportion of the human-induced diffusion of greenhouse gases
into the environment.
This issue of Sustainable Development Law & Policy
addresses the topic “Business Responses to Climate Change.” In
doing so, the issue brings to the reader a rich offering of articles
by top professionals in the climate change arena, with a specific focus on the role of the business community as it regards
climate change.
Dan Worth takes a look at the voluntary solutions to climate
change problems that have been developed in the absence of
federal regulation.1 Using case studies, he describes the roles of
innovation, energy conservation, and up-front investment in
cleaner technologies and their great value in forging solutions.
He particularly addresses the potential of these approaches for
universities.
Sara Standish notes that in the new, emerging world of
climate change regulation, companies that have not planned
* Perry Wallace is a Professor of Environmental and Corporate Law at the
American University, Washington College of Law.
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Climate Monitoring and Diagnostics Laboratory,
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

properly risk not only reduced profits, but also diminished
interest by the investment community.2 As a result, they focus
on the importance of shaping policies that encourage companies
to align growth strategies with environmental goals, thus allowing those companies to harness the innovative power of business
to produce environmental and economic solutions.
Stephen Tully takes on the important topic of business participation in the formation of the emerging climate change legal
regime.3 He takes us into the Conference of Parties (“COP”)
procedural process of the UNFCCC, concentrating on the
modalities for corporate participation and ends the article by

Point Barrow Observatory, Alaska is one of the many stations monitoring
the effects of climate change.

assessing the process and its prospects for meaningful lawmaking where the corporate community is intimately involved.
Sophie Smyth discusses the World Bank’s establishment of
the Prototype Carbon Fund for addressing the problem of
climate change.4 Concentrating on the topic of carbon finance,
in particular the Prototype Carbon Fund, she treats the novel

issues of international trusts and securities law that have arisen
as this legal and institutional climate change framework
emerged.
Stephen Hesse looks at our oceans, the resources and services they provide, and how we treat them.5 He then narrows his
discussion to the topic of how climate change affects the oceans.
There follows a discussion of public and private roles in the
protection of these resources, including possible incentives for
fishers, conservationists, the business sector, and governments
to cooperate in pursuit of appropriate protections.
Julia Philpott analyzes the Equator Principles, a 2003
agreement entered into by ten of the world’s largest banks,
addressing the environmental and social impacts related to project finance.6 Noting the immense influence these banks can
have over the design and technology choices—and thus the
environmental and social impacts—of development projects,
Ms. Philpott presents and discusses a model for inclusion of
greenhouse gas assessment and reporting into the Equator
Principles framework.
Todd Foley and Kevin Gallagher address the subject of
forward-looking energy companies that create profitable
markets while reducing society’s negative impact on global
climate systems.7 By moving quickly and effectively to develop
renewable energy sources, energy companies can diversify their
energy portfolios while at the same time promoting long-term
sustainability.
Itaru Nittu argues in favor of using patent revenue and
expenditures for environmental purposes, noting that patent
recipients profit from untaxed environmental degradation.8
Dr. Nittu proposes a new “green patent system” and discusses
the implications for climate change.
Taken together, these articles present the reader with highly interesting and up-to-date treatments of climate change. The
issues, ideas, and proposals presented here are an important part
of the debate and discussion around climate change, and they
will remain so in the years to come.
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ACCELERATING TOWARDS CLIMATE NEUTRALITY
WITH THE U.S. GOVERNMENT STUCK IN NEUTRAL:
THE EMERGING ROLE OF U.S. BUSINESSES, CITIES, STATES, AND
UNIVERSITIES IN AGGRESSIVELY REDUCING GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS
By Dan Worth*

INTRODUCTION
eadership on climate change is lacking at the federal
level in the United States. Progress at the international
level is little better. Although the Kyoto Protocol has
finally gone into effect with Russia’s recent ratification, it only
requires an actual 2.5% reduction of greenhouse gas (“GHG”)
emissions by 2012 for developed countries.1 China, India, and
other important developing countries currently are outside the
regime. These realities stand in sharp contrast to the 70-95%
immediate reductions in GHG emissions many credible scientists believe is necessary to prevent further irreparable harm to
the planet.2
Despite the federal vacuum, an increasing number of
businesses, cities, states, and universities have launched
aggressive efforts to reduce GHG emissions. These efforts have
come in response to increasing pressure from various sources,
including impending litigation, international regulation, fear of
domestic regulation, and climate-focused shareholder resolutions. As successful GHG emissions reduction case studies
emerge, businesses, governments, institutions, and individuals
are discovering that aggressively reducing GHG emissions can
make good business sense on many levels.3
Recently, the concept of “climate neutrality”4 has come into
vogue given the growing calls to move beyond carbon cuts to
carbon negative strategies in order to return to the 280 parts per
million (“ppm”) atmospheric carbon concentration of pre-industrial times from today’s level of 380 ppm. Many scientists
believe these measures are necessary to mitigate and reverse –
where still possible – the impacts already set in motion, including the now possible loss of the Greenland Ice Sheet.5
This move is important for two reasons. First, the U.S. now
emits as many GHGs as 2.6 billion people in 151 developing
nations.6 Given the global consequences of climate change, we
are morally responsible for reducing our own contributions.
Second, the U.S. must play an increasing international role in
curbing the emissions of countries like China, whose emissions
are predicted to grow by 3.3% per year through 2025, increasing China’s share of global carbon dioxide emissions from
twelve percent in 2000 to eighteen percent in 2025.7 As the
world’s largest market and largest GHG emitter with the second
highest gross domestic product per capita, the U.S. could be an
incredibly effective technological and moral leader on this issue.

L
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This article will explore the roots of climate neutrality,
identify some of the drivers of the growing movement
towards climate neutrality in the absence of federal action, and
highlight leading case studies from businesses, cities, states,
and universities.

THE ROOTS OF CLIMATE NEUTRALITY
“Climate neutrality” is a concept that originated at the end
of the last millennium through the work of the Climate Neutral
Network (“CNN”), which certifies products and companies as
“Climate Cool.”8 According to the CNN, a product, company, or
process is climate neutral if it is determined to have little or no
effect on the Earth’s climate.9 In 2000, Oberlin College commissioned a report from the Rocky Mountain Institute on how to
move the college campus to climate neutrality by 2020.10 Since
2002, event planners have also begun reducing and offsetting
emissions associated with their events and advertising them as
climate neutral.11 Achieving climate neutrality consists of
reducing as large of a percentage of GHGs as possible, estimating the remaining emissions, and then funding clean energy or
other GHG reduction efforts to offset any remaining emissions.
Another way to think about climate neutrality is to think
about net zero GHG emissions. This concept has already hit
auto showrooms in California, where the concepts of zero emissions vehicles (“ZEVs”) and low emissions vehicles (“LEVs”)
were born.12 Under this new framework, we can think of moving towards national climate neutrality as pursuing the goal of a
Zero Emissions Nation (“ZEN”).

* Dan Worth is the Executive Director of the National Association of
Environmental Law Societies (“NAELS”), a coalition of environmental law student groups that seeks to mobilize the university community in support of public
interest environmental solutions. Dan also currently serves on the Steering
Committee for the Energy Action Network, a coalition of student and youth
groups working on climate and energy issues. Prior to joining NAELS, Dan served
as the Harvard Law School Environmental Fellow, where he coordinated the
Environmental Working Group – a team of Harvard Law School administrators,
professors, alumni, and students working to develop a comprehensive environmental law program. While at Harvard, Dan volunteered for the Law Offices of
Matthew F. Pawa, P.C., where he conducted research on the recent tort-based
global warming cases. Dan graduated cum laude from Boston University School
of Law and has clerked for Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund in the organization’s
D.C. and Juneau, Alaska offices. Mr. Worth welcomes comments at
dworth_99@yahoo.com.
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THE STICKS: THE DRIVERS OF CHANGE
FEAR OF LITIGATION
On July 21, 2004, Connecticut, New York, California, New
Jersey, Rhode Island, Vermont, Wisconsin, and the City of New
York filed a tort-based suit against electric power corporations13
in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York.14 The plaintiffs allege that the cumulative 650 million
tons of carbon dioxide emitted from defendants’ power plants
are contributing to a public nuisance under both state and
federal common law.15 They seek an order holding each of the
defendants jointly and severally liable for damages associated
with global warming and enjoining them to abate their nuisance
by capping emissions of carbon dioxide and reducing them by a
specified percentage for at least the next decade.16 This is just
one of several climate-related lawsuits being considered or
brought against major U.S. industries. The threat of liability and
negative public relations associated with these and other suits
provide an incentive for U.S. corporations to comply now to
mitigate their liability.17

FEAR OF CURRENT AND FUTURE
DOMESTIC REGULATION
The Climate Stewardship Act (“CSA”), introduced by
Senators John McCain (R-AZ) and Joseph Lieberman (D-CT) in
October 2003, was defeated by a surprisingly close 43 to 55 vote
in the U.S. Senate. In March 2004, similar legislation was introduced in the House of Representatives by Wayne Gilchrest
(R-MD) and John Olver (D-MA). Earlier this year, the bill was
jointly reintroduced into both Houses of Congress.18
The Climate Stewardship Act is modeled on the 1990 Clean
Air Act acid rain program and would create a market-based
emissions cap and trade program around several greenhouse
gases. Electric utilities, refiners of transportation fuels, and
major industrial and commercial entities would be regulated
under the program with large emitters required to report annual
emissions and return to 2000 emissions levels by 2010.
Several states have also adopted or are considering adopting Renewable Portfolio Standards (“RPS”) that would require
public utilities to make a certain percentage of the energy they
procure come from renewable sources such as wind, solar, or
biomass.19 Other state mandates, goals, and settlements are
leading public utilities to reduce their climate impacts and in the
process supporting emerging clean energy markets.
According to a report issued by the Rocky Mountain
Institute, future regulation that will cap emissions combined
with the uncertainty of energy costs and the energy market could
“hurt business performance and lower asset values of carbonintensive plants and equipment,” and threaten a company’s
market share.20 Fossil-fuel producers and users, in particular
coal and petroleum industries and U.S. electric utilities, most of
which rely on coal-fired generation, are likely to be the big
losers unless they can adapt to potential new regulations.21
The auto industry is also the focus of recent California legislation that calls for the reporting, certification, and reduction
of greenhouse gas emissions from mobile sources beginning
5

with 2009 auto models. The California bill notes that passenger
cars and light trucks are responsible for approximately 40% of
California’s total greenhouse gas pollution22 and requires that
the California Climate Action Registry work with the California
Air Resources Board (“CARB”) to “adopt regulations that
ensure reductions in emissions of greenhouse gases.”23 The bill
states that finding technological solutions to reduce emissions
will stimulate the California economy, provide jobs, and “continue the California automobile worker tradition of building cars
that use cutting edge technology.”24
Pursuant to this legislation, in September 2004, CARB
issued regulations that one group predicts would reduce global
warming gases by nearly 30 percent by 2016.25 In December
2004, the auto industry, led by the Alliance of International
Automobile Manufacturers, responded with a federal lawsuit in
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California
challenging the constitutionality of the state statute and a public
relations campaign to battle the suit.26 Currently several environmental nonprofits are putting pressure on the auto industry to
comply with these regulations. The California Governor’s office
is defending the State of California against the lawsuit and the
California Public Employees’ Retirement System (“CalPERS”)
is looking into the auto industry’s stance.27 Possibly in response
to this pressure as well as proposed shareholder resolutions (see
below), Ford Motor Company agreed recently to study the climate impacts of its manufacturing activities and products.28

IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL REGULATION
In February 2005, the Kyoto Protocol went into effect
around the world with the U.S. standing on the sideline. U.S.
Congressional resistance to Kyoto was codified in 1997 through
Senate Resolution 98, sponsored by Senator Robert Byrd
(D-WV) and Senator Chuck Hagel (R-NE). In a brilliant legislative move, the Senators proposed a simple, but politically
elegant resolution that passed 95-0, “regarding the conditions
for the United States becoming a signatory to any international
agreement on greenhouse gas emissions under the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.”29 The
resolution stated that “(1) the United States should not be a signatory to any protocol…which would – (A) mandate new commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for the
Annex I Parties [developed countries], unless the protocol or
other agreement also mandates new specific scheduled commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for
Developing Country Parties within the same compliance period,
or (B) would result in serious harm to the economy of the
United States.”30
In addition, any supporters of a protocol or other agreement
to limit GHG emissions must make sure the protocol is “accompanied by a detailed explanation of any legislation or regulatory
actions that may be required to implement the protocol or other
agreement and should also be accompanied by an analysis of the
detailed financial costs and other impacts on the economy of the
United States which would be incurred by the implementation
of the protocol or other agreement.”31 With these four lines,
Senators Byrd and Hagel framed the Kyoto Protocol in such a
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY

way as to effectively block entrance into any agreement
that focused on the developed world and to switch the heavy
economic burden of proof to protocol supporters.
Now that the Protocol has gone into effect, however, some
are predicting serious harm to the U.S. by not ratifying the
accord.32 According to Craig Ebert, a Consulting Managing
Director with ICF Consulting, an international energy solution
consulting group, “investments by corporate America to
improve the operating efficiency will have no value in the
emerging $5-10 billion-a-year global carbon credit market.
While U.S.-based companies with operations overseas could
take advantage of these market opportunities, many do not
understand the competitive implications of a carbon-constrained
global business environment.”33

SHAREHOLDER RESOLUTIONS
Recently, shareholder resolutions have been pushing corporations from within to consider their contributions to global
warming and find strategies to reduce emissions. Last year,
record numbers of shareholders in oil, gas, and auto companies
proposed and voted for resolutions that would require companies to disclose the financial risks climate change poses to their
future economic health and lay out steps to compete in
an increasingly international pressure-filled and carbonconstrained market.34 These resolutions have been initiated by
environmental non-profits and investor coalitions.
Many companies have reacted to these resolutions with
affirmative steps, including disclosing greenhouse gas emissions, setting GHG targets, investing in carbon-constrained
energy technologies, integrating climate risk into core business
strategies, and making boards responsible for overseeing
climate change strategies.35 These proposed resolutions are
forcing companies to realize the serious potential financial
impacts of climate change to investors.36

THE CARROTS: THE BENEFITS OF REDUCING
EMISSIONS AND CASE STUDIES
ANYTHING BUT BUSINESS AS USUAL –
BUSINESSES SET AND MEET REDUCTION TARGETS
Aided by groups like the Rocky Mountain Institute, the
Pew Center for Global Climate Change, Ceres, Clean Air – Cool
Planet, the World Business Council for Sustainable
Development, and the World Resources Institute, U.S. corporations are reducing their GHG emissions and saving money in the
process.37 According to the Rocky Mountain Institute, applying
whole-systems thinking can provide end-use services at minimum cost38 and can also lead to other benefits such as motivating employees, attracting and retaining talent,39 and increasing
market positioning.40
One of the most successful case studies has come from BP
Amoco, which on the first day of the new millennium launched
a groundbreaking corporate GHG trading system with a goal of
reaching ten percent below 1990 levels by 2010. Slightly more
than two years later, BP reported they had met this goal at a projected savings of $650 million over the coming ten years.41 The
SPRING 2005

Pew Center on Global Climate Change is working with several
other businesses that have set and met emissions reduction
goals,42 including:
• Deutshe Telekom, which reduced energy use by fifteen
percent from 1995 levels by 2000;
• Dupont, which has reduced emissions by 65 percent from
1990 levels, with an actual reduction by 2002 of 67 percent;
• Royal Dutch/Shell, which reduced emissions by ten percent
from 1990 levels; and
• Toyota Motor Manufacturing North America, which
reduced energy consumption per unit of production by
fifteen percent from 2000 levels.

THINKING GLOBALLY AND BEATING KYOTO LOCALLY
An increasing number of U.S. municipalities are committing to serious emissions reductions that meet and in some cases
surpass Kyoto. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
launched a $mart $avings program to help cities and states
reduce energy use.43 The U.S. Department of Energy runs a
Clean Cities Project to “advance the nation’s economic, environmental, and energy security by supporting local decisions to
adopt practices that contribute to the reduction of petroleum
consumption.”44 The International Council for Local
Environmental Initiatives (“ICLEI”), which was launched in
1990 at United Nations headquarters in New York, runs a Cities
for Climate Protection program with 49 U.S. partners to create
a framework for reducing emissions.45
Two great examples come from the Pacific Northwest, where
the City of Seattle predicts a 40 percent reduction in emissions by
2012 and passed a resolution to require its municipal electric utility to mitigate the GHGs from one of its recent power purchases.46 Seattle Mayor Greg Nickels is also leading a charge to
convince mayors from around the country to voluntarily comply
with Kyoto.47 The city of Portland, Oregon also adopted a plan
that is slightly more aggressive than the Kyoto Protocol.48
In Telluride, Colorado, initial research steps are underway
to reduce emissions, and to save significant money in the
process. A recent report commissioned by the Telluride Town
Council, co-authored by Rick Heede (director of Climate
Mitigation Services, Inc., and co-author of the initial Oberlin
2020 study) suggests that the Town of Telluride can save 23 percent of its current energy costs, resulting in a savings of $53,650
per year by investing in electricity and gas saving retrofit measures.49 Cumulative net savings are estimated at $297,000 by
2011 to exceed $1 million in 2016.50

ATTAINING MULTIPLE STATES OF ZEN –
PROGRESS ON THE STATE LEVEL
Many governors and state governments have launched
efforts to lead the way through state climate initiatives, including at least eighteen state action plans,51 state regulations
including an increasing number of Renewable Energy Portfolio
Standards (“RPSs”),52 and regional multi-state initiatives. In
addition, at least three states, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and
California, have developed greenhouse gas registries.53
6

One of the most ambitious multi-state efforts is the
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (“RGGI”), an eleven-state
effort by Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic states to reduce carbon
dioxide emissions.54 Participating states and observers55 will
develop a regional strategy for controlling emissions including
a cap-and-trade program with a market-based emissions trading
system. The plan is scheduled for completion in April 2005 and
will limit emissions from electric power generators.56 The
stakeholder process includes representatives from twenty-four
groups.57 This effort is connected to the Regional Greenhouse
Gas Registry (“RGGR”), launched by Northeast States for
Coordinated Air Use Management (“NESCAUM”).58 Both
initiatives have come out of the New England Governors –
Eastern Canadian Premiers (“NEG/ECP”) Climate Action Plan,
adopted in August 2001, which shoots for a long-term goal of 75
to 85 percent GHG reductions.59

CHANGING THE CAMPUS CLIMATE:
SUCCESS STORIES WITHIN THE CAMPUS
GREENING MOVEMENT
The 4,000 colleges and universities in this country play a
lead role in training and educating the next generation of U.S.
and world leaders. Through their practices they also have a very
strong influence on the U.S. economy.60 In addition, it takes a
great deal of energy to provide services and housing to the more
than fifteen million students61 and thousands of professors on
today’s campuses, resulting in high aggregate GHG emissions.
The past five years have seen the emergence of a handful of
universities taking the technological and moral lead in combating climate change. Particularly successful efforts include
Harvard’s Campus Greening Initiative (“HGCI”),62 the Tufts
Climate Initiative (“TCI”),63 and work by the Environmental
Center at the University of Colorado-Boulder.64 In March 2005,
graduate students at the Bren School of Environmental Science
and Management at the University of California – Santa Barbara
launched a masters level graduate research project for the
National Association of Environmental Law Societies
(“NAELS”) to develop a long-term plan to aggressively move
the campus to climate neutrality.

WHERE THE BUFFALO (SUSTAINABLY) ROAM
In 2000, the University of Colorado Environmental Center
released a report called Blueprint for a Green Campus that
proposed “a vision of a growing, dynamic campus which steps
lightly upon the earth and satisfies additional demands for energy, transportation, and resources through increased efficiency
rather than increased consumption.”65 In a recent report, the
Center attempted to calculate the avoided costs its activities
have saved over the past five years. While noting the inherent
difficulties of calculating environmental savings, the authors
estimate that environmental programs save a net of over $5 million dollars annually on the Boulder campus.66 The study also
noted several non-economic benefits including increased
student involvement, enhanced student and faculty recruitment,
and better community relations.67
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COOLING THE CRIMSON
The Harvard Green Campus Initiative (“HGCI”) is an interfaculty organization that works to address the real life
challenges of achieving campus environmental sustainability
within Harvard University, to “support staff, students and
faculty at Harvard University to address campus sustainability
through the management of building design, construction,
renovation, procurement, landscape, energy, water, waste,
emissions, transportation, human health and productivity.”68
The Center was started in 2000 with a $70,000 grant. In
2001, the President and Provost of Harvard provided an additional $750,000 to further establish the Initiative. In addition,
Harvard created a $3 million Green Campus Loan Fund which
provides funding to projects that can generate a payback period
of five years or less, “generate infrastructure or behavioral
improvements that directly decrease Harvard University’s current environmental impact,” and “demonstrate an innovative
design and implementation approach.”69 The Center is currently funded by a combination of funding from the Office of the
President and Provost (twenty percent) and fee-for-service
partnerships between HGCI and Harvard University departments (80 percent).70
After four years of existence, the HCGI has reduced utility
costs by over $1 million and reduced GHG emissions by over
20 million pounds of carbon dioxide equivalent.71

STABILIZING THE IVORY TOWER
In 1999, Tufts University in Medford, Massachusetts committed to meeting or beating the Kyoto target for universityrelated greenhouse gas emissions, which translates into real
reductions of 30 percent emissions by the year 2012. To support
these efforts, Tufts launched the Tufts Climate Initiative (“TCI”)
– composed of two faculty members, a full time staff member,
an outreach coordinator, and a graduate intern.72 The goal of the
TCI is to steer Tufts University towards a cleaner energy path.
TCI focuses on several areas including climate education, carbon dioxide reductions, research and monitoring, and events and
outreach.73 TCI’s carbon dioxide emissions reduction program
focuses on several areas including new construction, renovations, alternative fuels and fuel switching, energy efficient technologies, personal action initiatives, and a clean electricity
aggregation project.74 A recent five-year report notes that Tufts’
goal to meet Kyoto is possible but requires both commitment
and resources.75

CAMPUS CLIMATE NEUTRAL
In 2004, the National Association of Environmental Law
Societies (“NAELS”) launched a national project called
Campus Climate Neutral (“CCN”) to mobilize the university
community in support of climate solutions while engaging graduate students in for-credit, supervised research projects to develop long-term climate neutral action plans for university campuses. In February 2005, a group of Masters students at the
Donald Bren School of Environmental Science and
Management at the University of California – Santa Barbara
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launched the first CCN project. Working with NAELS and the
California Climate Action Registry,76 under the supervision of
Professors Oran Young and Durwood Zaelke,77 these students
will do a comprehensive analysis of campus GHG emissions;
analyze technological, political, social, and financial hurdles;
and prepare a plan outlining several different paths to overcoming these hurdles and achieving climate neutrality. The effort
was launched at a California University Climate Summit at the
Bren School in February, 2005.78 This effort comes on the heels
of a study, now online, to achieve carbon neutrality at
Middlebury College supported by Clean Air – Cool Planet.79

THE NEXT NATIONAL MOVEMENT
In addition to these and other80 exciting university case
studies, a grassroots, university-based movement to address
GHG emissions has been developing this decade, leading to the
recent emergence of two very promising coalitions. On a student
level, a growing coalition of youth and student groups are
pushing for green energy purchases and other national and international emissions reduction efforts.81 On a professor and
administrator level, a growing coalition of professional groups
are working together and beginning to explore the possibility of

a Higher Education Climate Action Partnership (“HECAP”).
These coalitions will compliment ongoing campus campaigns
by established and nascent professional groups.82 These efforts
represent a growing interest at all levels of higher education to
catalyze campus GHG emissions reduction efforts, while
educating and training a new generation of world citizens and
leaders in the process.

CONCLUSION
At a recent April 2005 Ceres Conference, U.N. Foundation
President and former Colorado Senator Tim Wirth described the
current decade as one where climate change will be viewed as
an incredible opportunity rather than an interesting idea (1970s),
a problem (1980s), or a crisis (1990s).83 As this article shows,
increasing domestic and international pressure combined with
potential market opportunities are leading forward-thinking
cities, businesses, and universities to voluntarily adopt aggressive emissions reduction efforts. While these efforts are no substitute for action at the federal level, they are promising first
steps in a long-term push in this country to become a climate
neutral, and eventually climate negative, society.

ENDNOTES: Accelerating Towards Climate Neutrality
with the U.S. Government Stuck in Neutral
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BUSINESS AND CLIMATE CHANGE:
EXAMINING DRIVERS FOR ACTION
by Sara Standish*
INTRODUCTION

COST EFFECTIVE GHG REDUCTIONS FOR EARLY ACTORS

ising greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions – a major
driver of climate change – could negatively impact
human activity and natural resources. Even small fluctuations in temperature or precipitation could have amplified
effects for humans and ecosystems. With global energy consumption estimated to increase 150 to 230 percent by 2050, the
demand for solutions to climate change will intensify.1 As both
a source of emissions and a potential provider of solutions,
business has a pivotal role to play.
But what drives companies to take action? Some are able to
realize financial gains by initiating energy efficiency projects.
Others are forced to comply with regulation that limits emissions. In addition, regulation influences the markets in which
business operates, so companies that are not directly regulated
may see changes in their competitive positioning and market
opportunities.
These drivers – translated into business action – are illustrated by three examples in the first section of this article. Each
highlights why a company took action and what specific outcomes were expected. Examples are drawn from the experience
of the World Resources Institute’s Sustainable Enterprise
Program, which has engaged corporate leaders and investors on
GHG management, green power procurement, and climate
change strategies.
In order to curb climate change trends, current efforts to
reduce GHG emissions will need to be accelerated and expanded. Understanding the tangible returns and intangible benefits
that businesses seek when taking action can help create policies
that raise the level of corporate engagement. The second section
examines policies that can support business through clear
signals, long-term targets, and market mechanisms. In contrast,
the third section highlights how policies inhibit action by
creating an uncertain regulatory context.

In the United States, office buildings account for nineteen
percent of commercial energy consumption and $100 billion is
spent annually on lighting and heating costs.2 Energy efficiency
can reduce a company’s GHG emissions and save it money. In
2002, Citigroup installed a new technology to centrally manage

R

BUSINESS ACTION
Amidst the pressures and uncertainties of climate trends,
companies are taking action. Early actors are finding cost-effective GHG reductions. Companies that invest in developing and
manufacturing low-emissions technologies are positioned to
expand market share and improve their long-term competitiveness. New markets – partially driven by regulatory signals – are
creating an opportunity for clean energy products and services
to thrive.

As both a source of
emissions and a potential
provider of solutions,
business has a pivotal role
to play.
its heat, ventilation, and air conditioning (“HVAC”) operations
in the greater New York City area. The retrofit cost over $2.5
million, but energy efficiency rebates from the New York State
Energy Research and Development Authority and the Long
Island Power Authority reduced capital investment costs by
$507,000. Additionally, Citigroup estimates that the project has
led to a fifteen percent reduction in energy use and a 30 percent
reduction in service calls, while meeting an internal goal to
improve corporate environmental management systems.3

DEVELOPING NEW CLEAN ENERGY PRODUCTS
Trends toward a carbon constrained economy have
increased demand for “green” energy products and created new
market opportunities. For providers of energy-generating technology, investment in new environmentally friendly products
can create revenue. For example, General Electric manufactures
an array of products, including wind turbines and higherefficiency gas turbines that cut emissions. In addition, the
company acquired a solar photovoltaic equipment manufacturer, thus expanding its position in the market for clean energy
technologies.

* Sara Standish is a Program Coordinator II in the World Resources Institute’s
Sustainable Enterprise Program. Ms. Standish gratefully acknowledges the contributions to this article by Andrew Aulisi, Elizabeth Cook, and Samantha Putt
del Pino.
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CREATING COMPETITIVE POSITIONING WITH
CLIMATE STRATEGIES
Incomplete information about future regulations and
markets makes it difficult to determine a company’s long-term
competitive position. However, studies on the oil, gas, and automotive sectors have shown that carbon constraints could significantly change a company’s revenue, earning potential, and
shareholder value.4 In addition, major insurance companies such
as Swiss Re are asking companies for long term climate strategies.
In the automotive industry, emerging mandatory and voluntary standards in Japan, China, Canada, Australia, and the
European Union (“E.U.”) are forcing carmakers to build higher
fuel economy fleets. In California, legislation may increase fuel
economy by 30 percent and if successful, other states have signaled their desire to follow. Together with Canada, these states
could represent over 30 percent of the North American auto
market. Automakers investing in low emissions technology now
hold a competitive advantage in these carbon-constrained markets, affecting shareholder value. For example, Toyota, a company that is selling hybrid cars and leasing low-emissions technology to other automotive makers, is well-positioned in
markets that limit emissions.5

DEFINING VALUE PROPOSITIONS
In each of these examples, companies have benefited from
early action. These outcomes, or value propositions, provide a
window into why companies take action and how policies can
support the growth of climate friendly markets (See Box 1).
Incorporating these outcomes into short and long term goals can
help companies quantify the value of climate change activities.

POLICIES THAT SUPPORT BUSINESS ACTION
So, if companies can benefit – financially and otherwise –
by taking action on climate change, why aren’t they all lining up
for outcomes that improve their bottom line and the environment? For some, the initial costs, such as steep learning curves,
capital costs, and potential penalties for first movers, may seem
too high. For others, an aversion to risk or a failure to understand the market opportunities are factors. Simply put, all companies will not be affected equally by climate change action.
While some will thrive on new opportunities, others can at best
minimize risk.
Providing clear policy signals can help companies realize
return on investment, develop new technologies, or establish
long-term competitiveness, while reducing emissions. Also, utilizing market mechanisms can establish low-cost solutions
where companies take advantage of new business opportunities
related to environmental services. In addition, policies may provide unanticipated benefits, such as effective GHG management
systems that improve upon existing efforts.6

RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS
AS AN ACCELERATOR
Seventeen states have now adopted a “renewable portfolio
standard” (“RPS”) that requires electric power companies to use
SPRING 2005

increasing percentages of electricity produced from renewable
resources such as wind and solar, which do not emit GHGs.
These standards cover roughly 40 percent of U.S. electricity
supply, including large electricity markets in California, Texas,
and New York.7 An RPS can drive the creation of new renewable energy markets and diversify a state’s energy mix.
Texas, a state better known for oil than clean energy, passed
a renewable portfolio standard when restructuring energy utilities in 1999. The restructuring created room for new competitors
in the market, and with the addition of the RPS, renewable
energy became a viable business opportunity. In part due to the
state’s investment in “green” power and clear policy targets,
Texas is a leading provider of wind energy for the nation, supplying both residential and commercial markets.

CAP AND TRADE IN THE NORTHEAST U.S.
For policymakers, forward-thinking states often serve as
“incubators” for larger initiatives. This is well illustrated by the
successful nitrogen oxide (“NOX”) emissions trading program,
which began as regional legislation and was later adopted at a
national level. In the absence of federal action in the U.S. on climate change, state and regional initiatives are at the forefront of
climate change policy creation. The most developed regional
initiative is in the Northeast U.S., where nine states are working
together to create a “cap and trade” system.
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (“RGGI”) is
designed to manage carbon dioxide (“CO2”) emissions from
power plants within participating states through an interstate
emissions trading system. First, the states will set a limit on
allowed emissions. Then, regulated sources will be given permits to emit carbon. Companies that emit less than their
assigned permits can trade the excess permits to companies that
have higher abatement costs and therefore choose not to reduce
emissions.

New markets – partially
driven by regulatory
signals – are creating an
opportunity for clean
energy products and
services to thrive.
For companies operating in the Northeast, the RGGI creates
both challenges and opportunities. Compliance with RGGI may
increase energy prices, affecting downstream markets. But
businesses that effectively reduce energy use may reap a host of
benefits, including lower energy costs and increased competitive advantage in the face of wider regulation. The cap and trade
system allows cost-effective solutions to flourish and provides
companies with the flexibility to decide whether to make internal reductions or seek credits in the market.
10

BOX 1: TANGIBLE RETURNS AND INTANGIBLE BENEFITS11
Businesses create a GHG strategy by gauging tangible returns and intangible benefits. Anticipated
outcomes, or value propositions, are the indicators of a successful GHG program.

TANGIBLE RETURNS
• Climate-friendly projects yield a positive return on investment.
• New or enhanced products or services increase revenue, capture market share, and/or deliver
net income.
• Internal emissions-reduction projects allow for the sale of emissions reduction credits.
• Enhanced energy-conservation practices and fuel switching stabilize corporate energy use and
protect against energy price volatility.

INTANGIBLE BENEFITS
• Competitive positioning
• Low-carbon products or services improve the company’s position vis-à-vis its competitors.
• The public perceives the corporate brand as environmentally friendly, leading to improved
public relations.
• Strong environmental performance results in higher employee recruitment, retention, and
productivity.
• Shareholder-related benefits
• Shareholders drop climate resolutions as their conditions are satisfied.
• Investors perceive strong environmental performance as an indicator of superior business
management, resulting in a premium on the stock price and a lower cost for capital.
• The company’s stock is included in a specialized stock index, such as the Dow Jones
Sustainability Index, and is held by investment funds that track the index.
• The company receives higher stock ratings from “socially responsible investment” (“SRI”)
analysts, resulting in more stock purchases by SRI investors.
• Regulatory preparedness
• Company staff is trained to manage GHG emissions, thereby broadening the company’s
experience and enabling it to adapt more easily to future regulations.
• The company’s GHG emissions are at or below legal requirements at the time the GHG
regulations go into effect, thereby making compliance easier.
• A strong GHG management program gives the company greater credibility and thus a greater
voice in policy discussions and an opportunity to influence policy outcomes.
• Management benefits
• Coordination of GHG management across business units and jurisdictions improves
learning, identifies opportunities, leads to innovation, and offers unexpected efficiencies.
• The company is protected against potential class-action lawsuits related to corporate governance, specifically claiming breach of fiduciary responsibility for failing to manage GHG
emissions and their associated liabilities.

11
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UNANTICIPATED BENEFITS FROM THE EUROPEAN
UNION EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME
Companies operating in a carbon-constrained environment
may receive unanticipated benefits from voluntary or mandatory action. The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme
(“EU-ETS”) – the world’s largest greenhouse gas trading initiative – is designed to meet the E.U. commitments under the
Kyoto Protocol.8 Companies from six business sectors must
self-report emissions and undergo a third-party verification
process. For Pfizer, a leading pharmaceuticals company, complying with European emissions standards generated some
unexpected outcomes.
In 1993, Pfizer initiated a system to track its performance
toward an internal goal of a 35 percent reduction in emissions
per revenue dollar by 2007. Using web-based tools, the company gathered information from its facilities around the world.
This information was used to successfully identify over 600
energy efficiency projects and track total corporate emissions.
Under EU-ETS, four of the company’s facilities – located in the
U.K. – are required to obtain third-party emissions verification.
The verification system reinforces Pfizer’s corporate commitment to reporting and provides additional quality assurance.
Pfizer is now considering extending the verification system to
additional facilities outside of the E.U.9

POLICIES THAT INHIBIT BUSINESS ACTION
While business may face pressure from regulatory trends,
there can be high financial and other costs associated with taking action. Policymakers should be aware of these, especially in
the absence of any formal recognition. In fact, many of the lowcost, high-return GHG investments may be delayed in the face
of regulatory uncertainty. Sending clear signals to business with
short and long term policy commitments may help companies
overcome these limitations.

OVERCOMING INVESTMENT BARRIERS
FOR TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
Developed under the Kyoto Protocol, the Clean
Development Mechanism (“CDM”) is designed to aid technology transfer and provide needed emissions credits to nations
required to meet reductions targets. Under the CDM, emissions
reductions from clean or renewable energy projects are given a
market value in the form of “certified emissions reductions”
that can be sold by the energy producer to improve return on
investment. Through financing incentives that reduce the financial risk associated with high project costs, the CDM aims to
encourage investment by financiers and producers in new energy technologies in developing countries.
The CDM provides a growing opportunity for business to
engage in clean energy development while reducing investment
risks. Estimates suggest that given the average sellable credits
from current CDM projects, over 800 projects – a significant
increase – would need to be initiated to meet European demand.
This number increases to 1,700 when other Kyoto signatories
are included.10 As European companies invest in technology to
SPRING 2005

THE FINANCIAL SERVICE
INDUSTRY AND CLIMATE CHANGE:
INSURANCE AND REINSURANCE
By Cari Shiffman*
t the United Nations Institutional Investor
Summit on Climate Risk on November 21,
2003, institutional investors representing over
$1 trillion in invested capital met to address the financial
risks of global climate change.1 The discussions included the projected economic impacts of climate change and
the possible actions that investors could take in order to
address this risk in their portfolios.2 Harvard University
Professor John Holdren, speaking to the group on the
science of climate change, stressed that climate change is
“the most dangerous of all the environmental problems
caused by human activity.”3 Participants at the summit
called on institutional investors and the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission to take action to understand
and mitigate investor climate risk by requiring disclosure
and independent analyses of climate risk.4
Climate change is considered to be of particular
strategic business importance to insurance and reinsurance companies.5 As climate change poses an increasing
threat to human health, life and health insurance companies may begin to see a rise in demand for their services.6 While very few insurers have yet factored in climate
change-related risks when underwriting premiums and
deductibles,7 reinsurers have initiated qualitative sectorlevel impact analyses.8 Financial institutions and the
financial services industry, including insurers and
reinsurers, will likely continue to see a greater role in
addressing the impacts of climate change.9

A

* Cari Shiffman is a J.D. candidate, May 2007, at American University,
Washington College of Law.

ENDNOTES:
1United Nations, Institutional Investor Summit on Climate Risk, available at http://www.incr.com/summit_summary_report.pdf (last visited
Mar. 28, 2005).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 United Nations Environmental Programme (“UNEP”), CEO Briefing
on Climate Change tbl. 1, available at http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/CEO_briefing_climate_change_2002_en.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2005).
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 UNEP, supra note 5.
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bring operations into compliance, they will be poised to service
the technology need of this expanding market. And early
engagement will capitalize on the high-return energy projects,
such as landfill gas recovery and hydro-fluorocarbon
destruction.
Yet significant uncertainties remain, stilting the market’s
development. For developers and financiers, the uncertainty of
continued value for credits after the first phase of the Kyoto
Protocol in 2012 means that projects must come online quickly
and maximize sellable credits. Lead-time for construction and a
potentially lengthy approval process reduces the return on
investment. Long term policy signals are needed, or many projects will not attract financial capital.
For companies poised to develop projects or appropriate
technologies, the market demand for credits will impact profits.
Therefore, policies that leverage business must consistently
support the market. For example, the incentive to pursue CDM
projects is significantly weakened if energy efficiency, credit
trading, or joint implementation projects prove to be a less
expensive way to reduce emissions. In particular, the availability of excess credits from former Soviet countries that experienced emissions reductions due to economic decline could
undermine the market for project-based CDM offsets.

CONCLUSION
Curbing rising emissions trends requires a multifaceted,
coordinated effort, in which business leaders and policymakers
collaborate to drive change and reduce policy uncertainties. By
examining the relationship between regulation – or the threat of
regulation – and the value proposition for business to take action
on climate change, a number of key ideas emerge:
• Companies that take proactive steps on climate change can
offset some of the risks associated with regulation and create business opportunities.
• While the business case may be broadly tied to long-term
profitability, a company may anticipate specific benefits
and returns from its GHG program. These outcomes, or
value propositions, are indicators of a successful GHG program and strategy.
• Participating in mandatory or voluntary systems may identify unexpected benefits for engaged companies.
• Companies engaged in mandatory or voluntary schemes
may hold a competitive advantage over companies understanding and adapting to policy at a later time.
• Providing long-term regulatory certainty can provide incentives for business investment and stimulate new markets for
climate-protecting technologies.
• Climate change is a powerful example of how business can
create new market solutions to environmental problems.

ENDNOTES: Business and Climate Change
1

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, WORLD BUSINESS COUNCIL FOR
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, AND UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT
PROGRAMME, TOMORROW’S MARKETS: GLOBAL TRENDS AND THEIR
IMPLICATIONS FOR BUSINESS (2002).

5

2

6

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLE
ENERGY, available at http://www.eere.energy.gov/consumerinfo/tips/
comm_energy_use.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2005); see also U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, 1999 COMMERCIAL BUILDINGS ENERGY
CONSUMPTION SURVEY, DETAILED TABLES, ENERGY INFORMATION
ADMINISTRATION, available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cbecs/
detailed_tables_1999.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2005).
3

A. AULISI, J. LAYKE, AND S. PUTT DEL PINO, WORLD RESOURCES
INSTITUTE, A CLIMATE OF INNOVATION: NORTHEAST BUSINESS ACTION TO
REDUCE GREENHOUSE GASES (2004).
4

D. AUSTIN, N. ROSINSKI, A. SAUER, AND C. LE DUC, SUSTAINABLE ASSET
MANAGEMENT AND WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, CHANGING DRIVERS: THE
IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON COMPETITIVENESS AND VALUE CREATION IN
THE AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY (2003) [hereinafter Austin 2003]; see also D.
AUSTIN & A. SAUER, WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, CHANGING OIL:
EMERGING ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS AND SHAREHOLDER VALUE IN THE OIL
AND GAS INDUSTRY (2002) [hereinafter Austin 2002].

13

Austin 2002, supra note 4; see also A. SAUER, WORLD RESOURCES
INSTITUTE, TAKING THE (FUEL ECONOMY) HIGH ROAD: WHAT DO THE NEW
CHINESE FUEL ECONOMY STANDARDS MEAN FOR FOREIGN AUTOMAKERS?
(2005).
For further discussion of policies supporting business action, see PEW
CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, INNOVATIVE POLICY SOLUTIONS TO
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE (2005).
7 World Resources Institute, Figure based on calculation using U.S.
Department of Energy state energy consumption information (2005).
8

See PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, THE EUROPEAN UNION
EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME (EU-ETS): INSIGHTS AND OPPORTUNITIES
(2004).
9 Aulisi,

supra note 3.

10 PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE ACTIVITIES
IN THE

UNITED STATES: 2004 UPDATE (2004).

11 Aulisi,

supra note 3.

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY

COMMERCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE
CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME: WHO’S REGULATING WHOM?
By Stephen Tully*1
INTRODUCTION
ne corporate response to climate change is engaging
directly or indirectly with the intergovernmental
regime. Of the some six thousand registered
participants attending the tenth Conference of the Parties
(“COP”) of the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate
Change (“UNFCCC”) in Buenos Aires during 2004, over 560
individuals represented industry including 123 delegates accredited to the International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”). This
article considers the manner and extent to which corporations
initiate or prevent regulatory change at the international level
through the procedural lens of their participatory entitlements at
a COP. Part One reviews the applicable procedural rules governing access, attendance, and terms of corporate participation.
It also traces how the modalities for corporate participation have
evolved since 1992 in tandem with mutating corporate strategies. Part Two assesses the degree of regulatory change initiated by corporations in substantive and procedural terms and
characterizes the nature of their contribution against different
regulatory models. Part Three identifies several reasons
supporting the conclusion that engagement with intergovernmental negotiations as a strategic business opportunity can
prove to be impeded and ultimately unconstructive in the
context of climate change.

O

PART ONE: THE COMMERCIAL STRATEGY OF
PARTICIPATING IN REGULATORY DESIGN
Corporate responses to environmental regulation oscillate
between reactive and obstructionist strategies to proactive and
constructive approaches.2 This observation is also true in the
context of climate change.3 Companies seize commercial
opportunities, manage risk, minimize transaction costs, develop
environmentally-friendly products, compete against rivals, and
anticipate (or seek to influence) likely market developments.4
More specifically, management responses to rules that are
ambiguous, contradictory, and subject to rapid change range
between competition, avoidance, accommodation, collaboration, and compromise.5 The degree of corporate assertiveness
depends on what is at stake (assessable against individual corporate strategy, financial condition, or perception of urgency)
and relative leverage power (enhanced by forming coalitions
with like-minded protagonists, becoming indispensable, or
threatening withdrawal).
Non-market strategies at the national level include participating in regulatory design. Corporate officers are urged to
encourage the emergence of regulatory climates that are stable,
predictable, and conducive to investment.6 Political entrepreSPRING 2005

neurialism includes serving on government panels, providing
information, targeting receptive audiences, and molding commercial objectives around pre-existing political agendas. Access
to government officials enables agenda-setting and publicizing
an issue to increase the likelihood of inclusion in regulatory
development. Interestingly, large firms exploit their well-developed corporate image to build political capital for deployment
elsewhere, whereas more vulnerable firms pursue business
objectives from their new-found political legitimacy.7
In the cross-border context the strategic behavior of multinational corporations also includes regulatory engagement. This
is unsurprising since multilateral environmental agreements
are increasingly defining the scope of corporate liability.8
Furthermore, private sector participation in the climate change
context is expressly contemplated by each of the flexibility
mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol: international emissions trading between Annex 1 Parties (developed States) under
Article 17; investment in projects within Annex 1 Parties (joint
implementation) under Articles 3, 4, and 6; and investments by
Annex 1 Parties within non-Annex 1 Parties (developing States)
through the clean development mechanism (“CDMs”) of
Article 12.9 It has been observed that corporate political practices do not replicate those ordinarily utilized within the home
State but respond to the immediate political environment.10 The
manner and visibility of corporate political activity will therefore adapt to the particular institutional characteristics of intergovernmental fora. However, the proposition that corporations
initiate intergovernmental regulatory development presupposes
that they enjoy favorable terms of access and inclusion. A
review of the modalities for observer participation at COPs suggests only limited opportunities to formally contribute.

THE MODALITIES FOR CORPORATE PARTICIPATION
IN THE UNFCCC PROCESS
It is axiomatic that only heads of government, diplomats,
and other accredited representatives may express the formal
consent of States to be bound to conventional instruments.11
This does not preclude non-State actors from participating in
COPs as observers. Observers are “willing to provide meaningful contributions to the climate change process and to enhance
the engagement by civil society in the pursuit of sustainable
development.”12 The formal arrangements for observer participation involve a prior accreditation process and the modalities
for participating at the COP itself.
* Stephen Tully, formerly B.P. Postdoctoral Fellow of the ESRC Centre for the
Analysis of Risk and Regulation and of the Law Department, London School of
Economics and Political Science, United Kingdom, specializes in issues relating
to corporations under public international law.
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The Accreditation Process
Article 7(6) of the UNFCCC contemplates national or international non-governmental bodies or agencies “qualified in matters covered by the Convention” being represented at COPs as
observers unless one-third of States Parties object.13 Observers
must be relevantly competent or broadly representative of a
group interested in the topic of climate change. UNFCCC
accreditation is a continuous process with 834 non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”)
admitted as observers to date.14
Those already in consultative
status with the United Nations
(“U.N.”) are automatically
accredited without further
screening.
Although
the
UNFCCC secretariat initially
evaluates applications, admission is without prejudice to
subsequent COP decisions.
Applicants provide official
documentation describing the
scope of their mandate, governing structure, evidence of nonprofit (tax exempt) status,
activities demonstrating their
competence, affiliation details,
funding sources, publications, and designated contact points.
The non-profit criterion is partly irrelevant since a legitimate purpose of politically-organized business is to defend and
advance the interests of enterprises they represent. For example,
the International Climate Change Partnership represents chemical companies, the American Petroleum Institute represents U.S.
oil companies, and the World Energy Council represents energy
and utility interests. Although participating through politicallyorganized business groups usefully distances corporations from
political negotiations, it also poses several disadvantages (considered further below). Nonetheless, the Subsidiary Body for
Implementation (“SBI”) concluded that “the current arrangements for the accreditation of NGOs were satisfactory, and that
no change in the accreditation procedures was required.”15

missions. Rule 7(2) of the procedural rules provides that
“observers may, upon invitation of the President, participate
without the right to vote in the proceedings of any session in
matters of direct concern to the body or agency they represent,
unless at least one third of the Parties present at the session
object.” Observers do not enjoy voting rights nor have they
called for them, particularly if this entails responsibility to
implement decisions taken.
For the orderly conduct of
proceedings, the prior permission of the COP President is
required under Rule 32 before
individuals may speak. Although
priority for oral interventions is
accorded to States there is no
obligation to balance statements
from other speakers. Observers
address the COP for three minutes at the conclusion of the
final plenary session. The ICC
typically appoints a representative from the local chamber of
commerce to act as spokesperson. Although this opportunity
is jealously safeguarded by
observers, such interventions are
neither useful nor effective since decisions have already been
made and there is no opportunity for meaningful dialogue. Only
as recently as COP 9 were observers permitted to make
interventions on substantive agenda items during the plenary
session.
Under Rule 30 COP meetings are ordinarily public, and
although meetings of the two UNFCCC subsidiary bodies (the
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice,
“SBSTA,” and the SBI) are designated as private, this does not
preclude participation by duly accredited observers. However,
attendance can be unproductive and uninformative given
diplomatic posturing and limited time. Meetings closed to
observers include press briefings given by national delegations
and more importantly meetings of intergovernmental groups
other than convention bodies. UNFCCC expert group meetings
are ordinarily closed to observers and although there has not
been any demand for informal contact between them, expert
groups may draw upon additional expertise on an ad hoc basis
as deemed necessary.
Observers may also produce written statements in the
nature of reports and position or issue papers in U.N. languages
at their own expense. Although their content is not screened,
documents may only be displayed at designated locations, cannot promote products or services, and samples must be deposited with the secretariat. Under Rule 36 formal proposals are
introduced in writing by State Parties and distributed to delegations through the secretariat. Observer submissions when
solicited by governments are reproduced through the internet
and do not constitute official U.N. documents. By this route

Infusing commercial
perspectives can facilitate
or impede orderly regime
development by
extenuating the common
or disparate economic
interests of States.

Formal Modalities for Observer Participation
Observer participation at a COP is circumscribed by a primary enabling provision located within the UNFCCC text, secondary rules of procedure, and relevant governing body decisions. Article 7(2)(l) of the UNFCCC provides that COPs shall
“seek and utili[z]e, where appropriate, the services and co-operation of, and information provided by, competent…non-governmental bodies.” Observer participation is more specifically proscribed by procedural rules. The UNFCCC envisages that the
COP will adopt these rules at its first session.16 However, COP
1 was unable to do so and provisional rules have since been
applied.17
The procedural rules contemplate two modalities for formal
participation by observers: oral interventions and written sub15
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observers can propose textual suggestions on individual agenda
items or draft decisions.18
Although receiving objective information is a costless
means for governments to increase their knowledge base provided the volume is manageable, it is also a significant lobbying
technique. Just as there is no right or expectation for observers
to produce written submissions, so too is there no attendant obligation upon governments to consider their content. Influence
thus depends upon a credible reputation for producing balanced
proposals possessing intrinsic merit above author self-interest.
Observers undermine their stature by presenting unreliable data,
making exaggerated claims, or misjudging public opinion.
Observer practices are also regularized by governing body
decisions. The COP decided that observers may also attend
open-ended (that is, open to all States) contact group meetings
unless one third of State Parties present object.19 This is with
the understanding that proceedings can be closed at any time.
Such a decision marks a departure from orthodox U.N. practice
insofar as informal meetings are ordinarily closed to accredited
observers. The COP also decided that observers enjoy a right of
access to all official documentation unless the relevant body
determines otherwise.20 This is consistent with the SBI instructing “the secretariat to proceed with…activities, within the available resources…[for]… improving the availability of documentation and information to NGOs.”21

Managing Observer Participation in Practice
Finally, the modalities for observer participation at a COP
evolve by accretion based upon experimentation and prior experience. This includes the practice of States, the UNFCCC secretariat, and observers.
State Parties under Rule 17 are represented by heads of delegation “and such other accredited representatives, alternate
representatives and advisers as it may require.” Observers may
be appointed to national delegations to act in a general advisory
capacity or to negotiate specific points. States enjoy the widest
possible freedom of appointment, particularly where specialized
technical matters require enlisting experts possessing the necessary training and experience.22 European practice permits corporate officers to act as experts or consultants and exceptionally as head of delegation.23 Comparable U.S. guidelines envisage
that private sector representatives may not speak on behalf of
the government but may explain factual details where competent to do so for promoting national objectives.24 Industry assistance may be offered to governments to prepare oral interventions delivered during plenary sessions or intergovernmental
debates. For example, the Global Climate Coalition (“GCC”)
advised the Saudi Arabian, Kuwaiti, and Russian governments,
purportedly to obstruct political deliberations and weaken the
language of scientific reports.25
The UNFCCC secretariat has formulated guidelines concerning observer participation at COPs “reflecting current practice” and “in line with those governing NGO participation at
sessions of other bodies in the UN system.”26 Contemporary
practices include briefing observers, conducting information
sessions outlining substantive negotiation issues, allocating
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office space, and arranging meetings with senior delegates.27 To
facilitate COP proceedings the secretariat also commissions
work or expertise, exchanges information, and identifies suitable observer representatives to participate in panel discussions.
Secretariat practices are fluid and incremental: once privileges
are secured by observers they must be safeguarded since they
can be withdrawn without, notice particularly if abused.
The UNFCCC secretariat employs a constituency system
that differentiates between research and independent NGOs
(“RINGOs”), business and industry NGOs (“BINGOs”), environmental NGOs (“ENGOs”), local NGOs, indigenous peoples
organizations (“IPOs”), local government and municipal authorities (“LGMAs”), islanders, trade unions, and faith-based
groups. Participation in constituency groups is not official or
binding and does not preclude direct secretariat communication.
Designated focal points (for example, the ICC for BINGOs) act
as conduits to ensure effective observer participation by providing logistical support, identifying attendance demand, and
recruiting qualified individuals. Although the constituency
channel usefully structures observer participation, it inaccurately pools distinctive groups, can ignore differences of opinion,
and obfuscates overlapping membership.
The terms of observer participation, as formally defined by
the procedural rules with the accretions of State and secretariat
practices, provide an important platform legitimating attendance
and activity at COPs. However, several informal techniques do
not depend upon these foundations for their effectiveness.
Observer techniques also include lobbying, submitting proposals, organizing side-events, and raising issues for resolution.28
Additional modalities for observer participation include participating in workshops or panel discussions, conducting constituency meetings, and information gathering or dissemination.
For example, roundtables are an informal means for identifying the capacities, mandate, expectations, experiences, and
constraints of others. Although participation occurs on conditions approximating equality, meaningful dialogue need not
eventuate, since interventions are limited by time and depend
upon the Chairperson’s discretion. Furthermore, senior corporate executives assess attendance against other business
demands notwithstanding their considerable economic credentials and readiness, or otherwise to make commitments. The
UNFCCC secretariat has thus been pressing governments
towards more innovative formats which produce open, frank,
and spontaneous discussion.
The current practice for attendance and participation at
inter-sessional workshops and limited-membership bodies is by
invitation only and may be closed to observers when confidential matters are discussed.29 Constituency groups employ their
own selection procedures to identify representatives and bear
their own expenses. The challenge for governments is to promote transparency and observer participation (balanced geographically and by mandate) while safeguarding operational
efficiency and effectiveness (as determined by purpose, interest,
and available resources). For example, the U.S. objected to one
observer allocation by the UNFCCC secretariat which “clearly
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favored” representatives of companies that were members of the
ICC, “an umbrella organi[z]ation that is not fully representative
of our private sector.”30 SBI guidance instructs chairpersons to
tailor the number of observers to the nature of the workshop and
for the secretariat to improve the timeliness of distributing notifications and non-confidential documents, including through
web-based publications.31
To summarize, the formal conditions for observer admission to and participation at COPs critically depend upon State
consent.32 Observers only possess a legitimate expectation in
most respects and do not possess many rights that are opposable
against governments.33 That said, under Rule 8 duly-accredited
observers are entitled to receive notification of forthcoming
COPs and proposed agenda items.34 However, this does not
guarantee admission and negotiations strictly remain a matter
for States Parties. This is evidenced by the procedural rules,
governing or subsidiary body decisions, and the role of discretion exercised by individual Chairpersons. Contemporary practices concerning observer participation within the UNFCCC
process are a leading illustration of U.N.-civil society engagement and as such are subject to ongoing refinement. COPs
typically invite observers to play an active role in deliberations,
recognize the desirability of information exchange, and indicate
a willingness to consider submissions. How then do corporations seek to engage with intergovernmental negotiators on
climate change?

CORPORATE STRATEGIES FOR ENGAGEMENT
Corporate strategies for engaging with the UNFCCC spring
initially from intergovernmental negotiations for protecting the
ozone layer if not earlier. This is unsurprising given the presence
of repeat players such as the Alliance for a Responsible
Atmospheric Policy.35 A brief overview of the historiography of
the Vienna Convention and Montreal Protocol ostensibly
demonstrates “the crucial role played by industry in developing
and implementing international environmental policy.”36

Corporate Coalitions
(and Fragmenting Industry Opinion)
Similarly observed in the context of climate change, producers initially sought to refute existing scientific opinion
through extensive lobbying and media campaigns. This tactic
was abandoned following intergovernmental scientific assessments which concluded that human activity contributed to
ozone layer depletion.37 Indeed, one U.K. firm had been officially reprimanded for employing discredited language.38 The
European chemical industry’s attempts to block international
regulation were abandoned with the adoption of the Montreal
Protocol.39 European governments also initially had espoused
industry opinion concerning scientific uncertainty, non-viable
product substitution, and lower living standards,40 an interesting
contrast to their leadership aspirations in the climate change
context.
In a similar fashion the GCC financed advertising campaigns, commissioned reports and recruited scientists, think
tanks, and public relations firms. In its view, measures to curb
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greenhouse gas emissions “are premature and are not justified
by the state of scientific knowledge or the economic risks they
create.”41 This strategy emphasized the undesirable opportunity
costs associated with mitigation or adaptation and highlighted
disparities between States. The GCC predicted increased energy
costs, unemployment, and declining economic growth.42 More
recently it points to the lack of universal participation by States
as limiting the environmental effectiveness of the UNFCCC.43
These strategies were not universally supported by industry.
Indeed, one may speculate whether fragmenting industry opinion prompted the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol. The U.S.
Council for International Business had urged the U.S. government to consult with it prior to ratification.44 A $13 million
media campaign sought to bolster North American opposition.45
However, the failure of several members of the U.S. Business
Roundtable to secure a more moderate advertising text underscored divisions within industry. Although the U.S. Business
Roundtable subsequently endorsed the U.S. government’s decision not to ratify, the ICC envisaged continuing business participation, particularly by European firms.46 In fact, the ICC was
represented at Kyoto by a one-hundred-member delegation.47
So too will the GCC “continue offering assistance to international policymakers.”48 However, its declining credibility as
the singular voice of industry was marked by the withdrawal of
several prominent members between 1997 and 2000. The
newly-established Business Environmental Leadership Council
of the Pew Center on Global Climate Change became an alternative vehicle for presenting commercial perspectives. It also
permitted a volte-face on the emerging scientific consensus and
enabled its members to reposition themselves as offering constructive solutions to climate change questions. The latter is
consistent with business views that sustainable development
offers commercial opportunities.49
Furthermore, the critical participatory role occupied by corporations in the sustainable development context is sought to be
linked to and replicated within the UNFCCC process. Business
and industry as a “major group” of civil society participates in
deliberations of the U.N. Commission on Sustainable
Development to formulate and implement common policy
approaches.50 The ICC believes that climate change “is inextricably linked to the pursuit of a sustainable future.”51 The World
Business Council for Sustainable Development (“WBCSD”)
also acknowledges that “it is prudent for business to play its part
by looking for ways to reduce emissions of those gases.”52
Framing issues in sustainable development terms therefore
broadens the political appeal of its climate change position
statements.53

The Use (and Abuse) of Science
The ozone layer negotiations also indicated that technical
scientific critiques can be a useful procedural tool to facilitate
entry. For example, in 1995 the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (“IPCC”) identified a discernable human influence upon the global climate.54 Alleging that contributing
authors had excluded elements of dissension or scientific uncertainty, the GCC criticized the lack of transparency as to how
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comments on IPCC drafts were taken into account.55 Although
the U.S. was among those that defended the IPCC’s integrity,
subsequent changes to the review process opened up the reporting process to corporate actors.
An emphasis on sound science can be employed substantively to demand a high burden of proof before regulatory
measures are adopted. For this reason, elements of the business
community supports the precautionary principle. Orthodox risk
management techniques provide a ready alternative to command
and control regulation56 since scientifically derived standards
limit the potential for political arbitrariness in governmental
decision-making.57 A scientific rather than political basis for
identifying carbon emission stabilization targets could also
more accurately take into account natural sources. The application of the precautionary principle moreover affords reputational assurances of environmentally-sound business practices and
enforcement thereof can eliminate uncompetitive rivals.58
Promoting greater resort to voluntary initiatives is also consistent with anti-regulatory objectives.59
That the procedural agenda-forcing power of expert groups
can counter the substantive decision-making power of COPs is
also observable within the UNFCCC process. The technical
expertise marshaled by industry enables representatives to participate in expert working groups underpinning negotiations,
monitor developments, and ensure that commercial perspectives
are accurately understood. For example, the International
Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association
(“IPIECA”) attends IPCC plenary sessions, participates in
expert workshops, publishes joint reports with the U.N.
Environmental Programme, and organizes intergovernmental
symposia.60 It also recruited corporate officers to meet the
IPCC’s call for a stronger industry presence when preparing
technical reports.61 However, attracting industry interest may
prove more problematic than competency criteria.
The UNFCCC secretariat similarly seeks to draw business
into its work program. Close relationships tend to be formed
with well-established business groups who offer more stable
participation. Corporate experts occupy temporary positions to
share experiences and in turn acquire familiarity with its institutional performance. The secretariat’s effectiveness turns upon
budgetary arrangements and decision-making time-frames.
Lessons could also be learned from the Global Environmental
Facility (“GEF”), which also solicits financial management
expertise from corporate officers.62 The GEF secretariat cooperates with commercial interests with a view to executing projects in the most efficient and cost-effective manner.63 However,
private sector roles have been limited to public procurement or
advisory responsibilities on account of bureaucratic inertia and
information disclosure requirements.64 Furthermore, the firms
recruited to construct operational capacity for newly-privatized
industries are predominantly drawn from North America
and Europe.65

Adaptation and Activism
One corporate strategy common to negotiations concerning
ozone depletion and climate change has been for user and proSPRING 2005

ducer industries to insist that proposed reduction schedules
accommodate adaptation. Phase-out programs should respect
normal product and equipment lifetimes since overly strict
timetables impose costly transition periods before full values
have been realized. However, Du Pont demonstrated the advantages arising from pragmatic engagement as a “first mover” by
breaking ranks with resistant business elements that were experiencing declining negotiating influence at that time. It proposed
voluntarily phasing-out chlorofluorocarbon (“CFC”) production
ahead of intergovernmental schedules notwithstanding that
“neither the marketplace nor regulatory policy…has provided
the needed incentives” to justify the necessary investment for
developing substitutes.66
Although by no means committing itself to a comparable
extent, British Petroleum (“BP”) is credited with being the first
oil industry firm to acknowledge the case for adopting precautionary measures notwithstanding scientific uncertainty.
This strategy is properly appreciated in light of government signals that hardened industry opposition. In particular, the U.S.
government abandoned voluntary approaches in favor of legally-binding arrangements, and more importantly, invited private
sector contributions in crafting market-based mechanisms. A
strategy of constructive engagement enhances prestige, secures
consumer recognition for “progressive” environmental leadership, offers opportunities to influence outcomes, and better prepares firms when the inevitable regulation becomes effective.
Both case studies “suggest that international environmental
treaties require the assent of major affected industries” as
preconditions for their effectiveness.67 Differences in the regulatory evolution of these two regimes have been attributed to
clearer scientific evidence and the ready availability of alternatives with respect to ozone depletion. Business transformed
from outright opposition to supporting CFC production controls, since the concentrated nature of industry and accompanying market incentives enabled an orderly transition to substitute
products. The climate change context by contrast is associated
with relatively greater and more widely dispersed economic
impacts where the financial commitments, applicable timeframes, and investment risks deter interest in alternatives.

General versus Specific Politically-Organized
Business Groups
A further distinction is the proliferation of politicallyorganized business groups and their diverse role within climate
change negotiations. The ICC, as the most prominent corporate
actor, fulfils advocacy, facilitative, and corrective functions.
First, it supports the UNFCCC process provided that business is
recognized as part of the solution.68 This includes “the opportunity to contribute to rule making by providing information and
views”69 such as substantive proposals on selected items of
interest.70 The ICC seeks to accurately portray the views of its
member federations to national delegations, which in practice
reflects “mainstream” (albeit predominantly European) industry
opinion. ICC statements are also endorsed by trade associations,
national chambers of commerce and industry, and individual
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firms. To formulate common business messages the ICC solicits sector contributions across a range of issues and subsequently coordinates their distribution. It also organizes BINGO interventions during high-level ministerial sessions and regularly
conducts side events with the UNFCCC secretariat and the
Expert Group on Technology Transfer. BINGO presentations
are also conducted jointly with one or more governments.
Second, the ICC performs a service function by enabling
firms to undertake more effective interventions during a COP.
BINGO meetings review prior developments, identify likeminded delegations, assess the state of negotiations and highlight forthcoming events. The facilitative function also includes
identifying appropriately qualified representatives to participate
on panel discussions and arranging private meetings between
governments and national industries attending a COP. The ICC
additionally prepares detailed accounts of national positions71
to enable informed lobbying by its members.72
Third, the ICC ensures that national delegations espouse
perspectives consistent with positions assumed in other U.N.
fora and prior national determinations. It moreover signals the
economic viability of proposals from a practical commercial
perspective by reminding governments of probable market
impacts and corrects misinformation within industry.
National or trade-specific industry associations exercise
several functions at a COP on behalf of their non-attending
members. These include recruitment, monitoring political deliberations, advocacy (raising issues for intergovernmental resolution), education (providing scientific or policy advice), research
(identifying best commercial practice), and marketing (promoting voluntary mitigation measures to governments or advertising upcoming trade fairs). National trade associations enjoy
close working arrangements with State delegations such as private briefings during a COP on account of routine national level
engagement. Although they can create “noise” around particular
issues, trade associations are unable to assume commitments
without prior conferral with their membership. National anticompetition law moreover limits the degree of cooperation and
information exchange.
Ad hoc or permanent corporate coalitions represent one or
more economic sectors and promote single or multiple issues.
Sponsoring firms in effect purchase time slots during promotional side-events to showcase voluntary corporate initiatives
for tackling carbon emissions, demonstrating research and
development activity, and highlighting cost reduction measures.
Finally, partnerships and strategic alliances may be established
with ENGOs to pursue their mutual interest in influencing international environmental policy. Deriving the assumed social
legitimacy of ENGOs also demonstrates good corporate citizenship.73 Collaboration may additionally facilitate technological
development: for example, “hydrocarbons have made a remarkable penetration in the domestic refrigeration market, partly
because of their support and promotion by NGOs.”74 The question for present purposes is whether these multiple arrangements
are effective in initiating regulatory change.
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PART TWO: ASSESSING AND CHARACTERIZING
REGULATORY INITIATIVES FROM THE
PRIVATE SECTOR
The “new diplomacy” of intergovernmental environmental
negotiations is reputedly characterized by novel procedures75
and the participation of non-State actors including corporations.76 The comparative analysis of Part One above indicated
that infusing commercial perspectives can facilitate or impede
orderly regime development by extenuating the common or disparate economic interests of States. Do the strategic developments suggest that corporations are attempting to regulate governmental behavior and circumvent the self-evident procedural
constraints? If one accepts commercial contributions, does that
make the climate change regime ultimately self-regulatory or
are politically-organized business groups predominantly located
within industrialized States effectively regulating smaller firms
and/or Southern companies? To what extent does regulatory
adaptation by firms correlate with treaty implementation by
governments? This Part argues that the benevolent or malign
implications of regulatory initiatives emanating from the private
sector depend upon the perceived governmental role in designing environmental policy, which regulatory model is employed,
and how its products are correspondingly characterized.

ASSESSING CORPORATE CONTRIBUTIONS
The initial task is accurately elucidating the degree of commercial influence over the regulatory outcome. “The problem of
causality looms large when trying to isolate the influence of one
set of actors from that of others.”77 Although governments are
encouraged to solicit the maximum possible input from
observers to enrich deliberations, there is no assurance that voluntary contributions will be reflected in the final product.
Academic attention has devoted particular attention to the
ENGO role within climate change negotiations.78 Interestingly,
ENGOs have themselves conceded that governments may be
unresponsive to observer activism.79
An analytical framework for linking participation with the
degree of observer influence has been formulated.80 “Influence”
is defined as the intentional transmission of information by
observers and behavioral alterations in response by governments. The former is evidenced by observer activity (for example, lobbying, agenda setting, submitting written, and oral information), access (participatory terms of attendance or providing
advice), and resources (sources of leverage including knowledge, extent of support, and particular role). Behavioral
alterations by governments are evidenced both procedurally (to
what extent did observers participate?) and substantively (were
observer goals actually attained as evaluated against the final
negotiating outcome?).81
Procedurally speaking, the private sector has contributed to
the climate change debate from the outset. Mr. Maurice Strong,
then-CEO of a Canadian electric utility, was Secretary-General
for the U.N. Conference on Environment and Development in
Rio during 1992. The preparatory process encouraged equitable
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observer representation from developed and developing countries including a fair balance between those with an environmental focus and those having a sustainable development agenda.82 The ICC formulated an environmental management code
of conduct and the WBCSD was established to promote selfregulation by industry. Observer representatives could be
appointed to national delegations and, in accordance with U.N.
practice, oral interventions were at the discretion of
Chairpersons.83 Over one thousand firms participated with
around forty engaged in a broad range of activity.84 The ICC
responded positively to Agenda 21,85 particularly since it sought
to enhance formal participatory procedures “for the involvement
of [NGOs] at all levels from policy-making and decisionmaking to implementation.”86

Diverse commercial
perspectives overwhelm
intergovernmental
deliberations with
complexity, forestall
regulatory progress, and
render public policy
imperatives irrelevant.
Substantively the corporate impact upon intergovernmental
negotiations cannot be discerned from official documents.
Notwithstanding the sentiment of Agenda 21, COP reports continue to emphasize State-centric decision-making and observer
contributions are only recognized en passant. One roundtable
report, for example, identified the “catalytic role governments
play” and the “importance of the private sector was acknowledged.”87 Similarly, the SBSTA welcomed an exchange of
views with industry during pre-sessional consultations, invited
continued cooperation by industry with the Expert Group on
Technology Transfer, and envisaged industry participation in
sector-specific workshops.88 The SBI additionally foresaw
developing risk transfer mechanisms in conjunction with
insurance firms.89
It is entirely plausible that the commercial influence is
overstated given the existing cacophony of disparate voices.
BINGOs constantly question the effectiveness by which their
messages are communicated to and received by governments.
Firms raise issues for consideration, direct agendas, and cajole
governments but final outcomes may be unpredictable or important decisions deferred. Experienced corporate participants are
uncertain whether deliberate strategies succeed or whether
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governments were merely receptive at that time. Conversely
BINGOs are wary of assuming commitments that are properly
matters of State responsibility and volunteering information
which may be ignored, filtered, or misused. Governments could
be exploiting their interest and expertise when soliciting information on how observer activities could contribute to intergovernmental processes.90 Consultation can be tokenistic or selective with industry contributions limited to presenting information on technological developments to IPCC workshops or
expert meetings. Nonetheless BINGOs seek to make their contribution meaningful: informal meetings during each COP identify issues around which business opinion has coalesced, share
experiences, and discuss topics of common concern. Although
the prediction that European businesses are more environmentally aware than U.S. firms is not universally apparent, the
climate change scenario “best fits the stereotype of a transatlantic divide.”91

CHARACTERIZING CORPORATE CONTRIBUTIONS
This article proposes that assessing commercial contributions to international regulatory development depends upon
which regulatory model is sought to be applied. Part One above
observed that corporate political practices tend to conform to
local regulatory styles. For example, the relatively pluralist U.S.
political system is perceived to be more amenable to interest
group pressures. However, it need not be any more adversarial
than the European Commission (“E.C.”) system, as illustrated
by the successful lobbying of European firms against a carbon
tax. The orthodox command and control approach suggests that
imposing environmental standards is likely to engender resistance, in which case the regulatory response is avoidance by target groups, and regulatory initiatives by them are characterized
as obstructive.

PROMOTING REGULATORY
OR HARMONIZATION?

COMPETITION

The converse of the adversarial model of regulation – the
regulatory competition model – recognizes that environmental
regulation can spur industrial performance as a source of
comparative advantage.92 Regulatory innovation and targeted
intervention by “pioneer” environmental policymakers can
create lead markets for national firms and profitable export
opportunities.93 Regulation is a driver in the commercial selfinterest since it pushes industry towards technological innovation, encourages the development and commercialization of
alternative products or production processes, and establishes
novel service sectors. The waste disposal industry, for example,
is supported by regulatory measures concerning pollution control.94 Governments deliberately develop local specialities and
incidentally increase economic growth and taxation revenue.
The regulatory competition model transposed to the international context entails greater inter-sectoral competition characterizing intergovernmental bargaining insofar as governments
allocate gains and losses. The pertinent question is “who will be
the winners and losers” in the transition towards a less carbonintensive global economy.95 Economic sectors promote their
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particular production speciality (whether it is fossil fuel,
nuclear, hydropower, wind, or solar energy sources) as preferred
policy solutions. The International Gas Union, for example, promotes natural gas as a readily-available fuel alternative associated with reduced carbon emissions.96 The ICC argues that multilateral decision-making should not cherry-pick “winners and
losers” by conferring legally-embedded competitive advantages
to particular technologies, production processes, or economic
sectors and thereby subverting market forces. Industries moreover compete for favorable treatment by way of subsidies or
exemptions. For example, the U.K. government offers incentive
payments to participating firms in its emissions trading
scheme.97 It is similarly argued that taxpayer-sponsored initiatives in pilot programs and demonstration studies are warranted
so that renewable energy sources become competitive in terms
of cost and reliability with conventional fossil fuels.
National perspectives can accordingly be appreciated in
light of their structural dependence upon particular economic
sectors and principal sources of energy supply. Industry groups
opposed to strict emission controls are naturally aligned with
those States that consume or export fossil fuels. Their regulatory initiatives involve the joint pursuit of mutually-shared
negotiating objectives. Lobbying by industry becomes superfluous since there is solidarity with home or host States.98
Governments reciprocate by recognizing national firms for their
voluntary environmental effort and provide technical assistance
for completing greenhouse gas inventories. Corporations also
contribute to regulatory diffusion by promoting the national regulatory framework with which they are most accustomed. Its
adoption as the agreed international legal framework re-directs
the basis for competition, appropriates market share from
rivals, facilitates capital access, and re-allocates regulatory
adaptation costs.
For example, the Australian government has concluded that
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol “is not in Australia’s national
interest.”99 Although arguments for and against ratification are
evenly balanced, the fossil fuel industry is understandably reluctant to relinquish its global leadership in and dependency upon
producing energy and energy intensive products. The Australian
renewable energy sector unsuccessfully argues that ratification
is necessary “to build the next generation of core industries and
to help traditional industries maintain competitiveness in a global marketplace that is increasingly ascribing sustainability principles to development and trade.”100 That said, the government
is voluntarily committed to meeting its Kyoto target and has initiated a range of greenhouse gas abatement programs.
Australian companies have similarly established emissions
reduction targets to maintain their market position and preserve
trading opportunities, possibly in anticipation of the unsheltered
competition associated with eventual ratification.
That the regulatory competition model may pose undesirable consequences is reflected in the threat of migration by energy-intensive industries to havens offering regulatory relief.101
Companies extract an “unfair” competitive advantage through
lower regulatory compliance costs free from comparable legal
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constraints. The variable progress of States Party to the Kyoto
Protocol, non-Parties, and Parties voluntarily exceeding their
commitments “call into question whether an international
framework approach based on binding, differentiated, and
absolute emission reduction targets can effectively marshal a
sustained global response to climate change concerns.”102 NonParty status may be one means for governments to attract
inward investment and enable economic growth. However,
commercial activity outside the formal regulatory regime is a
short term solution on account of legal uncertainty, restricted
access to resource markets, and exclusion from trading opportunities. Systematic cost-benefit assessments of the competitive
impacts arising from regulatory policies are desirable for
improving political decision-making. State Parties either downgrade regulatory stringency where legally permissible or
encourage non-Parties to assume binding commitments.
The advantages of a level competitive playing field for
firms underlie the regulatory harmonization model. Universal
participation by States maximizes the geographical scope and
liquidity of markets, simplifies cross-border procedures, and
reduces regulatory compliance costs for all.103 Furthermore,
uniform implementation and enforcement prevent un-innovative rivals from undermining conventional regimes and may
ultimately lead to their demise through elimination or acquisition. Commercial contributions to regulatory development
become cost-effective since they obviate lobbying for identical
results within each national jurisdiction. However, the corporate
interest in regulatory harmonization is not unlimited. In particular, industry espouses the free choice of means principle concerning the mode of implementation: all technological options
should remain open with decisions left to host States in light of
local conditions and in conjunction with business consultation.
Relevant to the regulatory harmonization model is that legal
predictability is frequently emphasized by firms as a precondition to foreign direct investment.104 Regulatory uncertainty is a
barrier to business participation when implementing conventional regimes since firms lack the confidence to engage in longterm investment planning.105 Operational requirements have
lifetimes and cost-recovery considerations extending beyond the
first commitment period. Although the Kyoto Protocol calls for
subsequent commitments by Annex 1 Parties to be considered
during 2005, it does not proscribe their nature, commencement,
and duration or specify obligations for Non-Annex 1 Parties.
Governments understandably do not wish to foreclose policy
options. However, the absence of detailed information unsettles
business since decisions concerning technology, siting, permitting, access, and infrastructure must be made now to secure an
acceptable cost, quality, and availability of future energy supplies.106 The immediacy of answering these investment questions fortuitously coincides with the environmental urgency of
addressing climate change. However, the legitimate interest of
firms to limit commercial risks cannot justify inordinate regulatory predictability just as the governmental responsibility for
economic growth must respect the business function of identifying opportunities and threats.
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The regulatory competition and regulatory harmonization
models both suggest a degree of industry-government collaboration for identifying appropriate economic incentives. The coregulation model formalizes this close cooperation between
government authorities and target industries in regulatory
design. European environmental policy formulation is noteworthy for relatively greater resort to consensus-building, voluntary
industry agreements, and negotiated outcomes.107 The preferences of the European Business Roundtable, for example, are
reciprocally expected to be taken into account by European
governments.108
States and corporations are expected to jointly implement
international environmental law “to the extent they are able.”109
Joint collaboration satisfies legal obligations for governments
and enables firms to secure competitive advantages within international markets.110 The political objective of effective treaty
implementation at the national level thereby converges with the
commercial goal of minimizing operational disruption. The
effectiveness and political acceptability of environmental agreements at the national level depends upon support from the
corporate constituency. By this reasoning industry is entitled to
prior participation in intergovernmental negotiations since
exclusion renders subsequent implementation more difficult
given likely non-compliance.111
Although intergovernmental negotiations arise in the context of pre-existing economic conditions, permitting incremental regulatory adaptation by industry should not dictate the
sequencing of regulatory implementation by governments.
Public policy objectives are achievable through contractual
mechanisms.112 Designing international environmental regulation as a market-enabling regime can be expected to draw corporate support.113 In their joint efforts to construct robust and
credible markets, both governments and firms are engaged in
ongoing processes of organizational self-learning to smooth
transition periods.
For example, governments and firms seek to acquire experience with emissions trading as a novel form of environmental
regulation. Several firms engaged in voluntary experimentation
by developing intra-corporate schemes before formal regulatory
arrangements were instituted.114 The International Emissions
Trading Association (“IETA”) has particularly espoused a bullish approach.115 It has identified points of regulatory uncertainty such as whether emissions reduction units constitute recognizable property rights or whether national courts are able to
provide cost-effective dispute resolution.116 By monitoring
CDM decision-making, IETA can employ regulatory familiarity
to attract potential clients to the traders and brokers it represents.117 Observers attend meetings of the CDM Executive
Board in a nearby listening room and respond to calls for substantive or procedural input.118 IETA also drafted standardized
contracts to streamline commercial negotiations and reduce
transaction costs.119
The result reflected at COPs is that regional, national, or
intra-national emissions trading regimes are promoted by governments in conjunction with industry experts. Attempts to court
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prospective market entrants involve government-backed
schemes claiming commercial credibility. Industry groups analyze each scheme and call for further refinement, particularly
where participatory conditions confer advantages upon local
firms.120 To increase market size IETA further proposed linking
emissions trading regimes.121
An illuminating contrast is that firms with investment projects qualifying under the Kyoto Protocol (and promoted as such
for public relations purposes) may lack the financial incentive to
formally participate as operational entities. The administrative
bureaucracy of the CDM Executive Board concerning project
eligibility and accredited methodologies has thus far limited private sector participation to speculative activity.122 The CDM
remains under-resourced and its lethargic approval process has
only sanctioned several projects to date. To initiate regulatory
decision-making several firms developed candidate CDM projects with a view to evaluating investment viability and distributed data to governments.123

THE RISK OF REGULATORY CAPTURE
The co-regulation model poses the prospect of regulatory
capture whereby corporations successfully curtail the regulatory autonomy of governments. From the corporate perspective,
environmental strategies are formulated with an eye to subsequent implementation in terms of production cost, potential
liability, and ease of regulatory compliance.124 To minimize
operational disruption to core businesses, environmental
strategies are tailored to existing competencies, stakeholder
expectations, and corporate cultures. The undesirable alternative
includes management restructuring, unrealized goals given
limited resources, and operational inconsistencies across business divisions. From the intergovernmental perspective,
(over)reliance upon information inputs such as the technical
expertise or management experience of firms increases with the
number and complexity of issues to be addressed at a COP.125
Full disclosure is unrealistic in view of business proprietary
information and competition from State enterprises and other
firms. Since the onus lies upon government to identify novel
information sources, they may prefer to engage with the business community through roundtables and workshops where
other actors (including commercial rivals, smaller firms, and
ENGOs) offer counterbalancing perspectives.
Perfecting regulatory regimes necessitates soliciting
observer contributions on the interpretation and application of
the UNFCCC. For example, the GCC provided its views on the
interaction between dispute settlement mechanisms and compliance procedures. Emphasizing the voluntary nature of governmental participation and employing a strictly textual approach
to treaty interpretation, the GCC identified several issues as “not
ripe for resolution,” promoted greater expert inclusion, and
argued that only States Parties could initiate compliance procedures; “not the secretariat, not by other intergovernmental
organizations and certainly not by NGOs.”126 The compliance
procedures of the Kyoto Protocol by contrast can be triggered
by “competent” observers in respect of an existing case.127 This
extends to submitting factual and technical information where
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questions of implementation are raised.128 Furthermore,
reducing carbon emissions has created demand for compliance
measurement protocols. Reporting standards and verification
techniques were developed by the private sector for prospective
adoption by firms as risk management tools and by governments
as the basis for national regulation.129 Accounting, standardization, and accreditation firms also offer their quality assurance
services to government and industry.
Regulatory capture as a means of maintaining “business as
usual” is well-illustrated with respect to technology transfer.
Those industries which originally caused environmental damage
also possess the technical means for rectification. Developing
States seek access to affordable technology free from dependency upon foreign patent holders and developed States are
unable to compel private sector cooperation. Firms are prepared
to transfer technology on mutually agreed terms provided there
is strong intellectual property protection and respect for contractual arrangements.130 It could be argued that the application
or adaptation of existing technological solutions is sufficient
to mitigate climate change since it is proven in the field, less
risky, and currently available. Its more efficient application
reduces energy consumption and reaps “quick win” emission
reductions, delays obsolescence, and recoups a reasonable
return on investment.
Permitting firms to utilize cost-effective solutions may
amount to implementing what is most technologically convenient. Novel and practical solutions (such as photovoltaics, solar
or hydrogen cells, and wind or tidal turbines) pose more challenging technological innovations and lie further from the core
businesses of the incumbent fossil fuel industry. Furthermore,
large firms possess economies of scale to spread research
and development expenditure and the means for global deployment. Such firms can simply acquire this technology once it
has been demonstrated to be commercially viable by risk-taking
companies.
The resulting governmental role will be to remove regulatory and market barriers to the commercialization of technical
options. Meaningful controls may also be desirable to overcome
the preoccupation of well-entrenched firms with short-term
profits and provide a competitive boost to those second
generation firms inclined to innovate. Does the conclusion that
regulatory initiatives tend to track market developments entirely account for the contemporary inertia within the climate
change regime?

PART THREE: ENHANCING THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF CORPORATE CONTRIBUTIONS
European attempts at COP 10 to initiate negotiations on
post-2012 commitments were rebuffed by the U.S. as premature
and encountered resistance from the Group of 77. Governments
merely agreed to organize an intergovernmental seminar to
informally exchange information on measures currently being
undertaken to implement existing commitments and on ways to
further develop climate change initiatives.131 Government
resolve (or its absence) is one stimulus for business perceptions
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of commercial opportunities and investment risks. Flawed
through it may be, ratifying the Kyoto Protocol provides directional certainty that sustainable and renewable energy sources
will receive regulatory support. Such a governmental commitment triggers “top down” changes in corporate strategy insofar
as national operating conditions are affected. Intergovernmental
organizations accordingly call upon governments to transmit the
right market signals to investors.132
Political consensus is reciprocally preconditioned by signals from the business community. COP side events assume
greater significance when political negotiations stagnate and
governments become observers to contemporary business practices. From the “bottom up” intergovernmental negotiations
bridge the pace of operational adaptation by intransigent incumbents and voluntary experimental effort by progressive market
participants. This article offers two further explanatory insights
to the timing of regulatory development. The first is the prospect
that diverse commercial perspectives overwhelm intergovernmental deliberations with complexity, forestall regulatory
progress, and render public policy imperatives irrelevant.
The second is the concomitant challenge of ensuring that
business voices are commensurate with the envisaged implementation role.

THE (IN)COHERENCY OF BUSINESS MESSAGES
It has been asserted that “the companies that stand to lose
the most – at least in the short term – have from the beginning
been the most prominent and influential business voices in the
climate negotiations.”133 These include the fossil fuel industries
(coal and oil) as well as energy intensive sectors such as electricity, automobile manufacturing, cement, glass, chemicals,
paper, aluminum, and steel production. Such sectors undertake
cost-benefit analysis, propose further research and caution
against legal commitments. Regulatory initiatives are discouraged by appealing to the strategic or military importance
of industry, domestic energy requirements, detrimental
employment impacts, lower economic growth, lost business
competitiveness, high investment outlay, and modest environmental impact.
It could be reasoned that (a) fossil fuel industries seek to
forestall regime development, and (b) since their views dominate industry opinion, then (c) commercial contributions to the
climate change negotiations favor regulatory inertia. It is true
that the fossil fuel and energy intensive industries have engaged
with the UNFCCC process since its inception whereas other factions are more recent entrants.134 However, the fossil fuel sector
is unrepresentative of the private sector generally and since
“progressive” oil companies are simply adopting hedging strategies, the significance of their regulatory initiatives should not
be overstated.
To simplify regime design, governments prefer to deal with
organized groups representing mainstream opinion. However, it
can be difficult to identify which interlocutor reflects dominant
business opinion and carries sufficient authority to speak “on
behalf of industry.” Industries expected to benefit over the long
term (nuclear, natural gas, and renewable energy sources) have
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become increasingly active but the balance is yet to tilt in their
favor. These sectors press for stricter timetables and targets
which boost product demand and capture market share. The
electronics, agricultural, and forestry products sectors are less
engaged. One survey concluded that although companies are
adopting governance measures,
measuring greenhouse gas
emissions and discussing climate change at board level, few
are treating the issues raised as
imminent financial and environmental threats.135 Business
attitudes “should therefore be
considered cautiously and in
context.”136
This hypothesis suggests
that the diversity of business
interests prevents this constituency from acting as a cohesive block. Since the business
community is not homogeneous it may be unable to marshal coherent or uniform
recommendations. What firms
espouse individually or collectively, how they behave nationally or internationally, and the
consistency of their public posturing with their private action should be carefully distinguished. Individual businesses vary: some are motivated by
technological advancement and others are concerned with the
security of raw materials or stable product demand.
Transnational firms in particular may be unable to espouse any
particular opinion since different national units will pursue that
political strategy most compatible with their host environment.
Furthermore, operational divisions within a single firm may be
differently affected by climate change, thereby precluding the
formulation of a coherent policy.
That considerable variation exists within sectors is confirmed by studies seeking to account for the different strategies
of oil multinationals. Whereas several companies have accepted
the inevitability of regulation, others continue to challenge the
scientific basis of climate change.137 Their initial reactions were
influenced by distinctive home country institutional contexts
and individual corporate histories.138 With the exception of
Exxon-Mobil, strategic approaches began to converge as the climate change issue matured on account of participation in a common industry and management expectations. Differences in the
timing, pace, and type of shift in their climate change strategies
are explicable by reference to their respective commercial interests, management structures, and national operating contexts.139
Particularly pertinent was location (social demands for environmental protection, regulatory culture, and national environmental policy), internal organizational attributes (institutionalized

memory, degree of decentralization and availability of scientific expertise), and economic position (market assessments, long
range planning, and investment interests).140 Since companyspecific features (risk management technique, environmental
reputation, and capacity for
organizational learning) and
international market factors were
approximately identical for each
firm, their variable response is
attributed to the national context,
including the political institutions at work.141 Industry-specific factors militating against
the generality of these observations include its oligopolistic
nature following consolidation
during the 1990s and technological progress (albeit not always
rewarded) towards renewable
energy sources.
It has also been observed
that BINGO participation is relatively more turbulent than
ENGOs: strategic shifts by key
players create tensions within
the business community and
business associations may
become hamstrung.142 Messages
from politically-organized business groups can also reflect the lowest common denominator
between its progressive and conservative members. Their perspective consequently reflects the views of dominant members:
Korean industry, for example, remains resolutely opposed to the
Kyoto Protocol.143 Consensus decision-making becomes an
opportunity for an intransigent or conservative majority to exert
disproportionate leverage and delay or obstruct regulatory
development.

It can be predicted that
regulatory initiatives
will be forthcoming from
European firms on a
formal basis within the
E.C., whereas the
voluntary commercial
efforts of Australian
and U.S. firms will
indirectly shape
regulatory outcomes.
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Sector-Specific Solutions to Procedural Obstacles
Diverse participation is encouraged at a COP on the
assumption that intergovernmental deliberations will be
enriched and implementation enhanced through the identification of broadly shared aims. The UNFCCC secretariat encourages observer participation by organizations that (a) possess
relevant competence; (b) are broadly representative of sectoral
opinion; and (c) produce an equitable geographical balance.
COPs are predominantly attended by commercial interests from
industrialized States and only rarely from developing ones.
Politically-organized business organizations from the North
counter-argue that they represent companies headquartered,
sited, or having operations in the South who will ultimately
assume a greater implementation burden.144
The coherency of the business voice will dissipate in light
of changing scenarios, organizational attributes, and operational
specialization. However, it may be sufficient that the business
community concurs at a level of generality. Market-supportive
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regulatory frameworks entail freedom to trade, respect for
property rights (including protection from expropriation), fair
competition, and non-discriminatory treatment. For example,
governments were called upon to recognize as valid all carbon
emission credits acquired by companies without imposing selective criteria based upon national origin.145 Commercial decision-making and investment planning is sought to be insulated
from policy and regulatory uncertainty. Regulatory conditions
should be characterized by stability, transparency, information
access, non-arbitrary decision-making, minimal transaction
costs (including taxation), protecting intellectual property
rights, and contractual certainty.146 Common industry perspectives also coalesce around binding legal obligations rather than
weak political commitments, comprehensive disclosure concerning prospective national implementation, and up-front
terms for corporate participation.147
This article proposes that successfully harnessing commercial contributions – and diluting the influence of dominant
industry players – necessitates a sector-specific approach to
public policy engagement.148 Preparatory activities for the
International Conference on Financing for Development notably
drew functional distinctions between private banks, institutional investors, other market institutions, non-financial corporations, and business associations.149 Participating firms were
selected by reference to their commercial interests, likely
investment in developing States, geographical distribution, and
gender perspective.150 This analogy particularly applies to
interconnected industries yet to perceive the risks posed by climate change. For example, although actively courted by
ENGOs, the financial services industry has been unable to counterbalance the influence of energy corporations.151 This is
notwithstanding that global warming will occasion more claims
against insurance and re-insurance firms.152 The financial
sector continues to be unaware of the gravity of the issue, perceives no financial connection, lacks adequate information on
corporate emissions (which in turn hampers integrating climate
concerns into financial assessments), and remains uncertain
about investment opportunities on alternative energy
sources.153 However, governments wish to draw upon the
expertise of the financial services sector to inform the deliberations of intergovernmental workshops.154 Promoting the business case for emissions reductions is therefore important for
countering sector disinterest and raising awareness.

ENSURING THE PROPORTIONALITY OF
COMMERCIAL PERSPECTIVES
Business has hitherto preferred political action at national
levels where it is accustomed to well-chartered and predictable
channels of influence.155 Significantly, only well-entrenched
U.S. firms participated in the ozone layer negotiations since
most companies were content to concentrate their efforts elsewhere.156 The private sector moreover favors national regulation “because it is also more familiar with this approach, and
feels it can influence it through negotiation.”157 The susceptibility of governments to local pressures coincides with an interest in retaining national regulatory autonomy. Multinationals
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supposedly fear the emergence of international environmental
regimes.158 Commercial activity within international fora is
therefore directed at either blocking transnational measures or
circumventing applicable national constraints (for example,
where lobbying proves ineffective for reversing undesirable legislation or judicial precedents).
Industry also seeks to maintain effective participation pursuant to standardized procedural rules during intergovernmental
negotiations.159 Corporations support the UNFCCC secretariat’s initiatives by providing resources160 since it is likely to be
more receptive to their global management perspectives than
nationally-oriented governments, a fact which could be usefully
directed towards domestic audiences. Proposals for improving
the UNFCCC process include less structured panel sessions
involving free-form dialogue, audience participation, swifter
document dissemination, improved access to the floor during
plenary sessions, oral interventions during discussions, written
comments on specific agenda items, soliciting observer input
through the secretariat, and enhancing expert contributions.
BINGOs also proposed a Policy Dialogue Forum which contemplated a frank exchange of optimum policy options in a
transparent and depoliticized forum open to all interested actors.
Such proposals are consistent with deepening the engagement between civil society and intergovernmental bodies.161
The UNFCCC secretariat is involved in ongoing efforts to
enhance the effectiveness of observer contributions. It is generally supported in this endeavor by governments who are careful
not to establish precedents and prefer to be guided by their
needs on particular occasions. Governments prohibited
observers from approaching national delegations during plenary
debates and considered excluding observers who promoted perspectives contrary to UNFCCC objectives. Extensive agendas,
proliferating meetings or activities, lack of resources, limited
available time, and fragmenting agenda items are overloading
delegations and making negotiations more difficult to efficiently manage. The growing number of side events is “indicative of
deficiencies in the formal process.”162

Business Consultation, Observer Equality,
and Counterbalancing Perspectives
New Zealand was the first government within the UNFCCC process to express an interest in receiving counsel directly
from business during the mid-1990s. The COP convened a
workshop on the desirability of observer advisory committees.163 Business representatives argued that their participation
was crucial for selecting, developing, and implementing economically-sound policies and highlighted their responsibilities
for economic growth, employment, competitiveness, environmental protection, and social development. They supported a
more structured process for communicating commercial perspectives to ensure that practical technical and economic information could be utilized. Since no current arrangement served
industry or government needs, a convenient, direct, and additional communication channel had to be created. Furthermore, a
single mechanism involving different constituencies was not
feasible or desirable.164 ENGOs agreed that contemporary
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consultative mechanisms for soliciting technical input required
strengthening.165
The SBI subsequently evaluated observer entitlements
within other U.N. bodies with a view to developing procedures
to enhance observer participation within the UNFCCC
process.166 It concluded that the secretariat’s “improvised
responses have tended to generosity; the result is an open house
with a rather flimsy structure.”167 Systematically soliciting
observer perspectives could add a “new dimension” even where
existing practice was merely codified since it was uncertain
whether governments would routinely obtain observer opinions
or whether observers are entitled to be heard.168 Additional
questions included addressing different opinions within constituencies, whether governments should engage with non-State
actors at national levels so that observer interaction with the
UNFCCC reflected international interests, and whether governments should enjoy direct access to the views of individual
firms unfiltered by trade associations or ENGOs.
BINGOs proposed a business consultative mechanism
(“BCM”) distinct from the UNFCCC structure whose framework, activities, and internal processes would be determined by
participating business groups.169 It would enable industry to
volunteer unfiltered information and respond to intergovernmental queries in a timely manner on the full range of climate
change issues.170 Achieving a prior consensus position would
be unnecessary since the full panoply of business opinion
demonstrated the complexity of issues requiring intergovernmental resolution. Furthermore, the BCM would not be a means
of negotiating business commitments that were properly made
at national or regional levels. Observers “cannot and should not”
be negotiating parties since it is for governments to decide what
is environmentally necessary and practically achievable given
credible technical and economic assessments. Finally, business
participants from developing countries should receive administrative support and financial assistance.
ENGOs rejected the proposal since mechanisms for observer input should be open and transparent. The BCM in their view
would provide industry with privileged access, enable unreviewed material to be submitted, and curb the numerical
superiority of other observers. The principle of parity moreover
requires that participatory entitlements granted to one
constituency be extended to all others. As an aside, equality of
observer treatment could be usefully affirmed if not by the
UNFCCC procedural rules then pursuant to a COP decision.
Once complication is that UNFCCC Parties such as Australia
and the U.S. wish to participate as observers under the Kyoto
Protocol. Industry recommendations have a self-interested flavor insofar as the purveyors of particular technology may
possess conflicts of interest. Governments are wary of improper
or disproportionate influences exerted by COP observers. Since
domestic constituencies whose agendas are already being
advocated by their national government have little incentive to
participate, minority interests, or those with protectionist ambitions whose views have previously been rejected may wish to
repeat their exaggerated messages during intergovernmental
negotiations.
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The SBSTA concluded that existing consultative mechanisms be improved until consensus between the UNFCCC constituencies was achieved.171 Significantly, informal activities
undertaken by observers are left unaffected. Although their
impact is difficult to assess on account of their nature, such
activities tend to favor economically privileged actors. These
include lobbying, organizing side events (hiring Conference
facilities, staff attendance costs, and promotional publicity),
providing exhibits, conducting information sessions and
supporting the UNFCCC secretariat. By embedding their best
commercial practices within regulatory regimes, market leaders
possessing the advantages of establishment have the opportunity to determine economic conditions for the remainder of
industry, eliminate uncompetitive rivals, and facilitate corporate
consolidation.
Observer participation enables timely access to intergovernmental deliberations and suggests the likely direction of
national policies. The non-participation of developing States
from the first commitment period, albeit in recognition that
developed countries have historically contributed the lion’s
share of carbon emissions, has afforded the national corporations of industrialized States a valuable lead time over their
Southern counterparts. Such anticipatory action is not without
limit since formal legal frameworks are ultimately required to
underpin market transactions. Prudence dictates a “wait-andsee” approach before irreversible commercial decisions are
taken according to orthodox business criteria and what governments actually decide. Directors also owe fiduciary duties to
shareholders not to engage in overly-speculative investment
activity.
It is also noteworthy that intergovernmental negotiations
have become an elongated and dynamic process where the distinction between negotiation and implementation is blurred.
International environmental regimes are characterized by venues peripheral to the COP (workshops, pre-sessional consultations, expert panels, seminars, and executive body meetings)
and attended by States, intergovernmental organizations and
observers. Off-site side events (“side-bars”) organized outside
the Conference venue involve industry presentations to invited
government delegates and UNFCCC secretariat officials.
Although these fora facilitate information exchange and
consensus-building, they also shift decision-making further
behind the scenes and render them accessible to only the wellresourced.
Ensuring proportionality to business views may be unattainable insofar as commercial opportunities for influencing
governments extend beyond the fora of COPs to include public
procurement contracting and concluding investment agreements. Government and UNFCCC secretariat officials attend
industry-convened conferences which parallel intergovernmental programs. For example, the Business Council for Sustainable
Energy organized roundtables composed of corporations,
ENGOs, governments, and UNFCCC secretariat officials.172
Finally, observers are engaged in education, training, and public
awareness-raising activities largely free from governmental
oversight.173
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CONCLUSION
The challenge of reducing carbon emissions and facilitating
the eventual transition to renewable energy sources is enveloped
within the distinctive sustainable development paradigm.
Emissions trading is an interim measure for Annex 1 Parties
before joint implementation projects come to fruition and foreign direct investment is sought to be redirected towards developing States through the CDM. This article notes how different
regulatory models offer a useful explanatory value when characterizing commercial contributions and intergovernmental outcomes under the UNFCCC. Hence oppositional postures or
proactive strategies by firms may be symptomatic of the adversarial or collaborative regulatory models. It can be predicted that
regulatory initiatives will be forthcoming from European firms
on a formal basis within the E.C., whereas the voluntary commercial efforts of Australian and U.S. firms will indirectly shape
regulatory outcomes. That these corporate initiatives are having
an impact is vindicated by the IPCC’s conclusion that “significant progress relevant to greenhouse gas emissions reductions
has been made and has been faster than anticipated.”174
Corporate engagement with the UNFCCC process offers
useful procedural lessons for other sustainable development
concerns. Commercial contributions include disseminating
information, gathering information, participating in interactive
roundtable sessions, appointing to national delegations, providing counsel or advice, supporting international secretariats, and
conducting side-events. The proposal to institutionalize a communication channel in parallel to the UNFCCC supports several conclusions. First, the BCM illustrates greater corporate interest in formally engaging with intergovernmental negotiators.
Second, the BCM represents an acknowledgment that the procedural rules of access have a limited effectiveness. Informal
methods may favor the well-resourced, but participants are less

controlled, the process less transparent, and outcomes less predictable. Third, the fact that their attempt to enhance their participatory conditions failed also tends to rebut the presumption
that corporations wield inordinate influence over regulatory outcomes.
The concern expressed by governments and ENGOs that
commercial participants enjoy a disproportionate role during
negotiations is not altogether groundless. An anti-competitive or
unrepresentative flavor to industry participation is justifiable
inasmuch as the principal corporate participants are large multinationals possessing the requisite financial, technical, and organizational resources whereas small and medium-sized enterprises depend upon trade associations. Observer parity encounters
the reality that corporations operate within the industrialized
North, developing countries, and States not Party to the Kyoto
Protocol.
Finally, commentators must be cautiously discerning when
seeking to identify prevailing business opinion. The fossil fuel
industry will remain active in negotiations since the outlook for
energy products remains strong in the short- to medium-term.
Their strategic objective to prevent or favorably shape regulatory development has been inadvertently assisted by an incoherent
business voice. The renewable energy industry, a niche business, will correspondingly occupy a marginal political role, but
one which has been growing since COP 3. Corporate engagement as a strategy for initiating regulatory change is moreover
complicated by the widely-recognized tension between global
integration and local responsiveness. Insofar as intergovernmental negotiations have stalled then progress must emanate
from within industry. The first Meeting of the Parties to the
Kyoto Protocol to be held in Canada in December 2005 may
prove to be that catalyst.
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THE PROTOTYPE CARBON FUND:
A NEW DEPARTURE IN INTERNATIONAL TRUSTS AND SECURITIES LAW
By Sophie Smyth*1

INTRODUCTION
he Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change2 (respectively, the
“Kyoto Protocol” and the “UNFCCC”) entered into
effect on February 16, 2005. This was a major step forward in
the world’s efforts to combat the deleterious effects caused by
the emission of greenhouse gases into the stratosphere (effects
commonly referred to as “global warming”).3 However, long
before the Kyoto Protocol4 became effective, several small but
significant steps had already been taken towards achieving its
goals. The World Bank’s establishment of the Prototype Carbon
Fund (the “PCF” or “Fund”) illustrates one such step. The PCF
was a completely new concept in international environmental
law and much has been written about the role it has played in the
development of carbon finance.5 A lesser known fact, however,
reveals that the PCF also broke considerable new ground in the
realm of international trusts and securities law. The latter
aspects of the PCF are the focus of this article. This article
begins by describing the backdrop against which the PCF was
established and the reasons for its development. The article then
describes the novel issues of international trust funds and securities law that were encountered during the Fund’s formation
and the manner in which they were resolved.

T

THE PCF AND THE KYOTO PROTOCOL
The PCF is an outgrowth of the new universe of obligations
and opportunities spawned by the Kyoto Protocol, which
emerged in 1992 when the UNFCCC was signed and ratified by
180 countries (the “Parties”). The UNFCCC remains the first
instance of international recognition of the phenomenon of
global warming.6 Beyond providing that recognition, the
UNFCCC constituted a framework within which signatories
could work towards defining a regime for stabilizing worldwide
concentrations of greenhouse gases. As part of that framework,
the UNFCCC divides the Parties into three categories: (1) all
Parties; (2) all industrialized country Parties (Annex 1
countries); and (3) all industrialized country Parties except those
from the former Soviet bloc in a process of economic transition
(“EIT countries”) (Annex 2 countries). The UNFCCC requires
differing commitments from each category of Parties.7
The Kyoto Protocol, ratified by 141 countries, sets out the
regime presaged by the UNFCCC and contains two essential
elements. First, it puts all Annex 1 countries (which are listed in
Annex B to the Protocol and referred to as “Annex B countries”
under the Protocol) on a timetable to reduce their greenhouse

SPRING 2005

gas emissions by an average of 5.2 percent below their 1990 levels over a finite period of time, beginning in 2008 and ending in
2012.8 Second, it introduces several mechanisms by which such
countries can achieve these targets (the “Kyoto Mechanisms”).
Two of those mechanisms, the Joint Implementation
Mechanism, established under Article 6 of the Protocol, and the
Clean Development Mechanism, established under Article 12,9
introduced the concept that a country with obligations to reduce
its greenhouse gas emission reductions under the Protocol, i.e.
an Annex B country, could earn credit towards those obligations
by funding a project in another county which will contribute to
the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in that country. The
timetable for reductions, the Protocol’s quantifiable targets, and
the relative imminence of the dates by which they were to be
achieved, prompted immediate action. The ultimate effectiveness of the Protocol was generally regarded as a foregone conclusion and Annex B countries did not want to be caught short.
The Kyoto Protocol’s targets and mechanisms, and the
manner in which their implementation translates into practice,
lie at the heart of the PCF and the niche created for it to fill. With
respect to the targets, Annex B countries pass obligations to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions onto greenhouse gas-emitting
industries through the passage of national legislation that
imposes reduction targets on those industries. Consequently, the
Protocol and the legislation flowing from it create a pool of
government and private sector entities on the lookout for ways
to obtain greenhouse gas emission reduction credits.
The Kyoto Mechanisms created the possibility that an
Annex B country could satisfy its obligation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by contributing to greenhouse gas
reduction activities elsewhere. This presented a new and
unprecedented opportunity for collaborations between countries
or entities seeking to obtain such credits and developing
countries that could offer a cost-effective way of doing so. The
drastic difference in the cost of undertaking greenhouse gas
emission reduction measures in a developed country or an EIT
country, on the one hand, and a developing country, on the other,
gave rise to this emerging opportunity for collaboration.10 It is
by one or two orders of magnitude cheaper to achieve a ton of
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greenhouse gas emission reductions in an EIT country or developing country than to achieve such reductions in a developed
country; Japan being the most costly country of all for these
purposes.11
The World Bank created the PCF to pioneer implementation of the opportunities offered by the Kyoto Mechanisms to
create win/win collaborations between the developed and the
developing world.12 The Fund was designed to create a central
pool of resources, or a trust fund, managed by the Bank as
trustee and funded by governments and private sector entities
interested in securing greenhouse gas emission reduction credits. The idea was that the Fund would sponsor projects in developing countries and EIT countries that would generate such
credits. These credits would be paid to the Fund, and the Bank,
acting as trustee of the Fund, would distribute the credits to the
Fund’s contributors on a pro rata basis in accordance with the
amounts of their respective contributions. The Fund was the
brainchild of Ken Newcombe, a dynamic division chief in the
Bank’s Environment Department. He envisioned the PCF as a
central fund that would serve as a pilot of the Kyoto
Mechanisms, reap benefits for donors and recipients alike, and
offer, in the process, an opportunity for all parties to devise a
modus operandi for the Kyoto mechanisms, or as he was wont
to call it, an opportunity to “learn by doing.” This vision was
fine-tuned through extensive rounds of consultation with governments and private sector entities across the world that voiced
strong need for and interest in such a fund. It was recognized
from the outset that the Fund was a highly innovative concept,
riding the cusp of the sweeping changes introduced by the
Kyoto Protocol. Less keenly appreciated, however, was the fact
that in creating the Fund, a significant amount of “learning by
doing” would involve trusts and securities law.

A NOVEL TRUST FUND
The Fund represented a new type of business for the Bank,
which was not accustomed to administering a fund that combined both private and public sector contributors, or a fund
under which it had an obligation to generate returns for the trust
fund’s contributors. Five broad objectives had to be reconciled
within the Fund’s design. First, the Fund’s status as an international trust fund had to be reconciled with the participants’
strong desire to exercise extensive control over the Fund’s management and operations. Moreover, the Fund had to accommodate this desire for control with the participants’ equally strong
insistence that they should have no personal liability for the
Fund’s activities. Second, the participants and the Bank wanted
a clear distinction and disentanglement between the Fund’s
operations and the operations of the Bank. Third, the potential
conflicts of interest between the private sector participants in the
Fund and the Fund itself had to be managed. Fourth, both the
Bank and the participants wanted the Fund to include a role for
the countries hosting projects (the “Host Countries”), so that
these countries could gain experience through their involvement
in the Fund’s operations. Fifth, the Bank had to devise a
mechanism to receive, hold, and distribute the greenhouse gas
emission reduction credits that the Fund would accrue.
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TRUST, AGENCY, OR PARTNERSHIP
The participants’ strong desire to be actively involved in the
Fund’s management meant that the PCF would need a governance structure within which those interests could be expressed,
reconciled, and given effect, while at the same time accommodating a role for the potential Host Countries. All of this had to
be balanced against the Bank’s role as trustee of the Fund, as
well as its ability to have a sufficient say in the Fund’s operations. As a trustee, the Bank requires sufficient say in order to
properly discharge its fiduciary responsibilities; the responsibility to manage and administer others’ money is serious business
with serious legal consequences.
This kind of intricate governance structure was new territory for the Bank. Although the Bank was used to acting as a
trustee (and, indeed was then serving as trustee to well over a
thousand trust funds), it generally had much more unfettered
control. The Bank typically had broad discretion to administer
the funds placed with it in trust under standard trust agreements,
which constituted the vast majority of Bank- administered trusts
prior to the PCF. Standard trust agreements usually contained
broadly worded objectives. The Bank, as trustee, would select
the recipients of trust fund monies within the scope of those
objectives and report annually to the contributors on how the
funds had been used. There was no active, ongoing involvement
on the contributors’ part in those situations.13
In contrast, the governance structure devised for the PCF, as
set out in the Instrument to Establish the Prototype Carbon Fund
(the “Instrument’),14 creates a framework within which the participants can voice their opinions in the Fund’s management and
operations. The structure has five component parts: a Fund
Management Committee, a Fund Management Unit, a
Participants’ Meeting, a Participants’ Committee, and a Host
Country Committee.15 As Trustee, the Bank was charged with
forming the Fund Management Committee16 (which consists of
the Fund Manager, Ken Newcombe, and four other members of
Bank Management) to exercise general oversight over the
Fund.17 Day-to-day responsibility for the Fund’s operations is
vested in the Fund Management Unit, which is headed by the
Fund Manager and consists of a staff of technical and operational specialists selected by him.18
The participants’ active and ongoing involvement is
achieved through the Participants’ Meeting and the Participants
Committee. The Participants’ Meeting is an annual meeting of
all contributors to the Fund19 and is the vehicle through which
participants exercise an overview role over the Fund’s operations. At those meetings, participants review and approve the
Fund’s annual budget and business plan, provide the Bank with
general policy advice and strategic guidance, and approve any
suggestions for amendments to the project selection and project
portfolio criteria.20 The participants also have the power to
terminate the Fund by resolution of a two-thirds majority21 and
the power to authorize the Trustee to remove a participant in
certain circumstances.22
Participants exercise a hands-on role through their involvement in the Participants’ Committee. It consists of five
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participants, two drawn from the private sector and three drawn
from the public sector, who are elected at the Participants’
Meeting and whose membership rotates annually.23 The
Participants’ Committee does not have to give positive approval
to every project funded by the Fund; however, it vets every project proposal to determine whether to object to the inclusion of
the project in the Fund’s portfolio.24 It also provides general
advice to the Bank on the Fund’s operations.25

The Fund involved both
a collaboration and a
conflict between two very
different worlds: the new,
dynamic, fast-changing
world of international
environmental law, and
the more rigid, tightly
construed world of trust
law principles and
financial securities…
The participants’ demand for control over the Fund, risked
jeopardizing their desire to be free of liability for the Fund’s
activities beyond the amount of their contributions. Two sources
of liability were of particular concern to participants: (1) liability for claims against the PCF arising under contracts between
the Bank, as trustee of the PCF and private sector project sponsors (“Project Sponsors”) (the legal entities behind the projects
producing the emission reductions); and (2) liability in tort for
acts or omissions occurring in the course of those contracts. The
extent of the participants’ control under the Instrument gave rise
to the risk that a court faced with a claim in contract or tort
against the PCF might re-characterize the Fund as a general
partnership. Additionally, given the participants’ significant say
in the Fund, a court might conclude that the Bank, when acting
as trustee of the Fund, was acting not simply as trustee but also
as the participants’ agent.

The PCF as a Partnership
Under general principles of trust law, the substantive
powers and decision-making authority afforded the Participants’
Committee make the Fund vulnerable to being re-characterized
as a general partnership.26 While no single power of the
Participants’ Meeting or the Participants’ Committee (e.g. the
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veto power) creates this risk, the active, ongoing involvement of
the participants, provided for throughout the Instrument, makes
the risk impossible to dismiss.27

The Bank as the Participants’ Agent
Similar considerations apply to the issue of when and
whether the Bank, as trustee of the PCF, could also be regarded
as the participants’ agent. Given the participants’ expectation of
receiving emission reduction credits in return for their contributions to the Fund, the participants in the PCF may also be characterized as the beneficiaries of the PCF. The general rule is that
a beneficiary of a trust is not personally subject to liabilities to
third parties incurred in the administration of a trust.28 Hence, a
beneficiary is normally neither personally liable upon contracts
made by the trustee in the administration of the trust nor personally liable to third parties for torts committed by the
trustee.29 However, if a trustee acts on behalf of the beneficiary
and is subject to its control, the trustee becomes the beneficiary’s agent as well as its trustee, and in its capacity as the agent,
it can render the beneficiary liable upon a contract made by the
trustee and for torts committed by the trustee.30 The key factor
in determining whether or not a trustee is also an agent of the
beneficiaries depends upon the extent of the beneficiaries’
right to control the trustee.31 As stated in Restatement (Second)
Agency:
Where a number of persons transfer property to a person, designated as trustee, who is to do business with
such property for their benefit, the relation thus created may be a partnership. Whether or not it is a partnership depends upon the amount of control reserved by
the contributors. If as a group, they have the power, not
merely to elect the trustee, but also to direct the conduct of the business by the trustee, there is a partnership and the person designated as “trustee” is the agent
of the members of the group.32
Despite these risks, the participants did not want to cede
control to the Bank as trustee. Instead, they reached an understanding with the Bank on certain risk mitigation measures. The
Instrument was crafted to provide for the indemnification of the
participants from the Fund’s assets for any liability arising out
of the activities of the trust with the exception of liabilities
resulting from a participant’s gross negligence or willful misconduct.33 The Bank was similarly indemnified as trustee of the
Fund.34 Further, the Instrument provides that neither the Bank
nor the participants will be subject to any personal liability to
any third person in connection with the Fund’s activities.35
Accordingly, the Instrument directs that all contracts
entered into by the Bank as trustee of the Fund shall explicitly
provide to this effect.36 As this provision does not fully mitigate
against the risk of tort liability, an agreement was reached where
the Bank would add the participants as “named insureds” under
its professional liability insurance policy, and the Instrument
authorizes the Bank as trustee to pay for such insurance out of
Fund assets.37 It was also agreed that the Bank would require
the Project Entities, with which it would contract as trustee of
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the Fund, to maintain appropriate general liability insurance to
protect both the Bank and the participants against general liability claims that might arise from Fund sponsored projects.38

DISENTANGLEMENT FROM THE BANK’S OPERATIONS
The Bank and the participants both wanted to ensure that
the Fund’s operations were kept separate and distinct from the
Bank’s core lending operations. In particular, the Bank did not
want a conflict of interest to arise between its obligations as
trustee of the Fund and its position as lender to Host Countries
of Fund-sponsored projects. The concern arose because, ordinarily, a trustee is under a duty to the trust beneficiaries to
administer the trust solely in the beneficiaries’ interests and to
take reasonable steps to enforce claims held in trust.39 This general principle does not apply, however, if the terms of the trust
instrument expressly provide otherwise.40
Accordingly, the Bank and the participants agreed that the
Instrument would absolve the Bank, as trustee, from any obligation to pursue any action or claim on the participants’ behalf
against any Project Entity or Host Country that defaulted on its
agreements.41 However, the Instrument stops short of determining how such actions or claims will be pursued if the Bank as
trustee does decide to refrain. It simply provides that the Bank
as trustee and the participants will use their best efforts to agree
on satisfactory arrangements for dealing with any such dispute,
including, if necessary the assignment and transfer of all or part
of the Trustee’s rights and obligations under the agreement in
dispute to a third party.42 To date, the provisions of this clause
have not yet been invoked.
To further ensure disentanglement, the Bank and the participants also agreed that there would be no cross-default clause in
the Bank’s loan agreements that would entitle the Bank to exercise remedies if there is a default under an agreement between
the Bank as trustee of the Fund and a Host Country or Project
Entity. 43 Nor will there be any cross-default clause in the latter
agreements that would allow the exercise of remedies under
those agreements if there is a default under any Bank loan agreement.44

MANAGING POTENTIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
BETWEEN THE PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPANTS
AND THE FUND
The participants from the private sector did not want their
participation in the PCF to preclude them, or their affiliates,
from investing in projects associated with Fund-sponsored
projects, or in other funds or ventures that might compete with
the PCF. The government participants and the Bank were prepared to accept private sector participants having these conflicts
of interest so long as such conflicts did not interfere with the
integrity of the PCF’s project approval process. Accordingly, a
mechanism had to be devised whereby a participant could
recuse itself from the project approval process whenever it had
such a potential conflict of interest.
Towards this end, the Instrument requires a participant who
has an interest in a project associated with a project being considered for funding by the PCF or is in a venture that competes
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with the PCF, to disclose that interest to the Bank as trustee,
prior to the Participant Committee’s review of the pertinent
project proposal.45 The Bank as trustee has the authority to
determine whether the participant’s interest is such that it should
not take part in the Participant Committee’s deliberations on the
project.46 If the participant disagrees with the Bank’s determination, it can advise the Participants’ Committee of the conflict
or potential conflict, and the Participants’ Committee (with the
exception of the participant making the disclosure) will decide
whether the participant should be permitted to take part in the
Committee’s deliberations on the project.47 The Bank as trustee,
in consultation with the Participants’ Committee, can decide on
how to sanction a participant who fails to provide timely disclosure of a competing interest.48

THE HOST COUNTRIES’ ROLE
The goal of involving the Host Countries in the Fund’s
work was achieved by including the Host Country Committee as
a part of the Fund’s governance structure.49 The Host Country
Committee is composed of representatives of Host Countries
and potential Host Countries (countries that have given written
endorsement of project proposals under consideration by
the Fund).50
The Host Country Committee provides guidance to the
Bank and the participants on the Fund’s development and implementation, which includes giving advice on proposed amendments to the Fund’s project selection and portfolio criteria and
on effecting an equitable sharing between the participants the
Host Countries of any greenhouse gas emission reductions arising from Fund sponsored projects.51 It meets at least annually at
locations the Bank considers appropriate, so as to allow for
interaction with the participants.52 Further, representatives of
the Host County Committee attend Participants’ Meetings and
Participants’ Committee Meetings as observers in order to further strengthen the interaction between the Fund and the Host
Countries.53 These provisions are ground-breaking in that they
allow meaningful participation by non-contributing developing
countries and EIT countries in the work of an international
trust fund.

ADMINISTERING A PORTFOLIO OF EMISSION
REDUCTION CREDITS
As the PCF was being established to implement the Kyoto
Mechanisms, there was no established modality or consensus as
to the nature of the instruments that would reflect the participants’ interests in their pro rata shares of greenhouse gas emission reductions. The precise nature of the Bank’s obligations as
trustee with respect to such instruments was, therefore,
unknown and the Bank’s responsibilities had to be framed in a
way that took the evolving nature of the international framework into account. Therefore, the Instrument provides that the
Bank, as trustee, will facilitate the process of validating, verifying, and certifying emission reduction credits earned by Fundsponsored projects.54 Additionally, the Instrument explicitly
authorizes the Trustee to carry out this function by engaging
qualified third parties to perform those functions in accordance
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with relevant standards and criteria “to be developed under the
regulatory framework of the UNFCCC and/or national laws.”55
The Bank as trustee also facilitates the transfer of greenhouse
gas emission reduction credits from the Host Countries to the
participants, although the scope of this obligation to facilitate is
not entirely clear.56 In order to enhance the Bank’s ability to
perform this function, the Bank has the authority to engage third
persons to serve as registrar, transfer agent, or custodians in
respect of the Fund’s property, including instruments evidencing
participants’ entitlement to greenhouse gas emission reductions,
as necessary.57
With respect to reporting obligations to the participants, the
Bank reports bi-annually to participants on the operation of the
Fund and provides each participant with a statement of account
regarding its share of Fund property.58 Further, it agreed to produce a statement of account, at the participant’s request, which
confirms the participant’s pro rata share of greenhouse gas emission reduction credits held by the Fund.59 The Instrument
explicitly exempts the Bank, however, from any responsibility
to ensure that greenhouse gas emission reduction credits earned
by the PCF will be credited under the UNFCCC or the Kyoto
Protocol.60 The most the Bank could undertake was to “endeavor to ensure” that the contractual arrangements entered into
among it, the participants, and the Host Countries and Project
Entities would be “structured flexibly so as to enable them to
conform with the guidelines, modalities and procedures of the
regulatory framework of the UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol if, when,
and as they are developed.”61

A NOVEL FINANCIAL INTEREST
In addition to the issues regarding the legal nature of the
PCF itself, an additional question arose about the precise legal
nature of the participants’ interests in the PCF. This issue surfaced because the participants expected a return on their contributions to the Fund (the emission reduction credits to be garnered from Fund-sponsored projects), and this meant that participants’ interests in the Fund could, conceivably, be regarded
as securities.62 If such interests were, in fact, securities, then any
efforts undertaken within the United States to solicit interest in
the Fund amongst potential participants would have to be conducted within the defined rubric permitted under U.S. Securities
Laws, or the equivalent of such laws in any other jurisdiction in
which the Fund was being marketed.

THE LEGAL STATUS OF INTERESTS IN THE FUND
FOR SECURITIES LAWS PURPOSES
The Bank pursued the question of whether interests in the
Fund were securities in the Netherlands, Finland, Norway,
Sweden, Japan, Canada, and the United States, countries where
the Carbon Team were conducting conferences, talks, and consultations on the Fund in these countries as a way of soliciting
interest in it. In Europe and Japan, the answer was straightforward; interests in the Fund would not be regarded as securities.
In the United States and Canada, however, the situation was far
less clear; arguments could be made either way. The vagaries of
Canadian law were not a major obstacle as initial interest in the
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Fund from the Canadian private sector was limited, and Canada
was not a prime target market. The lack of clarity under U.S.
law, however, was a major stumbling block. The United States
was a target market and, by virtue of the location of the Bank’s
headquarters in Washington, D.C., many of the Carbon Team’s
solicitation activities were held in the United States. Moreover,
U.S. Securities Laws have a degree of extra-territorial reach,
depending on whether an issuer’s activities abroad may have an
effect within the United States.63
Although the Bank, as an international organization, is
immune from the application of U.S. and other national securities laws, it voluntarily complies with the requirements of such
laws in all jurisdictions in which it issues securities. The proper
functioning of the Bank depends on its ability to sell its bonds
on the international financial market.64 The Bank goes to considerable lengths to preserve investor confidence in its bonds, in
part, by operating in accordance with the norms and requirements of the national securities laws in the markets where bonds
are sold. Thus, the Bank did not want to risk damaging its good
standing in the U.S. market (one of the largest markets for its
bonds), and the excellent relations it has with the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”), by acting in a manner,
vis-à-vis the PCF, that was inconsistent with its scrupulous voluntary observance of U.S. Securities Laws and SEC regulations
in respect to its own bonds.
The uncertainty under U.S. law arose from the broad definition of what constitutes a “security.” A “security,” according
to the United States Supreme Court in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,65
is something that creates a “financial relationship” between the
parties and looks like an “investment contract.”66 Further, an
“investment contract,” according to the Supreme Court, has certain key characteristics: it is a contract, transaction, or scheme
whereby a person invests money in a common enterprise and is
led to expect profits, derived solely or essentially from the
efforts of the promoter of the enterprise or a third party.67
Analyzing participants’ interests in the PCF under this definition, interests could be regarded as securities. The Fund gives
rise to a financial relationship between the participants inter se
and between the participants and the Bank as Trustee.
Additionally, it involves the investment of money in a common
enterprise, with the expectation of earning greenhouse gas emission reduction credits which could be derived from the efforts of
parties other than the participants.68
On the other hand, several factors support the position that
interests in the PCF are not securities. The Bank is a development institution, not a for-profit institution, and many of the participants in the PCF are governments. Moreover, PCF’s primary
purpose is to provide an opportunity for all affected parties, participants, the Bank, and Host Countries to pilot the Kyoto
Mechanisms and to “learn by doing.” True, the participants saw
involvement in the PCF as a way of receiving emission reductions credits, and such credits would count against any future
domestic or international legal obligations to reduce their emission reductions that might accrue to them in the future.
However, those obligations were putative, potential future obli32

gations as they were just evolving and in a very nascent state at
the time the PCF was established. Arguably, therefore, the participants’ hope that their contributions to the PCF might at some
point in the future help satisfy those obligations, fell short of an
actual “expectation of profit.”69
The Bank sought SEC advice on how interests in the PCF
should be characterized. Pending receipt of this advice, however, a decision had to be made on how to proceed. Needless to
say, concerns about the precise legal nature of participants’
interests in the PCF were far from the Carbon Team’s radar
screen. Their key concern was to build public and private sector
knowledge and interest in the
PCF, the opportunities it offered
to be involved in piloting the
Kyoto Mechanisms, and the
implications of the Kyoto
Mechanisms for countries and
industry over the long term. The
very newness of the concepts
necessitated an extensive and
aggressive marketing campaign.
Accordingly, they were engaged
in an extensive worldwide effort
to promote the PCF by giving
speeches, holding conferences,
and meeting with government
and industry representatives. In
addition, they launched a public
PCF website. In the face of the
uncertain legal status of interests in the PCF, these marketing
efforts became a cause for concern. If interests in the PCF were
considered securities, then these efforts clearly flew in the face
of U.S. Securities laws and regulations; the Bank had not filed
any information on the PCF with the SEC or followed any of the
SEC’s registration requirements. The Bank had no inclination to
do so because registering with the SEC is a time-consuming
process and is inconsistent with the accelerated pace at which
the Bank was planning to launch the PCF.
Pending guidance from the SEC, the Bank decided to strike
a midway point and to conduct its PCF marketing activities in
accordance with the requirements of the “private placement
exemption” to the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1933 (the
“1933 Act”).70 Under that exemption, transactions “not involving any public offering” are exempt from the registration
requirements of the 1933 Act.71 The exemption is premised on
the notion that not all investors are equal and that institutional
investors that are sufficiently sophisticated and have sufficiently strong bargaining positions do not need the protections of federal registration.
The parameters of this exemption have evolved through
case law. In SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., the Supreme Court
established guidelines for the application of the exemption.72 It
held that the exemption only applies if: (1) the offering is made
to a limited number of offerees, all of whom have access to the
type of information that would be contained in a registration

statement filed under the 1933 Act; (2) the offerees are sufficiently sophisticated to demand and interpret the information
provided to them; and (3) the offering is of a limited size both
in terms of the number of securities offered and the aggregate
offering price.73 The Court also indicated that the requirement
that the offer be made only to a limited number of offerees is
more readily established if it can be shown that the issuer has a
pre-existing relationship with the offerees.74
The burden of proof for establishing that the exemption
applies lies on the party claiming its protection.75 That party
must show that the exemption’s requirements are met not only
with respect to each purchaser
but also with respect to each
offeree.76 Indeed, the exemption has been held not to apply
where the issuer could adduce
no evidence concerning the
actual number of offerees,
the offerees’ particular characteristics or of a relationship
between the issuer and numerous offerees.77 Further, any
public advertising is regarded
as inconsistent with a claim of
a private offering.78 And the
use of investment seminars and
other promotional meetings
will lead to the denial of the
exemption.79
Thus, the decision to market interests in the PCF within the
boundaries of the private placement exception had wide-sweeping ramifications. The constraint on the nature of potential participants who could be approached and the size of the Fund were
not a problem; the PCF was designed for corporate, not retail,
participants, and the maximum size of the Fund (consistent with
its pilot nature) was $150 million.80 But the constraints on the
number of offerees meant that the Carbon Team had to completely change their way of doing business. It stymied their
wide-ranging road shows and investment seminars, in which
they would convey information on the terms and proposed size
of the fund and predictions relating to its performance and the
value of the greenhouse gas emission reductions it was hoped
Fund-sponsored projects would generate. Instead, the Team’s
communications about the PCF had to be pre-screened and edited by Bank lawyers. Even seemingly innocuous communications, such as several pages of a draft article written for
Environment Affairs magazine, were pre-screened. The Carbon
Team was also restricted in the kinds of meetings they could
hold and on the numbers of attendees they could allow. Further,
they had to dismantle their public website and erect a new one
devoid of anything that could be construed as an exhortation to
participate in the PCF. They erected a separate password-protected site for potential participants, who were given access
once they signed a memorandum of understanding with the
Bank indicating their intention to participate in the Fund.

Less keenly
appreciated…was the
fact that in creating
the Fund, a significant
amount of “learning by
doing” would involve
trusts and securities law.
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These constraints gave rise to many tensions. The rigid
requirements of the private placement exemption were directly
at odds with the Carbon Team’s strong need to market the Fund
and encourage governments and industry to participate. The
Team viewed the constraints as a muzzle and argued that they
would kill the Fund’s prospects for success. The constraints
were also at odds with the Bank’s broader need to highlight its
leadership in international environmental matters and its institutional mandate to be open and transparent. The Bank’s credibility was especially important in the post-Kyoto Protocol world as
non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) had already voiced
suspicion of the PCF. NGOs publicly accused the Bank of trying to corner the market in emissions reductions trading. NGOs
also claimed that the Bank was helping the Western World at the
expense of developing countries by plucking “the low-hanging
fruit” that would earn emission reductions credits for those
Western nations.81
Nonetheless, the balance tipped in favor of guarding the
Bank’s reputation and the market standing of its bonds. While
the Bank ran the risk of being sued for failing to disclose information or for providing inadequate disclosure by a disgruntled
participant, the likelihood of this occurring was relatively
remote. Instead, the Bank’s main risk was to its reputation for
violating U.S. Securities Laws. The Bank potentially faced negative press (should the Bank be found in violation of the laws of
its largest shareholder), revocation of its then fifty-year-old legislative exemption from registering its securities in the U.S., and
an investigation of its securities and investment operations by
U.S. Government General Accounting Office, SEC, or similar

entity. The Bank might also face collateral negative effects on
replenishment legislation concerning the Bank’s sister organization, the International Development Association, in the U.S.
Congress and erosion of the benign treatment the SEC had
accorded to the Bank over the years due to its credibility as a
good citizen. The prospect of this parade of horrors meant that
the conservative approach of relying on the private placement
exemption prevailed.

CONCLUSION
Despite facing many new issues and competing needs and
concerns, the Fund successfully closed on April 10, 2000 at the
level of $135 million, and was considered a major triumph in
ingenuity and perseverance.82 From its conception, the Fund
involved both a collaboration and a conflict between two very
different worlds: the new, dynamic, fast-changing world of
international environmental law, and the more rigid, tightly construed world of trust law principles and financial securities
(which in the case of trusts date back to the 1800s and in the
case of securities originates in the U.S. post-depression era of
the early 1930s). Therefore, in addition to being a pilot for the
Kyoto Mechanisms, the Fund also served as a pilot for a new
form of public/private sector international trust fund and for a
new form of security, or quasi-security. Already, its governance
structure has become a precedent; in the five years since it was
established, many new carbon funds have been created for
which the Bank acts as trustee, including, for example, the BioCarbon Fund, the Community-Driven Carbon Fund and separate Italian, Danish and Dutch Funds. The nature of the participants’ interests in those funds remains an open question.
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THE CARBON EMISSIONS MARKET BOTTOMS OUT
IN ONE SOUTH AFRICAN COMMUNITY
By Rachael Moshman*
the creation of the Prototype Carbon Fund (“PCF”) on July
embers of the Durban, South Africa community
20, 1999.6 The PCF aims to reduce climate change and proare not celebrating the most recent international
solution for addressing climate change. The
mote the World Bank’s goals for sustainable development.7
Kyoto Protocol, an international agreement to reduce greenWhile PCF projects are meant to attract investments in
house gas emissions, went into effect in early 2005 with
developing countries under the CDM,8 it is possible the
some optimism for what a carbon
World Bank also recognized
emissions-based market could do
an opportunity for profit in a
for preventing climate change.
burgeoning carbon emissions
For the citizens of Durban, howmarket. The World Bank has
ever, the carbon emissions
established itself as a broker of
market is contributing to a future
carbon
emission
trading
of continuing health concerns
between the North and the
and life next to a toxic landfill.
South, for which it will charge a
Through Flexible Mechcommission of eight to ten
anisms in the Kyoto Protocol,
percent.9 Though the World
Bank claims it charges the comcountries and private companies
mission only to cover costs, a
are able to buy credits for carbon
memo leaked from the World
emissions reduced in other
Bank in 1999 estimates that the
countries to compensate for the
bank saw its involvement as
carbon emissions they are
brokers bringing a potential
not reducing themselves.1 The
Clean Development Mechanism
profit earning of $100 million in
(“CDM”) encourages developed
just the first year.10
countries and private companies
In the meantime, comto invest in emission reduction
plaints about PCF projects,
projects in developing countries
which have now been estabin exchange for carbon credits
lished all over the developing
that will be counted as a reducworld,11 have been surfacing
tion in the funder’s overall
from the communities that are
Boy walking past the Bisasar Landfill.
carbon emissions output.2
supposed to be benefiting from
The funding of carbon emission reduction projects for
these projects. Durban, South Africa, a community predomthe developing world is an attempt to address the inequitable
inantly populated by people of color,12 is home to the
impact that developing countries experience from climate
Bisasar Road landfill, which was established during
change. The developed world has been contributing to cliapartheid.13 The South African Government used the landfill
mate degradation since the first days of industrialization.
to deposit toxic waste coming from mostly white communiSince 1850, 80 percent of all carbon dioxide emissions have
ties.14 Once an area full of beautiful biological diversity,
come from developed countries, and developed countries
Durban has become a toxic, foul-smelling wasteland sufferwill continue to contribute far more than developing couning from increased cancer clusters in the immediate vicinity
tries for some time to come.3 Meanwhile, although climate
of the landfill.15
change is caused disproportionately by the industrialized
world,4 developing countries are more susceptible to natural
disasters brought on by climate change.5
* Rachael Moshman is a J.D. and M.A. (International Affairs) candidate,
Apparently recognizing the unequal impact of climate
2006, at American University, Washington College of Law and the School of
International Service.
change on developing countries, the World Bank approved
Patrick Bond, Centre for Civil Society
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Durban received election-time assurances from the
African National Congress that the site would be closed.16
However, in 2002 the World Bank promised profits for the
mayor of Durban in exchange for implementing a project
that would capture methane gas escaping from the landfill
and convert it into electricity.17 The World Bank receives
$15 million dollars for the Durban Landfill Gas to Energy
project from funders looking to trade in carbon credits.18
While the World Bank promises that the project positively
affects local groundwater and air quality, creates a small
increase in skilled local jobs, and brings profit for the
municipality,19 the quality of life of people living near the
landfill continues to be debilitated. Cancer remains a threat,
and now the power plants that generate electricity from the

landfill’s captured methane produce noise and toxic gases,
such as benzene and formaldehyde.20
With the World Bank choice to fund PCF projects such
as the Durban site, which represents relatively profitable
pickings when compared to projects that could bring real
sustainable change to the developing world, the developing
world will continue to suffer disproportionately from climate change. Today, the people of Durban are suffering
twofold from the passing of the Kyoto Protocol. Not only is
this added suffering legally sanctioned by the Kyoto
Protocol, but the developed world can continue to emit carbon dioxide because it has been granted that right by the
funding of a harmful project.
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ADAPTING TO SEA CHANGE:
MANAGING MARINE RESOURCES IN THE FACE OF CLIMATE UNCERTAINTIES
By Stephen T. Hesse*
INTRODUCTION
f Captain Kirk of the Starship Enterprise was right and space
is the final frontier, then our oceans and their unexplored
trenches and seamounts are a close second. For now though
the heavens can wait: in the short-term, preserving our oceans
and maintaining successful stewardship of marine resources are
far more important to human prosperity. For better or worse, by
the middle of this century we will know if we have succeeded,
and our success will depend on how quickly, and comprehensively, we respond to the unpredictable climate changes that
have already begun to impact our oceans and marine resources.
Many of us have grown up with pictures taken from space
that reveal Earth is a sparkling blue planet, dominated by water.
Oceans cover more than 70 percent of Earth’s surface and
plunge as deep as eleven kilometers or 6.8 miles. In 2002, fishermen extracted around 84 million tons of fish from the planet’s seas and oceans, and more
than 2.6 billion people – half the
world’s population – received at
least twenty percent of their animal protein primarily from
marine sources.1
In the U.K. no one lives
more than 125 kilometers from
the sea, eighty percent of
Australians live within fifty
kilometers of the ocean, and in the U.S. more than half of the
population lives in coastal watershed counties. Looking seaward, the U.S. has the largest exclusive economic zone (“EEZ”)
in the world, extending 200 nautical miles offshore along
13,000 miles of coastline and encompassing 3.4 million square
nautical miles of ocean (a square nautical mile equals 1.3 square
miles). About one half of the U.S. gross domestic product
($4.5 trillion in 2000) is generated in coastal areas and adjacent
open waters.2 Considering the importance of the ocean, it is
amazing how little we know about our seas. The U.S.
Commission on Ocean Policy acknowledged in its Ocean
Blueprint that “the oceans remain one of the least explored and
most poorly understood environments on the planet.” Yet we
depend on their riches in countless ways.
The seas provide global transportation routes that link ports
worldwide and are the lifelines of coastal economies and inland
cities. Our coasts are havens for recreation and tourism, while
coastal and offshore fisheries provide jobs and essential protein
for food. Coral reefs and unexplored deep waters host abundant

I

biodiversity that may prove invaluable in the search for pharmaceuticals and new food sources. Scattered across the ocean
floor, too, are mineral riches, gas and oil deposits, as well as
geothermal resources. The seas offer other sources of energy as
well, including waves, tidal action, and temperature differentials
that can be harnessed to produce electricity. And some of the
most valuable riches that our coastal areas and open waters offer
are those that are most difficult to value, including “global climate control, life support, cultural heritage, and the aesthetic
value of the ocean with its intrinsic power to relax, rejuvenate,
and inspire.”3
Despite the invaluable role the oceans play in modern society and the unknown riches of their seemingly boundless depths,
multiple human threats endanger our seas, including anthropogenic climate changes. This article will offer a brief look at
our oceans, the resources and
services they provide, and how
we are treating them. It will
then consider how climate
changes affect these waters and
the marine resources that underpin our fisheries and seafood
industry, followed by a look at
some public assessments of our
seas and some private initiatives
that are seeking to conserve
marine resources. It will also
offer some thoughts on how climate change may provide an incentive for fishing industries,
conservationists, the business sector, and governments to cooperate in addressing the critical issues of sustainable development
related to marine exploitation and conservation. Perhaps, in
doing so, this article will offer an impetus for greater cooperation on other issues related to environment and change.

With increasing climate
change, we are facing
unprecedented changes
to our seas.
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HUMAN DEPENDENCE ON MARINE RESOURCES
In the United States alone, more than thirteen million jobs
are tied to maritime trade. Annual offshore oil and gas extraction
is valued at between $25 and $40 billion, and marine-sourced
pharmaceuticals and bio-products are part of a growing industry, potentially worth billions of dollars.4 The most familiar
resources we pull from the oceans are fish, but the fish themselves are only part of an economic and cultural tradition that

* Stephen T. Hesse is a professor in the Law Faculty of Chuo University, Tokyo,
Japan, and an environmental columnist for The Japan Times.

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY

Andy Bruckner, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

industrial wastes. The magnitude of the problem is amplified as
enriches towns and cities of coastal regions worldwide. Fish
wastes from communities across the globe are finding their way
provide a healthy source of protein, and hundreds of thousands
into our oceans through atmospheric emissions, point-source
of jobs ranging from fishing to transport to retail. In the U.S., the
and runoff discharges, as well as direct dumping. These wastes
annual value of the commercial fishing industry exceeds
include industrial and agricultural chemicals, oil spills and
$28 billion, while recreational saltwater fishing is worth another
5
petroleum products, heavy metals, and radioactive substances.
$20 billion. The coasts are home to millions of Americans and
And from these same waters we pull the fish and shellfish
attract millions more who come for recreation and tourism, one
we eat. For human society, global fisheries are some of the most
of the fastest growing business sectors in the U.S. and its terriimportant food resources available, yet we are undermining
tories. These visitors spend billions of dollars, providing jobs
their survival. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the
for millions of workers. For instance, money spent on recreUnited Nations (“FAO”) estimates that only about one-quarter
ational boating annually tops $30 billion.6
of monitored ocean fish populations are underexploited (three
Unfortunately, despite these economic benefits, we do a
percent of all ocean fish) or moderately exploited (21 percent of
poor job of assessing and valuing the intrinsic services our
all ocean fish)11 and could produce more.12
oceans and coastal waters provide. We do not appreciate how
climate control is regulated through carbon sequestration and
In contrast, 52 percent of fish stocks are fully exploited,
how the ocean serves as hatcheries for the fish and shellfish we
producing catches that are close to maximum sustainable limits.
take for granted.7 Considering how much coastal communities
Even further, sixteen percent are overexploited, seven percent
benefit from tourism dollars and the seaside real estate market,
are depleted, and one percent is recovering from depletion.13
it is surprising that we have not done a better job of putting monConservation is necessary for rejuvenation of these populations.
etary values on sandy beaches, clean water, and unobstructed
Of the top ten fish species that provide about 30 percent of
ocean views. Far too often, we do not realize the full worth of
the fish we consume, seven of those species are either fullythese natural assets until an oil spill or careless development
exploited or over-exploited.14 Along with over-fishing of
target species, by-catch is also a serious problem contributing to
takes them away from us, and only then do we measure the loss
the decline of marine resources worldin terms of fish killed or tourism lost.
wide. By-catch refers to the non-target
But accidents and carelessness are
species that are hauled aboard with tarnot the only causes of marine degradaget species then tossed overboard
tion. Decades of coastal disturbance,
because they are not commercially
resource extraction, waste disposal, and
valued.15
fishing have compromised the biological
8
Consciously and unconsciously,
health of our seas. All along our coasts
we continue to construct port infrastrucwe continue to compromise the biologiture, resort and recreation facilities, and
cal health and productivity of our
barriers and jetties to prevent flooding
oceans. Increasingly we understand the
and erosion. These, in combination with
impacts of our actions and many comdredging for navigation, alter and
munities with political will and finandegrade coastal and riparian ecosystems
cial resources have begun to address
that are important nurseries for marine
some of these problems. But for the
life. Offshore we drill for gas and oil,
most part, we still place great demands
and drag heavy trawling gear along huge
on our oceans. These demands are
swaths of the sea bottom to gather fish
increasing faster than our understanding
and shellfish. These activities degrade
of the consequences of these actions.
the marine environment, stirring up sedNevertheless, recognizing the critical
iment, destroying habitat, and reducing
role oceans play in our food supply and
the valuable diversity of life that once
global economy is the first step; the
thrived on the ocean floor.9
next is to better understand our currentIn addition to the bounty we have
ly altered seas and then examine how
Coral bleaching is one result of climate change and
extracted from the oceans, we have
climate changes will impact the oceans
changing sea temperatures.
assumed that our boundless oceans can take
and our own use of maritime resources.
as much abuse as they can provide us benefits. For centuries, we
THE REALITY OF CLIMATE CHANGE
have used our rivers, bays, and oceans as dumps. Relying on the
For scientists worldwide, there has never been any doubt
outdated adage, “dilution is the solution to pollution,” we conthat climate change is a reality. The essence of most global
tinue to use our seas in this manner, even as our wastes have drawarming and climate change debates over the past two decades
matically changed in quantity and quality.10 What was once an
has not been about confirming or denying climate change.
easy way to dispose of sewage and simple garbage remains the
Instead, it has focused on determining how much influence
default mode worldwide for disposal of human, animal, and
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human activities have on our global climate, and in turn on our
planetary biosphere.16
In 2001, the United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (“IPCC”) offered the most widely accepted and
definitive consensus on the issue. The panel announced, “[t]here
is new stronger evidence that most of the warming observed
over the last [fifty] years is attributable to human activities.”17
Since then, contrarians have criticized the IPCC’s conclusions,
but the vast majority of scientists agree that today’s warming
trend is aided by human industrial activity.
More recently, the Arctic Council, an intergovernmental
forum comprising the eight arctic nations, released a report
detailing the effects climate change is having on our natural
resources. The Council’s findings are of particular importance to
policymakers and scientists. One such conclusion states:
Ice cores and other evidence of climate conditions in
the distant past provide evidence that rising atmospheric carbon dioxide levels are associated with rising
global temperatures. Human activities, primarily the
burning of fossil fuels (coal, oil, and natural gas) and
secondarily the clearing of land, have increased the
concentration of carbon dioxide, methane, and other
heat-trapping (“greenhouse”) gases in the atmosphere.
Since the start of the industrial revolution, the atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration has increased by
about 35% and the global average temperature has
risen by about 0.6ºC. There is an international scientific consensus that most of the warming observed over
the last fifty years is attributable to human activities.18
Two months after the release of the Arctic Council’s report,
a British government report on the state of the U.K.’s coastal
waters affirmed the findings of the Arctic report:
Human activity has already resulted in adverse changes
to marine life and continues to do so. … There is also
evidence that the marine ecosystem is being altered by
climate change: for example sea temperatures are rising and the distribution of plankton species is changing. These changes pose a real threat to the balance and
integrity of the marine ecosystem.19
Immediately after that report, scientists from Scripps
Institution of Oceanography at the University of California at
San Diego announced that they had produced clear evidence of
ocean warming and confirmed that the warming is primarily the
result of human activities.20 And, just one month later, another
group of researchers offered further proof that the oceans are
warming and rising. The team of U.S. federal and university scientists at the National Center for Atmospheric Research released
a study suggesting that, even if we stop emitting greenhouse
gases into the atmosphere, global sea levels will continue to rise
eleven centimeters (four inches) by 2100, due to thermal expansion from the warming of the seas as a result of those emissions
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we have already released.21 Some sources argue that we cannot
stop our emissions, and so greater sea level rise is inevitable.22

CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE IMPACT ON OUR SEAS
Before considering the impacts of climate change on fisheries, it is worth looking at the potential effects climate change
will have on our oceans and coastal areas. Of these, perhaps the
easiest to visualize, and the most daunting, is the rise in sea
level. Two mechanisms cause ocean levels to rise: thermal
expansion and fluctuation of polar ice caps and glaciers, both
caused by increases in temperature.23
Over the past hundred years, sea levels have been rising
about one to two millimeters per year. This is primarily due to
thawing following the last ice age. According to the U.S.
National Safety Council (“NSC”), this trend will continue
unabated due to warming from human emissions of carbon
dioxide and other greenhouse gases. As the NSC notes, “the
only real disagreement or uncertainty is how high the sea will
rise and how fast.”24 Recent computer models estimate that over
the next several hundred years sea levels could rise as much as
three feet.25 This could have a devastating effect: with hundreds
of millions of people living in low lying and coastal areas, rising seas are certain to endanger human settlements worldwide.
In addition, as oceans warm and rise, storm surges will
become an increasing threat to life and property. Storm surges
occur when the mean sea-surface height rises during hurricanes
and typhoons, causing waves and tides that accompany the
storms to become correspondingly higher.26 Storm surges
increase the risk of severe coastal damage and flooding, including flooding along inland rivers. Changing water levels, including flooding and storm surges, will also affect navigation in
bays, ports, and tidal rivers, impacting transportation and commerce, and requiring costly changes in navigational infrastructure.
Similarly, a decrease in water levels results in numerous
problems. In areas where climate change causes reduced rainfall, water levels in rivers are likely to drop.27 With less water
to dilute pollutants and nutrients, pollution concentrations in
coastal areas will rise. Where precipitation decreases, groundwater levels will also drop, and this in combination with rising
sea levels will result in greater saltwater intrusion into coastal
groundwater supplies. Less river water flow also contributes to
warmer waters entering the oceans, further exacerbating the
warming of seawater that is already occurring. In other areas,
however, where warmer temperatures are causing increased glacial and polar cap melting, the increasing flow of fresh, cold
water is likely to cool water temperature and dilute salinity.
Since changes in salinity and water temperature also affect
ocean water circulation, it is clear that changing climactic conditions will impact oceans and coastal waters in myriad ways
that vary dramatically from place to place and from season to
season. In short, with increasing climate change, we are facing
unprecedented changes to our seas.
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IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON
MARINE RESOURCES
Scanning the headlines in the October 2004 issue of
SeaFood Business, there is no mention of climate change, but it
is clear that climate and weather are critical concerns for the
fishing industry. Some of the headlines read: “Hurricanes
Hammer Florida’s Seafood Industry;” “Red Tides Stifle Bivalve
Harvests;” “Crawfish Farmers Need Rain;” and “Hurricanes
Miss Red-snapper Fishery.”28 All too easily, weather can make
or break a fishing community, and can determine whether an
entire segment of the seafood industry stays afloat or sinks.
Simplifying the big picture, we see that complex and unpredictable feedback loops result when ocean temperatures warm
and alter weather patterns.29 Warming ocean temperatures cause
sea levels to rise, but in combination with salinity changes, they
also influence the “geographic distribution of marine biota and
can have direct effects on the species composition, breeding and
population dynamics of plankton, benthos, fish and other
species.”30 In contrast, cold water can affect growth rates, force
animals to move to warmer water, and cause species to redistribute.31
Coral reefs, for example, are some of the most diverse
ecosystems on the planet and are home to more than 25 percent
of all marine species. Besides acting as nurseries to young fish
and shellfish, they are invaluable for tourism and protect islands
and coastal areas from storm surges and pounding waves. In
recent years, bleaching incidents, when corals lose their characteristically bright colors, have increased dramatically worldwide
and directly correlate with warmer water temperatures.32 Even
a few degrees above-normal water temperatures may cause
corals to bleach and die. Corals, which are also highly sensitive
to changes in water chemistry, are damaged by any change in
chemical composition. For example, rising levels of carbon
dioxide (“CO2”) in the atmosphere create higher levels of CO2
in the seas, which in turn reduces the density and calcification
rate of corals.33
But the impact of warmer water is not just found in shallow
waters where corals live. Eight years ago, scientists at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (“MIT”) reported evidence that “deep-sea environments undergo climatically driven
temperature, nutrient and organic carbon flux changes during
glacial-interglacial cycles.”34 Previously it was believed that
marine life three kilometers or more below the surface of the
oceans was little affected by climactic changes, but this research
confirmed that climate changes even affect deep-sea biota.
Since climate changes impact both shallow water corals and
deep water benthic life,35 it is not surprising that ocean fisheries
are also affected. For simplicity’s sake, marine fisheries can be
divided into coastal and ocean fisheries. Of these, the former
will suffer greater impacts from climate change. According to
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “[w]etland loss,
salinity changes, and higher temperatures are likely to affect finfish and shellfish in the coastal zone. The most vulnerable
species are those that either reproduce in coastal wetlands,
spend their entire lifetimes in an estuary, or both.”36
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Peter Benchley, the author of Jaws, explains in a 2003 film,
“In Hot Water,” that the marshy grasslands of tidal estuaries provide food and nursery grounds for hundreds of species. He says
in the film, “when the water rises by just a few inches, it drowns
the marsh. And when we lose the marsh, we lose the base of the
food web.”37 Furthermore, certain migrating cold water species
are also especially susceptible to changes in water temperature.
Scientists have found that salmon (including sockeye), steelhead, chum, and coho eat more in warmer waters.38 However,
once temperature reaches a certain threshold the fish can starve
to death. If northern Pacific waters warm substantially, the
salmon will have to migrate further north or live at greater
ocean depths.
High seas fisheries are expected to suffer less impact from
climate changes because open-ocean fish are more mobile and
less location-dependent. They also regularly experience year-toyear variations in climate. Nevertheless, we are uncertain how
temperature changes will affect these fish, and in the meantime
human demands on these fisheries are increasing.
As mentioned earlier, many fish stock are either fullyexploited, over-exploited, or depleted. Looking at tuna stocks,
skipjack alone appears to have potential for increased catches,
while bigeye and yellow fin are now fully or over-exploited.39
If, due to warming, the high seas experience substantial changes
or fluctuations in temperature, it is unpredictable how these
changes will impact the nutrient cycling, food supply, migration
patterns, and fertility of fish stocks, particularly the commercial
favorites that are already heavily fished.
Aquaculture is beyond the purview of this article, but it is
worth noting that worldwide, and particularly in China, efforts
to raise freshwater and marine fish species are meeting with
considerable success. Aquaculture is expected to play an
increasing role in feeding the world’s growing population. Wild
fisheries, however, will remain the backbone of subsistence and
commercial fishing. Ichiro Nomura, Assistant Director-General
of the FAO Fisheries Department recently stated that, “in light
of current trends, the continued improvement of management of
wild fish stocks is essential. Aquaculture may help reduce pressure on capture fisheries by reducing demand for wild fish and
lowering prices, but that’s only part of the solution.”40

HISTORY OF INACTION HIGHLIGHTS
THE NEED TO ACT
As Yogi Berra once said, “[w]hen you come to a fork in the
road, take it.” There is a growing consensus, symbolized by the
international movement to create a Nobel Prize for
Sustainability, that we are at a crossroads in human history.
Unless we begin to transform the relationship of humans to each
other and the environment in a way that acknowledges the interdependence of economic, social, and natural resources, our children and grandchildren will not be able to experience the same
quality of life that we have enjoyed. Indeed, they may be facing
an unprecedented global crisis if current trends in global
warming, water shortages, desertification, and ozone depletion
continue.41
40

The two ecosystems where this transformation is most crucial are our forests and our oceans. These troves of biological
diversity are the foundation upon which all our needs rest.
Oceans sequester carbon and are the “central bank” of the water
cycle. They also play a key role in moderating global temperatures and provide food for much of the world’s population.
Preserving these oceans and their fisheries is a challenge that
must be an integral part of any plan for global sustainability.

eries instruments, including the U.N. Fish Stocks Agreement,
the FAO Compliance Agreement, and the FAO Code of Conduct
for Responsible Fisheries.47
For the most part, however, the world’s fisheries remain
poorly understood, insufficiently managed, and highly vulnerable to the vagaries of fishers, markets, and ecosystem dynamics,
including weather and climate changes. Recognizing there are
numerous variables that impact fisheries, as well as diverse
local, national, and regional stakeholders with interests in fisheries management, it is obvious that conserving and managing
global fish resources for future generations will require a worldwide public and private effort that is cooperative, comprehensive, and fair.

Robert and Carol Herbertson

GOVERNMENT AWARENESS IS GROWING

The Viedna Glacier in the Patagonia Icefield, Argentina. Global warming
causes glaciers to melt, which contributes to rising sea levels.

The freedom to fish on the high seas can be traced to the
seventeenth century writings of Grotius and Roman law.42
Today, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(“UNCLOS”), which entered into force in 1994, is the cornerstone of the current legal regime regulating the high seas.43
Article 87 of UNCLOS affirms the principle of “freedom of the
high seas,” which includes “freedom of fishing,” but these freedoms have limitations.44 As noted in Article 87(2), “these freedoms shall be exercised by all States with due regard for the
interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the
high seas.”45 Theory and practice, however, depart from this
view: “[F]reedom to fish on the high seas combined in most
cases with a de facto open access to fishery resources has resulted in a serious and problematic situation, characterized most
notably by the lack of incentives for individuals to constrain
fishing effort and comply with conservation measures.”46
Conservation efforts in the last century have focused primarily on local or regional waters. Until the 1980s, regional
fisheries bodies (“RFB”) mainly undertook research and advisory functions, providing a forum for management discussions
rather than taking on decision-making and enforcement. Then,
the 1982 United Nations (“U.N.”) Convention on the Law of the
Sea, followed by the 1992 U.N. Conference on Environment
and Development, helped to usher in a new era for RFBs. Since
then, the international community has adopted a number of fish-
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Two recent reports illustrate that governments have finally
begun to appreciate this urgent need to conserve and manage
international water bodies. In mid-2004, the U.S. Commission
on Ocean Policy released An Ocean Blueprint for the 21st
Century.48 Later, in early 2005, the British Government published Charting Progress: An Integrated Assessment of the State
of UK Seas.49 Both publications reach similar conclusions about
the need for comprehensive cooperation and management.
The U.S. report offers a list of thirteen guiding principles to
steer the nation’s marine policy, beginning with sustainability.
“Sustainability” is defined as “…meet[ing] the needs of the
present generation without compromising the ability of future
generations to meet their needs.” The remaining twelve principles are: (1) responsibility for stewardship of the oceans;
(2) recognition of “inextricably intertwined” ocean-landatmosphere connections; (3) ecosystem-based management
rather than based on political boundaries; (4) multiple use management “that balances competing uses while preserving and
protecting the overall integrity of the ocean and coastal environments;” (5) preservation of marine biodiversity; (6) decisionmaking based on the best available science and information;
(7) adaptive management; (8) understandable laws and clear
decisions “governing uses of ocean and coastal resources;”
(9) participatory governance ensuring widespread participation
of citizens; (10) timeliness and predictability of ocean governance systems; (11) accountability of decision makers and the
public; and (12) international responsibility to act “cooperatively with other nations in developing and implementing international ocean policy.”50
The U.K. report suggests seven “Actions” to take in dealing
with ocean management, and these are divided into two categories.51 The first category is “knowledge of the marine ecosystem” and calls for: (1) the development of marine ecosystem
indicators; (2) “marine monitoring activities, to identify gaps
and to develop a more comprehensive approach to U.K. Marine
Monitoring;” and (3) “the promotion of marine research into the
more fundamental gaps in basic knowledge.”52
The second category raises four “institutional issues,”
including: (1) “pooling scientific expertise and ensuring that the
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relationship of work on specific issues to the broader marine
environment is properly understood;” (2) establishing “a national framework for managing marine data and information based
on the principle of ‘capture once and use many times’;” (3)
developing “a better understanding of how climate change
affects the marine environment;” and (4) adopting a proposed
Marine Bill “to facilitate the application of ecosystem approach
to sustainable development.”53 The U.K. report also calls for
“achieving a fuller and more comprehensive understanding of
the state of the seas and so of improving the quality of marine
stewardship. All actions will require a coordinated, multi-sector
approach to fulfill the vision we have for the marine
ecoystem.”54
While the U.S. Blueprint focuses more on guiding policymaking and the U.K. report more on acquisition and effective
use of knowledge, the two reports stress the importance of sustainability and share three key means of achieving this goal.
Both recognize the need for an ecosystem-based approach to
sustainable development and the use of marine resources; both
state the need for stewardship as a goal in managing these
resources; and both identify atmospheric issues as a concern.
However, the British call for “a better understanding of how climate change affects the marine environment,” whereas the U.S.
report states that marine policies should be based on the fact that
“oceans, land, and atmosphere are inextricably intertwined and
that actions that affect one Earth system component are likely to
affect another.”

ECOSOUND PROJECT
Another interesting initiative in the private sector is the
partnership between the New England Aquarium in Boston (the
“Aquarium”) and Ahold USA, the fifth largest grocery chain in
the United States. The partnership, called the EcoSound Project,
was created through a cooperative agreement between the
Aquarium and Ahold, in which the Aquarium helps Ahold buy
seafood from environmentally responsible sources.57
This innovative and unique partnership between conservationists and the seafood industry was made possible through
mutual cooperation and understanding about each partner’s

Changing water levels,
including flooding and
storm surges, will also
affect navigation in bays,
ports, and tidal rivers,
impacting transportation
and commerce…

PRIVATE INITIATIVES TO CONSERVE FISHERIES
ARE MAKING GAINS
The U.S. and U.K. reports illustrate a growing national
government awareness of the need for broad-based stewardship
and management in order to ensure sustainable marine
resources. However, the two representative governments still
lag behind the private sector in practical and innovative efforts
to conserve fisheries.

ECO-LABELING
One private sector initiative that is both encouraging better
management and successfully raising consumer awareness is
“eco-labeling,” such as that being undertaken by the Marine
Stewardship Council (“MSC”). MSC is a not-for-profit, nongovernment organization that certifies fisheries as well managed
and sustainable.55
The process begins with a request for certification. Then an
MSC team takes a comprehensive look at that fishery and determines whether it is well-managed. If the fishery passes certification, products from that fishery can be sold with the MSC
logo. As of March 2005, MSC certified eleven fisheries around
the world and more than four percent of the world’s wild fish
supply was in the MSC assessment process. There are now over
220 marine products stamped with the MSC eco-label in
22 countries.56
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goals. Ahold USA is a subsidiary of Europe-based Royal Ahold
and is the parent company of six supermarket chains with 1,600
stores across the U.S. serving twenty million customers.58 In
2000, Ahold approached the Aquarium, because its staff had a
record of successfully bringing together fisheries stakeholders.
“The Aquarium was involved in marine conservation, but was
not seen as an environmental advocacy organization that could
not work with fishermen. Ahold approached us with this idea of
auditing their seafood species,” explained Heather Tausig,
Director of Conservation for Global Marine Programs at the
Aquarium.59
The project was not a simple feat. As Tausig recalls, “traceability was a big issue…trying to find out where their seafood
was coming from, and increasing accountability. This was the
beginning of the seafood choices movement, and consumers
were starting to come to fish counters and ask questions.” Each
recommendation by the EcoSound team begins with a look at
Ahold’s present sources. The Aquarium researchers then survey
scientific literature, talk with scientists, and make site visits.
They also look at the history and population dynamics of the
species, any fishery management plans, levels of by-catch
(unwanted fish that are caught and often dumped), habitat
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impacts of fishing, and social and public concerns relating to
the fishery.60
The research takes considerable time, but Tausig feels that
the work is helping to encourage sustainable stewardship of
ocean resources, stating that “EcoSound is building powerful
incentives for sustainable fishing, rewarding progressive action
on the part of business and industry, and encouraging consumers
to make purchasing decisions that favor marine conservation.”61
The project is looking to expand with the Aquarium and Ahold
USA beginning to strategize how to expand to other restaurants,
food service providers, specialty food stores, and supermarket
chains.62
Increasingly, corporations such as Ahold recognize that
effective conservation policies are still nascent and are concerned that fish stocks are being exploited at increasing rates.
Aware that climate changes will make the situation even more
complex, forward-looking seafood industry executives are
moving proactively to protect and promote management of fish
stocks for the sake of future generations of consumers and
fishers, both commercial and subsistence.63

CONCLUSION: WORTH DOING IT BADLY,
TO DO IT BETTER
Recalling three key points from the U.S. and U.K. reports –
ecosystem-based marine management, responsible marine stewardship, and better understanding of the effects of climate
change – and considering these in combination with the MSC
and EcoSound initiatives, potential paradigms can be imagined
that orchestrate cooperation among the four key players: fisheries, conservationists, the business sector, and government.
Imagining, of course, is far easier than doing.
The goal of such a paradigm would be to ensure sustainable
management of fisheries worldwide. It requires successful coordination of local, national, and international environmental
regulation on a scope only achieved with the adoption and
implementation of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer. Nonetheless, we now see fishermen
working with MSC, and Boston Aquarium conservationists
working with corporate officers at Ahold USA. The remaining
link needed to complete this theoretical circle of stakeholders is
the participation of public officials.
Cooperation of this sort was pondered last autumn in
Seafood Business. K. Dun Gifford wrote an article entitled Some
Good Things are Starting to Happen, in which he states:
[i]magine that open-ocean fisheries were managed
wisely by officials who were knowledgeable about
fish, fishermen, fisheries business and environmental
considerations. If this dream turned to reality, some
truly wonderful things would happen:
• Oceans would be fished and farmed to protect long-term
production, not to generate the highest short-term cash
flow.

43

• Market prices for catches would rise and fall within a predictable and profitable range, which would reward fairly
the boat owners’ investments and crews’ labor.
• Fishing families would earn stable, year-round wages, and
their coastal communities would thrive on these fishing
wages and income generated by supporting businesses.
• Consumers would have stable supplies of high-quality local
seafood.
• An armistice would end the debilitating wars between fishermen and environmentalists; government regulators would
make quick realistic decisions; and court dockets would be
empty of head-of-the-pin fisheries cases.64
Gilford also asks whether this dream is too utopian. Perhaps
it is. But with human population growing, seafood consumption
increasing (and over fifty percent of our fisheries already fullyor over-exploited), sea levels rising, and unpredictable changes
in climate and weather already influencing human settlements
and activities, we are approaching a confluence of human and
environmental factors that demand action.
To stabilize marine resources and resource use at a sustainable level, and maintain that level into the foreseeable future,
our response to this confluence will require unprecedented
cooperation between fisheries, environmentalists, industry, and
government regulators. Still, the U.S. and U.K. reports illustrate
government recognition that public welfare demands more
knowledgeable and comprehensive ecosystem management and
biodiversity preservation. If the public sector moves forward
with a commitment to fulfilling this demand, and initiatives in
the private sector continue to succeed, and if the impacts of climate change further inspire progress in both these areas, the
result could be a perfect storm of positive feedback spurring
cooperation among key stakeholders for reasons of enlightened
self-interest, or simply fear and desperation.
Whatever the reasons for potential cooperation, one obvious downside is that international cooperation requiring transparency, accountability, and participatory governance on such a
global scale has never been attempted, and myriad obstacles will
ensure that efforts repeatedly stumble. The upside is that,
considering what is at stake, even the most halting successes
could provide the incentive for redoubled cooperation and further experimentation. And if cooperation among producers,
conservationists, industry, and government officials at the local,
regional, and international levels can achieve some measurable
success in buffering marine resources from human and climate change impacts, what planetary challenge of environmental concern would remain too daunting for this unwieldy
alliance to tackle? Certainly, the survival of our second to last
frontier demands that we try it. After all, as the author
G.K.Chesterton once exhorted, “If it’s worth doing, it’s worth
doing badly.”
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KEEPING IT PRIVATE, GOING PUBLIC:
ASSESSING, MONITORING, AND DISCLOSING THE GLOBAL WARMING
PERFORMANCE OF PROJECT FINANCE
by Julia Philpott*
INTRODUCTION
Many investment banks are beginning to pay attention to
the environmental and social impacts of their project finance.
On June 4, 2003, ten of the world’s largest banking institutions
entered into a watershed agreement to adopt a code of conduct
for addressing environmental and social issues related to their
financial activities. The voluntary code of conduct commits participating investment banks to finance only those infrastructure
projects in emerging market and transition economies (hereinafter, “developing countries”) in which developers can
demonstrate, to the satisfaction of the bank, compliance with
local environmental laws and social procedures.1 The banks
named this commitment the “Equator Principles.”
The Equator Principles, however, do not provide guidance
to bank analysts and project developers on how to address what
is arguably the most profound environmental and social risk facing the world today: global warming. Unfortunately, adequate
public policy and market incentives presently do not exist to
compel the banking industry to assess, monitor, and report the
greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions associated with its flows of
project finance in developing countries.2 Even when bank analysts and project developers take leadership positions and consider the risk of global warming, their focus typically is on the
risk that global warming poses to a single project or portfolio of
projects, rather than the risk that project financing poses to the
global environment.
Several questions emerge. Is it possible to assess quantitatively the global environmental quality of project finance? If
such quantification is possible, then is it possible to monitor and
report, in terms of absolute and relative GHG performance, on
who in the banking industry is helping and who is hurting the
global environment? If so, is it reasonable for the Equator
Principles to implement a measurable standard for the global
warming performance of its members’ project finance? The
answer to these questions is yes.
Among the Equator Banks, and within the banking industry
more broadly, there are also questions about disclosing at the project versus corporate level, attributing carbon dioxide (“CO2”)
emissions to debt versus equity capital, estimating emissions for
the life of a project versus year-by-year, and disclosing expansions, upgrades, and re-financing versus only new electricity
generation capacity (i.e., “greenfield” projects). To date, there is
no generally accepted framework providing guidance in
response to these questions.3 This gap is important. Before the
Equator Banks can implement and comply with a standard for
45

global warming performance, the banking industry needs a standardized, valid, and reliable approach for assessing, monitoring,
and disclosing project finance-related GHG emissions.
This article develops an analytical framework called the
Project Finance CO2 Discovery Framework in an attempt to
advance dialogue about the need for greater transparency and
accountability for the global warming performance of project
finance. The article begins by outlining some of the reasons why
a standardized framework is a good idea, the current situation in
regards to the Equator Principles and global warming performance standards, and some of the challenges of developing and
using a standardized framework. The next section provides a
detailed example of how to apply the framework at the project
level, using the electric power sector as an example. Following
is a detailed example of how to apply the framework at the corporate level, describing what the information outputs look like
and how they might be useful to analysts and policymakers. The
article discusses some of the framework’s limitations and political sensitivities and suggests some important areas in a future
research agenda. The article concludes with the observation that
the framework, because it helps reveal potential risks and opportunities concerning global environmental health, can help create
and deliver value for those financial institutions demonstrating
leadership in global environmental protection through their
investment choices and project finance decisions.

THE ISSUE
Investment banks, asset managers, and project developers
invest in, finance, and design large infrastructure projects—the
factories, roads, and power plants that support economic activity. Once built, infrastructure can operate for many decades.
Power plants, for instance, have rated lifetimes of 30 to 40
years; often, they have actual life spans lasting 60 to 70 years or
more.4 Because infrastructure lasts so long once built, one could
argue that it is literally the physical foundation locking in long* Julia A. Philpott researches and consults on the policy and economic connections between climate, energy, and the capital markets as they pertain to sustainable development. She holds a MSc degree in urban and regional planning, specialized in economic development in developing countries, and is pursuing a MBA
degree, specializing in global finance. The author thanks the following people for
reviewing and commenting on earlier drafts of this article: Matt Arnold, Forest
Trends; Michelle Chan-Fishel, Friends of the Earth; Foster Diebert, WestLB;
David Jhirad, World Resources Institute (“WRI”); Markus von Haniel, ABN
AMRO; Crescencia Maurer, WRI; Bill Moomaw, Tufts University; Joel Posters,
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Glenn Wiser, Center for International Environmental Law; and Daphne
Wysham, Institute for Policy Studies. Ms. Philpott welcomes comments at
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term energy consumption patterns. A bank’s investment and
finance decisions, such as financing investment in either a new
coal-fired power plant or a new natural gas-fired power plant,
has local air quality and global warming implications that may
persist downstream for generations. Yet, investment banks—
such as the Equator Banks—asset managers, and project developers make their technology choices and financial decisions
without sufficient assessment, transparency, and disclosure of—
and ultimately public accountability for—global environmental
health.

Is it possible to assess
quantitatively the
global environmental
quality of
project finance?
Today’s investment banks, asset managers, and project
developers will continue having influence over the world’s
GHG trajectory for generations to come. The Equator Banks’
influence is a reflection of the sheer volume of investment and
finance over which they have at least some, and often a significant, amount of control. In their research on the role of financial
institutions in a globalizing world economy, Hildyard and
Mansley note that “the combined assets of the world’s 50 largest
banks and financial companies account for 60 percent of the
world’s global capital.”5 London-based Dealogic, which produces statistics and analysis of the project finance market, estimates that 23 of the 25 banks that have signed on to the Equator
Principles arranged in 2003 a total of $55.1 billion of project
loans, that is, 75 percent of the $73.5 billion project loan market
volume in 2003.6 But while the Equator Banks and other financial actors exert influence over global environmental outcomes,
the Equator Principles do not include a code of conduct toward
the global environment.

CURRENT SITUATION
Fortunately, the situation is not entirely bleak. Several
banks are beginning to consider the global warming implications of their operational, and perhaps even more importantly,
their financial activities (e.g., project finance). For instance,
HSBC Holdings, headquartered in London, unveiled its carbon
management plan on December 7, 2004 at the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change’s (“UNFCCC”)
10th Conference of the Parties. HSBC Group’s carbon management plan commits the bank to “carbon neutrality” from its
operations globally.7 Citigroup took an even more progressive
step in beginning to consider the global environmental implications of its financial activities in addition to its operational activSPRING 2005

ities. Citigroup announced at a press conference in early 2003
that the bank would move forward and report GHGs associated
with its project finance portfolio for power plants in developing
countries “despite that there is no standardized approach and
that, to date, no other major bank reports [GHGs associated with
project finance].”8 In 2003, Citigroup reported that it did not
finance investment in any new power plants. Citigroup, therefore, reported zero implied carbon for the year.
In its 2004 Corporate Citizenship Report, Citigroup reported the financing of one power plant, and estimated total implied
carbon ranging from 2.7 million MtCO2 to 5.5 million MtCO2,
depending on a 30-year or 60-year life of project. Citigroup allocated to itself a percentage of total implied carbon equivalent to
the percentage of the debt debt it financed.9 The report, however, provided no information on the project’s location, size, technology type, and did not identify Citigroup’s project financing
percentage, the other financiers, or any of the operational
assumptions necessary for such an assessment, as discussed
below in Table 2. While a step in the right direction, Citigroup’s
reporting on the GHGs associated with it project finance portfolio lacks transparency and, ultimately, corporate accountability.
There are several reasons compelling the banking industry
to begin taking environmental and social issues more seriously
than before. Avoiding negative environmental and social
impacts can be an effective means of reducing costs from controversial projects. Similarly, avoiding negative impacts reduces
risk, the fear of litigation, and the global reach of liability concerns for themselves and their clients (e.g., project companies,
private developers, and local governments). Some banks also
hope to enhance their reputations as good corporate citizens. In
an interview with the Financial Times about the changing corporate behaviors of the Equator Banks, Rachel Kyte, Director of
Environmental and Social Development at the International
Finance Corporation (“IFC”), the private lending arm of the
World Bank Group, shared her own observations about this shift
in corporate behavior:
[T]hose banks (the Equator Banks) started seeing a
competitive advantage. They could attract good risk
businesses by managing these issues better and now
some of the leading Equator Banks are using environmental and social corporate governance factors to
assess their clients . . . and asking themselves if, based
on the assessment results, they want to be a particular
client’s banker.10
Recent debates in developed countries about corporate governance have also influenced the banks, and have spawned a
bevy of regulatory and voluntary codes of conduct in several
countries. The most recent new corporate governance code of
conduct in the United States is the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act.11
The Act requires directors of U.S.-listed companies to maintain
a system of controls that allows them to report accurately on
material business and financial risks. While Sarbanes-Oxley
does not define risk or materiality, it does open the door for analysts to consider to what extent disclosure provisions incorpo46

rate the environmental and social impacts of a publicly traded
company’s financial activities.12 Because investment banks can
fall under the category of “publicly traded company,” and their
financial activities have implications for global environmental
health, to assess, monitor, manage, and report the GHGs associated with project finance is a relevant activity for analysts.

THE CHALLENGE
Unfortunately, several challenges remain for those in the
banking industry that might take leadership positions assessing,
monitoring, disclosing, and, even more importantly, managing
the global environmental quality of their financial activities:

LIMITED PERFORMANCE STANDARDS AT THE IFC
The IFC is the private sector lending arm of the World
Bank. It provides equity investment, loans, and guarantees for
large infrastructure projects. The banking industry, export credit agencies, and other international financial institutions in the
private sector traditionally have viewed the IFC’s Safeguard
Policies as the standard-bearer for doing business in developing
countries. The IFC derives its global influence from being the
world’s largest source of debt and equity for investment banks
doing business in developing countries.13 The IFC does not
have a specific global warming performance standard, it is
vague in its use of the term “significant” when GHG accounting
is required, and IFC policy does not address indirect emissions.14 Ironically, some of the Equator Banks, such as Citibank
and HSBC, appear to have stronger environmental and social
performance standards than the IFC.

INSUFFICIENT IPCC LEADERSHIP ON THE ROLE OF
PRIVATE FINANCIERS
Exacerbating the IFC’s lack of a performance standard for
the private sector is the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (“IPCC”) stance on the private sector’s role in global
environmental policy. The IPCC is the primary source of scientific and technical expertise for parties to the UNFCCC and its
Kyoto Protocol.15 The IPCC’s near exclusive focus on the activities of states, however, precludes it from giving sufficient attention to the power of private sector financiers and institutions to
shape environmental outcomes.16 While the IPCC has the
potential to help private sector financiers understand the challenges global warming poses to financial markets, “the IPCC’s
framing of climate issues is geared for the information needs of
international diplomacy rather than the needs of financiers and
investors.”17

LACK OF A COMMON ASSESSMENT PLATFORM,
REPORTING METRICS, AND TRANSPARENCY STANDARD
Underlying insufficient IFC and IPCC leadership is the
absence of a generally accepted assessment platform and a common set of reporting metrics for the banking industry. In April
2003, Citigroup consulted with non-governmental organization
experts in the GHG accounting and reporting field to gain
insight into “best practice” methodologies for assessing, monitoring, and disclosing GHG emissions. Citigroup affirmed that
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BOX 1

THE KYOTO PROTOCOL TO THE
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON
CLIMATE CHANGE20

The mainstream scientific community agrees, based on overwhelming evidence, that human-induced atmospheric changes to date already have made
discernable impacts on the Earth’s climate. Accordingly, 160+ of the
world’s nations have committed themselves in the UNFCCC to the longterm stabilization of atmospheric concentrations of GHG emissions at
environmentally and economically safe levels.
When governments adopted the UNFCCC in 1992, they expected it to be
a launching pad for stronger action in the future. By establishing an ongoing process of review, discussion, and information exchange, the
Convention makes it possible to adopt additional commitments in response
to changes in scientific understanding and in political will.
In 1997, some 10,000 delegates met in Kyoto, Japan and adopted a
Protocol under which developed countries agreed to reduce their combined
greenhouse gas emissions by at least five percent for the reporting period
2008-2012, compared to 1990 levels. Developing countries do not have
obligatory commitments to limit emissions under the Kyoto Protocol. This
reflects the UNFCCC principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” and its acknowledgment that developed countries must take the lead
in reducing GHG emissions.
The United Nations opened the Kyoto Protocol for signature on March 16,
1998. Although the United States signed the Protocol on November 12,
1998, the Clinton Administration did not send the treaty to the Senate for
its advice and consent prior to ratification. President George W. Bush subsequently renounced it in March 2001. In October 2004, Russia ratified the
Protocol, finally enabling it to enter into force in January 2005. The global market for CO2 emissions offsets is now officially established.

there is not, at present, a standard approach within the international banking industry for transparency and accountability
for the global warming performance of project finance.18
Additional research supports Citigroup’s findings. Researchers
in business and government so far conclude there is no known
classification of project finance flows that distinguishes
between those that are environmentally sound and those that are
environmentally damaging.19

A DESKTOP TOOL FOR ATTRIBUTING CO2
EMISSIONS IN PROJECT FINANCE
The Project Finance CO2 Discovery Framework is a fourstep process comprising standard methods in public policy and
financial analysis. The model builds on the IPCC’s GHG
methodology, the World Bank Greenhouse Gas Assessment
Handbook, and the methodology the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation (“OPIC”), a branch of the U.S. government, uses to account for and report project level GHG
emissions.21
The remainder of this article explores the application of the
Project Finance CO2 Discovery Framework to financial deals
for the construction of new power plant projects in the electric
power sector. The electric power sector is a worthy example of
how to apply the Project Finance CO2 Discovery Framework for
several reasons. One reason is that the sector accounts for a significant percentage of the world’s GHG emissions. In 2000,
electricity generation accounted for 39 percent of global CO2
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY

emissions.22 Another reason is that
most energy analysts anticipate that
world electricity demand will double between now and 2030, with
most of the growth occurring in
developing countries.23
Projections suggest that over
the next 30 years, developing countries will require about $2.4 trillion
of investment and financing for the
construction of new power
plants.24 Current trends holding
forth, the majority of the investment and finance flows in developing countries likely will come from
investors and financiers in developed countries. On that basis, it is
important that the Equator Banks
and other financial actors begin to
not only publicly report on the
global warming performance of
their project finance portfolios, but
also insert GHG criteria into their
project design, due diligence and
financial decisionmaking processes. For discussion purposes only,
the framework’s analysis focuses
only on CO2 emissions, the primary GHG implicated in global
warming. The framework’s output
is a set of four CO2 emissions
measures (i.e., “implied carbon”
indicators) at the project, corporate, and sector levels:
• CO2 emissions per kilowatthour (“kWh”) produced,
expressed in gram units
(“gCO2/kWh”);
• Annual emissions, absolute
and relative, expressed in metric ton units (“MtCO2/year”);

TABLE 1

Required Data
Operating and Market Characteristics

Technical and Market Assumptions

• Installed capacity, in mega watts (MWs)

• Estimated life-of-project

• Fuel type

• Hours of operation per year

• CO2-equivalent emissions factor

• Capacity factor

• Starting price for CO2 offsets

• Ceiling price and discount rate for CO2 offsets

A Four-Step Process
Step 1.
Step 2.
Step 3.
Step 4.

Assess “implied carbon” at the project, corporate, or sector levels
Compare global environmental benefits, in the form of CO2 offsets, from alternative technologies
Estimate monetary value of global environmental benefits, in the form of CO2 offsets
Transform global warming performance data into financial information

PROJECT LEVEL
ANALYSIS

CORPORATE LEVEL
ANALYSIS

For a single project:

For a single corporation or group:

SECTOR ANALYSIS

For the sector,
at any geographic level:

1.

What is the project’s total
amount of “implied carbon”
(MtCO2) with the chosen technology?

1.

What is the portfolio’s total
amount of “implied carbon”
(MtCO2) with the current mix
of technology choices?

1.

What is the electric power sector’s total amount of “implied
carbon” (MtCO2) with the current mix of technology choices?

2.

What opportunities exist for
project-based, global environmental benefits by displacing
conventional with alternative
generation and fuel technology
that reduces implied carbon,
per year and life-of-project?

2.

What opportunities exist
within the portfolio to create
global environmental benefits
with an alternative mix of fuel
and electricity generation
technologies that reduce
implied carbon, per year and
life-of-project?

2.

What potential exists within
the electric power sector to
create global environmental
benefits by displacing
conventional with alternative
technologies, and by what
amounts per year and over
life-of-projects?

3.

What is the potential monetary
value ($/MtCO2) of global
environmental benefits, in the
form of CO2 offsets, for the
project under different
emissions market scenarios?

3.

What is the potential monetary
value ($/MtCO2) of global
environmental benefits, in the
form of CO2 offsets, for the
portfolio under different
emissions market scenarios?

3.

What is the potential monetary
value ($/MtCO2) global
environmental benefits, in the
form of CO2 offsets, for the
sector under different
emissions market scenarios?

• Life-of-project
emissions,
absolute and relative, expressed in metric ton units
(“MtCO2/30 years”);
• Potential project offsets from investment in less CO2-intensive technology, expressed in metric ton units (“MtCO2”);
and
• Estimated monetary value of project offsets, expressed in
U.S. dollars (“$”).

PROJECT ANALYSIS: HUB ELECTRIC POWER PROJECT
In 1985, the Government of Pakistan, with the help of the
World Bank Group, developed a long-term energy strategy that
envisaged the involvement of private investors in the country’s
SPRING 2005

WORKFLOW FOR THE PROJECT FINANCE CO2
DISCOVERY FRAMEWORK

electricity generation.25 The objective was to meet the increasing demand for power in Pakistan “in the most efficient and
effective way to achieve the levels of growth” the Pakistani government had set for its economy.26 One year later, the development of the Hub Power Project began.
In 1991, the Hub Power Company, LLC (“Hubco”) incorporated in Pakistan as a limited liability company responsible
for implementing the project. The deal reached financial closure
(i.e., a signed financial agreement) in 1995 and was to construct
a 1,292 megawatt (“MW”), diesel-fired electricity generation
facility located near the Hub River in Balochistan, about 40
kilometers north-west of Karachi. According to Hubco, the Hub
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BOX 2

DEALOGIC’S PROJECTWARETM
DATABASE29

Dealogic’s commercial database, ProjectWare,™ secures finance and
investment data directly from commercial banks, investment houses, and
regional and multilateral development banks. These institutions voluntarily report to Dealogic, based in London, on financial transactions in which
they play a banking role. ProjectWare™ houses data on over 9,000 project finance deals from around the world.
ProjectWare™ provides details investment and project finance deals. It
identifies the financing roles played by the institutions involved in the
deal. It includes information on debt and equity capital, and bank loans,
foreign direct investment, corporate finance, and portfolio capital/institutional investment. ProjectWare™ also includes information on whether
there is involvement by regional development banks, multilateral development banks, and local investors.
ProjectWare™ does not correct monetary values for inflation or adjust
them to reflect any base-year currency values. Consequently, the figures
presented in this article are unadjusted for inflation or currency values.
Dealogic calculates investment and project finance amounts using the
U.S. dollar value of the investment at the time they enter it into the database. In the case of foreign currency-denominated projects, Dealogic converts these to U.S. dollar equivalents based on exchange rates published
in the Financial Times.
Due to variations in project scale between different energy resources,
ProjectWare™ is best suited to covering larger power plants based on fossil fuels, hydropower, and geothermal resources; it is less suited to covering smaller-scale renewable energy-based power plants. Based on World
Bank estimates of project financing for new power plants, ProjectWare™
likely captures approximately 25 percent of all project financing for new
power plants in developing countries.

power plant is “one of the largest private power projects in the
newly industrialized world.”27 Hubco designed the plant to
meet the World Bank’s environmental requirements. The company characterizes the project as one that “sets the standards for
the formulation of a private power framework in Pakistan; [it]
has elicited numerous responses from international investors.”28
Of the principal bankers, two had signed on to the Equator
Principles as of early April 2005: Citibank and Standard
Chartered Bank.

Step 1: Assess CO2 Emissions
The first step in the Project Finance CO2 Discovery
Framework is to assess emissions. The required technical data
for CO2 assessment for the Hub Electric Power Project resides
in the public domain on Hubco’s website.30 According to the
Greenhouse Gas Assessment Handbook,31 an analyst can define
the boundaries of project analysis “to include on-site activities
only, while in other cases, boundaries may be drawn to include
upstream or downstream activities as well”32 and “locally
derived carbon emissions factors . . . should be used if available.”33 On that basis, and consistent with IPCC methodology,
the boundaries for this assessment are drawn to assess and make
explicit the Hub Electric Power project’s direct and indirect CO2
emissions, expressed as CO2/kWh. The first factor includes
only those direct CO2 emissions associated with the generation
of electricity using diesel as the fuel. The second factor is the
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life cycle (i.e., “cradle-to-grave”) CO2 emissions factor.34 A life
cycle assessment’s goal is to “give a comprehensive picture of
the environmental impacts of products, by taking into accounting all the significant ‘upstream’ and ‘downstream’ impacts.”35
The product of multiplying the average heat rate for
Pakistan (1988 data) by the carbon content of diesel is the factor for direct CO2 emissions.36 Heat rate is a measure of a power
plant’s thermal efficiency; that is, how efficient the power plant
is at converting fuel to electricity. British thermal units (“Btu”)
per kilowatt-hour (“kWh”) express the heat rate.37 The second
factor is the life cycle (i.e., “cradle-to-grave”) CO2 emissions
factor, expressed in grams as gCO2/kWh.38 This article uses
average life-cycle emissions factors for Western Europe,
expressed as gCO2/kWh produced: coal is 1,340; diesel is 855;
natural gas is 605; and wind power is 36.39
According to the World Bank’s methodology, the average
power plant operates at 85 percent of its installed capacity and
the annual operating capacity of 8,760 hours per year. Hubco
reports on its website that the Hub Power Project operates at
85.9 percent of its installed capacity.40 Consistent with the
World Bank’s guidance that locally generated data is preferable
to averages, the author used Hubco’s data. To be consistent with
CO2 offset prices in metric ton units, this article converts grams
to metric tons (“MtCO2”) by dividing grams by 1,000,000. For
each power plant project, the formula is the same:
Where:
A

is installed capacity in megawatts (“MWs”) x 1,000 for
conversion to kilowatts (“kWs”);

B

is annual operating capacity, i.e., a constant at 8,760
hours per year;

C

is the capacity factor, assumes 85 percent base-load
capacity actually used;

D

is the maximum feasible electricity produced in one
year (“kWh/year”);

E

is country-specific heat rate, expressed as (“Btu/kWh”),
by fuel type;

F

is the standard carbon co-efficient by fuel, i.e., the
carbon content of fuel (“gCO2/btu”);

G

is the CO2 emissions factor (“gCO2/kWh”), by fuel
type;

H

is feasible CO2 emissions annually, divided by
1,000,000 for conversion to Mt; and

I

is feasible CO2 emissions cumulatively for life-ofproject, defined as 30 years.

The result of running these equations is a profile of the Hub
Power Project’s CO2 emissions (See Table 2). According to the
framework’s data output, the Hub Power Project has the potential to release into the atmosphere 6,644,744 MtCO2 each year
based on an emissions factor of 683 gCO2/kWh. Assuming the
power plant continues operating for 30-years, it has the potential to release into the atmosphere 199,342,306 MtCO2 over its
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY

Step 3: Estimate Monetary Value

operating life. Based on life cycle factor of 855 gCO2/kWh, the
author estimates that the Hub Power Project has the potential to
release into the atmosphere 8,312,390 MtCO2 each year.
Assuming the power plant continues operating for 30 years, it
has the potential to release into the atmosphere 249,371,693
MtCO2 over its operating life.

The third step in the Project Finance CO2 Discovery
Framework is to estimate the potential monetary value of CO2
offsets under different emissions market scenarios. The goal is
to translate environmental benefits, in the form of CO2 offsets,
into financial terms. From this information, analysts can determine if a project merits a more detailed, robust analysis. The following example relied on an Excel spreadsheet and a standard
present value (“P.V.”) method. Investment banks would want to
consider the market value of CO2 emissions that could fall
below a coal baseline, for instance, because that potential value
could be included in the project’s revenue stream. The following calculations use an emissions market scenario that includes
a starting CO2 permit price, quoted by the European Climate
Exchange, is currently $22.63 for one MtCO2.46 The example in
Table 4 focuses on the monetary value of CO2 offsets from displacing diesel with natural gas and wind power under different
emissions market scenarios. Starting in 2005 through 2035, the
scenario reflects a starting CO2 permit price of $22.63 for one
MtCO2 in 2005, assumes a 30-year life-of-project, and uses
growth rates (i.e., discount factor) of two percent for 2005 and
five percent for 2035. The assumption on ceiling price at a two
percent discount factor is $33.63 per MtCO2, occurring in year
2024. The assumption on ceiling price at a five percent discount
factor is $60.04 per MtCO2, occurring in year 2024.47
The result is a set of indicators for the present value of the
potential CO2 offsets from displacing diesel with natural gas or
wind power for a 30-year project. Consider the monetary value
of displacing diesel with natural gas (See Appendix B). A two
percent discount factor could transform 76,357,710 MtCO2 of

Step 2: Compare Environmental Benefits
The second step in the Project Finance CO2 Discovery
Framework is to evaluate the increase, reduction, or avoidance
of CO2 emissions from alternative technology (e.g., coal, natural gas, and wind power) compared against the reference case
(i.e., diesel). The global warming literature refers to this aspect
of the analysis as a “twinning” approach; analysts use it to estimate potential “project-based offsets” (CO2 emissions permits)
under the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol. According to the
World Bank,43 this approach is similar to its “with or without”
project analysis approach.44 The approach is a standard comparative project analysis comprising a reference project (e.g., a
diesel-fired power plant) and its emissions against an alternative
project (e.g., a natural gas-fired power plant) and its emissions.
The results in Table 3 reflect that displacing diesel with coal
as the fuel source for electricity generation does not yield any
CO2 offsets; in fact, emissions increase by 7,099,574 MtCO2
annually and 212,987,225 MtCO2 over the project’s 30-year
operating life. By contrast, a switch from diesel to natural gas
yields 2,545,257 MtCO2 offsets each year, and 76,357,710
MtCO2 offsets over 30 years. Similarly, displacing diesel with
wind power yields 6,294,748 MtCO2 offsets per year and
188,842,445MtCO2 over the power plant’s 30-year operating
life.

EXCEL SPREADSHEET STRUCTURE:
A DESKTOP ASSESSMENT OF “IMPLIED CARBON”41

TABLE 2

Deisel

Operational Characteristis

Calculation 1.
Electricity Produced in One Year

A

B

C

Calculation 2.
CO2 Emissions Factors

D

E

F

Calculation 3. Feasible CO2
Emissions

G

H

I

Installed
Capacity

Feasible
Operating
Hours

Baseload
Capacity

Max. Feasible
Electricity
Produced

Heat Rate
by Fuel

Carbon
Co-Efficient by
Fuel

CO2
Emissions
Factor

Max. Annual
Emissions

Max.
Life-of-Project
Emissions

MW*1,000(kWs)

(per year)

(%)

(kWh/Year)

(Btu/kWh)

(gCO2/btu)

(gCO2/kWh)

(MtCO2/Year)

(MtCO2)

1,292

8,760

85.9%

D=A*B*C

G=E*F

H=D*G/1million

I=H*30 Years

1,292,000

8,760

85.9%

9,722,093,280

*683

**6,644,744

***199,342,306

9,337

0.0732

*The life-cycle emissions factor for diesel is 855 gCO2/kWh.xlii **Using a life cycle emissions factor, maximum annual emissions is 8,312,390 MtCO2.
***Using a life cycle emissions factor, maximum emissions is 249,371,693 MtCO2 over 30 years.
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REFERENCE VS. ALTERNATIVES: COMPARING OFFSETS FROM FUEL SWITCHING45

TABLE 3

From

What would happen to total CO2 emissions were a 1,292 MW diesel-fired power plant
switched to coal, natural gas, or wind power to generate electricity?

To

*CO2-Intensity
of Electricity
Production

Annual
Emissions

Annual Offsets

Life-of-Project
Emissions

(gCO2/kWh)

(MtCO2/Year)

(MtCO2/Year)

(MtCO2/30 Years)

Diesel

(MtCO2/30 Years)

683

6,644,744

N/A

199,342,306

N/A

Coal

1,414

13,744,318

-7,099,574

412,329,531

-212,987,225

Natural Gas

422

4,099,487

2,545,257

122,984,606

76,357,710

Wind

36

349,995

6,294,748

10,499,861

188,842,445

COMPARATIVE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS:

Table 4
From

Life-of-Project
Offsets

Estimated Monetary Value of CO2 Offsets from Fuel Switching at Hub Power Project48

To

Diesel

*CO2
Intensity

Life-of-Project
Emissions

Fuel
Switching
Offsets

Offsets
Present Value
@ 2%

Offsets
Present Value
@ 5%

(gCO2/kWh)

(MtCO2/30 Years)

(MtCO2/30 Years)

($/30 Years)

($/30 Years)

683

199,342,306

N/A

N/A

N/A

Natural Gas

422

122,984,606

76,357,710

$2,283,391,705

$3,528,077,292

*Wind

36

10,499,861

188,842,445

$5,647,121,437

$8,725,389,020

*Source Electric Power Research Institute, 1997

offsets over thirty years into a total of $2.2 billion in project revenue. Likewise, a five percent discount factor could transform
the same 76,357,710 MtCO2 of offsets into $3.5 billion in project revenue over the same 30-year period. For wind power, the
monetary values of offsets totaling 188,842,440 MtCO2 over a
30-year period, estimated at two and five percent, are $5.6 billion and $8.7 billion, respectively (See Appendix C).

Step 4: Transform Data into Information
The fourth step in the Project Finance CO2 Discovery
Framework is to transform data into information. As business
scholar and management pragmatist Peter Drucker asserts in
Forbes, “information is the interpreted meaning and significance of data.”49 In keeping with Drucker’s assertion, the goal
is to explore CO2 offset data and give project companies, financiers, policymakers, and other stakeholders the chance to understand and communicate jointly the potential environmental and
financial risks and opportunities in the face of uncertainties. The
Project Finance CO2 Discovery Framework makes the following contributions to the practice of assessing, monitoring, and
disclosing the GHG implications of investment and project
finance in the electric power sector:
• Quantifies absolute GHG performance;
• Compares relative GHG performance;
• Analyzes GHG performance of reference vs. alternative
projects;
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• Translates global environmental benefits, in the form of
CO2 offsets, into financial terms; and
• Provides reporting metrics and structure.

CORPORATE ANALYSIS: SELECTED FINANCIERS
With project level data gleaned from the Dealogic™ database, the following section explores the framework’s application at the corporate /portfolio level, relying on seven financiers
as examples for discussion purposes only. The seven financiers
were involved in investment fund financing the construction of
40 new plants in developing countries that reached financial closure between the years 1994 and 2001. The forty projects in this
example spanned seven countries, totaling $23.4 billion in project finance, representing 27,650 MWs of new electricity generation capacity using coal, diesel, and natural gas.50 These seven
financiers are, in descending order from largest to smallest
amount of investment financed within this group of forty projects, Sumitomo, WestLB, Mizuho, BOT-Mitsubishi, BNP
Paribas, Citigroup, and Isveimer.

Step 1: Assess Emissions
Using the same method described in Table 2, and aggregating project level data to developer financier portfolios, the 40
power plant projects collectively have the potential to release
into the atmosphere 408.2 million MtCO2 each year; total
implied carbon over 30 years is 12.2 billion MtCO2. Important
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY

TABLE 5
*Financiers

GLOBAL WARMING CHARACTERISTICS OF $2.4 BILLION
OF FINANCIAL PRODUCTS AND SERVICES (1994-2001)32

Portfolio Average
CO2 Intensity

Total Annual
Portfolio Emissions

Adj. Annual
Portfolio Emissions

(gCO2/kWh)

(MtCO2)

(MtCO2)

Adj.30-Year
Portfolio Emissions
(MtCO2)

1. Sumitomo Bank (Japan)

840

62,845,780

9,034,941

271,048,217

2. West LB (Germany)

426

1,425,868

1,425,868

42,776,048

3. Mizuho (Japan)

804

112,089,669

10,701,260

321,037,786

4. BOT-Mitsubishi (Japan)

772

120,458,177

8,359,485

250,784,559

5. BNP-Paribas (France)

741

69,845,766

5,911,301

177,339,022

6. Citigroup (United States)

637

36,988,420

2,686,984

80,609,527

“CO2 intensity” of electricity
production and 100 represents
the most CO2-intensive electricity production. The result
is a series of Index Values.53
The example in Table 6 suggests that WestLB’s project
finance portfolio, for instance,
is the least CO2-intensive
within this group, while
Isveimer’s project finance
portfolio is the most CO2intensive.54

Step 3: Estimate
potential monetary value

In order to estimate the
potential monetary value of
less CO2-intensive portfolios,
7. Isveimer (Italy)
1,018
4,549,175
4,549,175
136,475,244
the framework adjusts the carbon coefficient for each projTotals
408,202,855
42,669,014
1,280,070,403
ect in a corporate portfolio to
Source: Underlying data on file with author and deried from the Dealogic™ database.
be the next least CO2-inten*Financiers listed in descending order from largest to small volume of investment and financing provided.
sive technology. The goal is to
quantify potential CO2 offsets
to note is that each project finance deal had multiple financiers,
from less CO2-intensive technology for each project and estiwhose financing is not necessarily captured in this example estimate potential monetary value for each portfolio. For instance,
mate. For instance, while project financing totals $23.4 billion,
a coal-fired power plant project becomes a diesel-fired power
the seven financiers provided approximately ten percent, or
plant project while a diesel-fired plant becomes a natural gas$2.4 billion in project finance. Adjusting for this, estimates of
fired plant. Natural gas-fired power plants become wind power
implied carbon reflect each bank’s actual proportional (i.e., pro
projects. Wind power projects remain the same. Average project
rata) contribution of project financing. Annually, the forty
finance CO2-intensity for each portfolio, expressed as
power plants have the potential to release 42.6 million MtCO2
gCO2/kWh, adjusts accordingly.55
(See Table 5). Over a thirty-year operating life, the power plants
Step 4: Transform Data into Information
have the collective potential to release into the atmosphere 1.2
51
billion MtCO2.
The result of applying the Project Finance CO2 Discovery
Framework
is a baseline of absolute and relative global warmStep 2: Compare Performance
Analysts can apply the framework
to not only a single financier, but also to
multiple partners and competitors. The
information required to develop this chart is
the same information used to put together
the original project-specific assessment. By
properly analyzing the chart for each
financier’s relative position, one gains
invaluable intelligence quickly and easily
about strategies and priorities.
Using the framework to estimate the
average portfolio CO2 intensity, expressed
as CO2/kWh, values range from 426 to
1,018. Indexing in the example above represents the distribution of global warming
corporate/portfolio performance indicators
of different financiers, revealing their positions on a common scale. For global warming performance, zero represents the least
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TABLE 6

COMPARATIVE GLOBAL WARMING PERFORMANCE OF
SELECTED CORPORATE FINANCIERS: $2.4 BILLION IN
FINANCIAL PRODUCTS AND SERVICES
*Actual Value

**Index Value

1.Sumitomo (Japan)

840

70

2. WestLB (Germany)

426

0

3. Mizuho (Japan)

804

64

4. BOT-Mitsubishi (Japan)

772

58

5. BNP Paribas (France)

741

53

6. Citigroup (United States)

637

36

1,018

100

Financier

7. Isveimer (Italy)

*Actual Value = CO2/kWh in Table 5
**Index Value = Actual Value minus Minimum Value/Maximum Value minus Minimum Value multiplied by 100. Using
Sumitomo as an example, the equation is: Sumitomo?s Index Value = [840 – (426/1,018) – (426 * 100)]

52

TABLE 7

*Financiers

EXAMPLES OF MONETARY VALUE OF GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS IN A GLOBAL
EMISSIONS MARKET: FUEL SWITCHING, OFFSETS, AND PRESENT VALUE56
**Average Portfolio
CO2 Intensity: Next
Least CO2-Intensive
Technology

Adj. Annual Portfolio
Emissions

Potential Annual CO2
Offsets Created by
Fuel Switching

Potential
Monetary
Value @ 2%

Potential
Monetary
Value @ 5%

(gCO2/kWh)

(MtCO2)

(MtCO2)

($/30 Years)

($/30 Years)

553

9,034,941

2,852,045

$2,558,616,240

$3,953,327,778

36

1,425,868

1,275,087

$1,143,901,413

$1,767,446,466

3. Mizuho (Japan)

498

10,701,260

2,884,130

$2,587,400,218

$3,997,802,014

4. BOT-Mitsubishi (Japan)

441

8,359,485

3,222,585

$2,891,033,737

$4,466,947,330

5. BNP-Paribas (France)

415

5,911,301

3,094,092

$2,775,760,564

$4,288,838,308

6. Citigroup (United States)

247

2,686,984

1,876,642

$1,683,566,247

$2,601,284,674

7. Isveimer (Italy)

783

4,549,175

1,051,280

$943,120,491

$1,457,219,093

$14,583,398,911

$22,532,865,665

1. Sumitomo Bank (Japan)
2. West LB (Germany)

Totals
Source:Underlying data on file with author and deried from the Dealogic™ database.
*Financiers listed in descending order from largest to small volume of investment and financing provided.

ing performance among financiers. For instance, the information above in Table 7 suggests that global warming performance
and monetary performance vary significantly from bank to
bank, despite operating in the same countries with the same
opportunities, needs, and resource constraints. Analysts can
update this information, essentially a snapshot of the existing
situation, at regular intervals thereby assessing, monitoring, and
disclosing performance changes and investment bank leadership
that advances global climate health and protection.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTITIONERS
One could argue that the Project Finance CO2 Discovery
Framework provides only a static snapshot of a financial institution’s global warming performance and ignores the historical
trends of those institutions. This article now will address this
concern.
An analytical tool that Hax and Majluf discuss in their 1983
research on methods for strategic planning is the “ShareMomentum Graph.”57 The Share-Momentum Graph is a tool in
business that, if adapted for a GHG assessment, could help an
analyst better understand implicit and/or explicit strategies for
dealing with GHG emissions. Adapting the graph to GHG
assessment is to assess a financial institution’s performance
along two dimensions for a given time period, such as every five
years. To adapt the graph, analysts plot the position of each
financial institution in terms of two dimensions: 1) absolute
portfolio emissions; and 2) relative project portfolio emissions.
Those financial institutions whose absolute emissions have
grown at the same rate, say over a five-year period, as group
emissions, fall on a diagonal line. Falling below the diagonal
line are those institutions that increased absolute emissions over
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the same five-year period at a rate higher than the group, that is,
they increased their share of group emissions over the same
five-year period. Falling above the diagonal line are those financial institutions that decreased their share of group emissions
over five years. The results of such a graphical representation
can serve as a diagnostic tool for detecting trends in the CO2
growth-share positioning of financial institutions and their project finance portfolios. A growth-share graph can also help verify whether a historical trend is consistent with a financier’s or
group’s intended strategic positioning.
Finally, this article underscores an important cautionary
note for analysts when using the Project Finance CO2 Discovery
Framework or a similar framework. Analysts should not use the
framework without a simultaneous assessment of a project’s
local air pollution implications. Analysts easily can adapt the
framework, by inserting the appropriate emissions factors for
local air pollutants, in order to complete a simultaneous, comprehensive assessment of a project’s overall air quality implications. The Project Finance CO2 Discovery Framework could
skew the results away from a community’s environmental and
social goals. For instance, from a CO2 perspective, diesel may
appear favorable to coal as a fuel source for generating electricity. From the perspective of local air pollution, diesel will likely increase particulates that can be carcinogenic and harmful to
human health.

FUTURE RESEARCH
There are several issues that, while beyond the scope of this
article to address, are worthy of dialogue in the proper international arenas, including the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol discussions and negotiations. For instance, by not addressing the
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY

global warming implications of its private entities’ investment
and financial flows, does a developed country undermine its
ability to meet UNFCCC commitments? What might such indicators imply for definitions of “additionality” under the Kyoto
Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism?
The threshold concern is whether developed countries
might use investment and finance conditions as a “back door”
through the Kyoto Protocol to impose unofficial or extra-legal
carbon caps on developing countries. Additional questions
include: How might the negotiations of developing country
commitments under future Kyoto Protocol budget periods
account for the CO2 emissions associated with capital flows,
particularly from private banks based in developed countries?
What might a process look like to allocate fairly the responsibility for the environmental impacts of capital flows?
Finally, a significant challenge for Civil Society is finding
and accessing sufficient, accurate, and reliable data.
International financial institutions such as the IFC and governmental institutions such as the IPCC can and should play a pivotal role establishing a pipeline of data and information between
those who have project level financial and operating data, and
those in the public domain wishing to aggregate, analyze, and
report such data. For the banking industry, greater transparency
could create value. If databases were accurate, consistent, timely, and readily available, information on global warming performance could help an investment bank celebrate milestones
on the path towards sustainability and could provide a useful
means of sharing best practices with the wider community.
External recognition is a way to publicize the results of a successful global environmental health initiative, potentially creating greater value.

APPENDIX A

CONCLUSION
The adoption of the Equator Principles, while a progressive
milestone, may be insufficient to guarantee implementation of,
and compliance with, a voluntary banking industry code of conduct for the global environment. Notwithstanding this lack of
guarantee, the adoption of an industry-wide code of conduct on
social and environmental issues, even if it does not yet include
global warming, is still an important indication of progress.
Investment banks, asset managers, and project developers
and financial actors present untapped potential to determine
downstream environmental outcomes through upstream, climate-conscious due diligence protocols and financial decisionmaking. These global actors make choices about technology and
infrastructure design in the pre-investment and business plan
stages of the typical project development cycle. By virtue of
being the farthest upstream in the project development process,
decisions made in the first two stages influence energy consumption patterns and GHG emissions.
The research findings in this article contribute to a growing
body of environmental and social sustainability knowledge in
relation to the role of the banking industry, specifically, and the
capital markets, more generally. The strength of this research is
that it contributes a reasonable approach for assessing, monitoring, and disclosing the global warming performance of project
finance and the financiers involved. The Project Finance CO2
Discovery Framework offers practitioners an approach for
translating global warming performance data into financial
terms that analysts, project developers, investors and financiers,
and policymakers can include in upstream project design, due
diligence, and financial decision-making processes.

CARBON CO-EFFICIENT OF FUEL

Fuel

gCO2/Btu

Coal

0.0952

Diesel

0.0732

Natural Gas

0.0531

Renewable

0

Source: International Energy Agency, 2002

SPRING 2005

54

APPENDIX B

CALCULATING THE MONETARY VALUE OF ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS OF
DISPLACING DIESEL FOR NATURAL GAS IN ELECTRICITY GENERATION

Present Value @ 2% Discount
Starting price = $22.63 per MtCO2
Ceiling price = $33.63 per MtCO2
PV @
2%

Year
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*Annual
Offsets

Present Value @ 5% Discount
Starting price = $22.63 per MtCO2
Ceiling price = $60.04 per MtCO2

= Value/Year

PV @
5%

Year

*Annual
Offsets

= Value/Year

2005

$23.08

2,545,257

$58,751,149

2005

$23.76

2,545,257

$60,479,124

2006

$23.54

2,545,257

$59,926,172

2006

$24.95

2,545,257

$63,503,080

2007

$24.02

2,545,257

$61,124,696

2007

$26.20

2,545,257

$66,678,234

2008

$24.50

2,545,257

$62,347,190

2008

$27.51

2,545,257

$70,012,146

2009

$24.99

2,545,257

$63,594,133

2009

$28.88

2,545,257

$73,512,753

2010

$25.49

2,545,257

$64,866,016

2010

$30.33

2,545,257

$77,188,391

2011

$25.99

2,545,257

$66,163,336

2011

$31.84

2,545,257

$81,047,811

2012

$26.51

2,545,257

$67,486,603

2012

$33.43

2,545,257

$85,100,201

2013

$27.04

2,545,257

$68,836,335

2013

$35.11

2,545,257

$89,355,211

2014

$27.59

2,545,257

$70,213,062

2014

$36.86

2,545,257

$93,822,972

2015

$28.14

2,545,257

$71,617,323

2015

$38.70

2,545,257

$98,514,120

2016

$28.70

2,545,257

$73,049,670

2016

$40.64

2,545,257

$103,439,826

2017

$29.27

2,545,257

$74,510,663

2017

$42.67

2,545,257

$108,611,818

2018

$29.86

2,545,257

$76,000,876

2018

$44.81

2,545,257

$114,042,409

2019

$30.46

2,545,257

$77,520,894

2019

$47.05

2,545,257

$119,744,529

2020

$31.07

2,545,257

$79,071,312

2020

$49.40

2,545,257

$125,731,756

2021

$31.69

2,545,257

$80,652,738

2021

$51.87

2,545,257

$132,018,343

2022

$32.32

2,545,257

$82,265,793

2022

$54.46

2,545,257

$138,619,261

2023

$32.97

2,545,257

$83,911,108

2023

$57.18

2,545,257

$145,550,224

2024

$33.63

2,545,257

$85,589,331

2024

$60.04

2,545,257

$152,827,735

2025

$33.63

2,545,257

$85,589,331

2025

$60.04

2,545,257

$152,827,735

2026

$33.63

2,545,257

$85,589,331

2026

$60.04

2,545,257

$152,827,735

2027

$33.63

2,545,257

$85,589,331

2027

$60.04

2,545,257

$152,827,735

2028

$33.63

2,545,257

$85,589,331

2028

$60.04

2,545,257

$152,827,735

2029

$33.63

2,545,257

$85,589,331

2029

$60.04

2,545,257

$152,827,735

2030

$33.63

2,545,257

$85,589,331

2030

$60.04

2,545,257

$152,827,735

2031

$33.63

2,545,257

$85,589,331

2031

$60.04

2,545,257

$152,827,735

2032

$33.63

2,545,257

$85,589,331

2032

$60.04

2,545,257

$152,827,735

2033

$33.63

2,545,257

$85,589,331

2033

$60.04

2,545,257

$152,827,735

2034

$33.63

2,545,257

$85,589,331

2034

$60.04

2,545,257

$152,827,735

Totals

76,357,710

$2,283,391,705

76,357,710

$3,528,077,2920
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APPENDIX C

CALCULATING THE MONETARY VALUE OF ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS OF
DISPLACING DIESEL FOR WIND POWER IN ELECTRICITY GENERATION

Present Value @ 2% Discount
Starting price = $22.63 per MtCO2
Ceiling price = $33.63 per MtCO2

Year

PV @
2%

2005

$23.08

2006

= Value/Year

Year

PV @
5%

6,294,748

$145,299,150

2005

$23.76

6,294,748

$149,572,655

$23.54

6,294,748

$148,205,133

2006

$24.95

6,294,748

$157,051,287

2007

$24.02

6,294,748

$151,169,236

2007

$26.20

6,294,748

$164,903,852

2008

$24.50

6,294,748

$154,192,621

2008

$27.51

6,294,748

$173,149,044

2009

$24.99

6,294,748

$157,276,473

2009

$28.88

6,294,748

$181,806,496

2010

$25.49

6,294,748

$160,422,002

2010

$30.33

6,294,748

$190,896,821

2011

$25.99

6,294,748

$163,630,442

2011

$31.84

6,294,748

$200,441,662

2012

$26.51

6,294,748

$166,903,051

2012

$33.43

6,294,748

$210,463,746

2013

$27.04

6,294,748

$170,241,112

2013

$35.11

6,294,748

$220,986,933

2014

$27.59

6,294,748

$173,645,935

2014

$36.86

6,294,748

$232,036,279

2015

$28.14

6,294,748

$177,118,853

2015

$38.70

6,294,748

$243,638,093

2016

$28.70

6,294,748

$180,661,230

2016

$40.64

6,294,748

$255,819,998

2017

$29.27

6,294,748

$184,274,455

2017

$42.67

6,294,748

$268,610,998

2018

$29.86

6,294,748

$187,959,944

2018

$44.81

6,294,748

$282,041,548

2019

$30.46

6,294,748

$191,719,143

2019

$47.05

6,294,748

$296,143,625

2020

$31.07

6,294,748

$195,553,526

2020

$49.40

6,294,748

$310,950,807

2021

$31.69

6,294,748

$199,464,596

2021

$51.87

6,294,748

$326,498,347

2022

$32.32

6,294,748

$203,453,888

2022

$54.46

6,294,748

$342,823,264

2023

$32.97

6,294,748

$207,522,966

2023

$57.18

6,294,748

$359,964,427

2024

$33.63

6,294,748

$211,673,425

2024

$60.04

6,294,748

$377,962,649

2025

$33.63

6,294,748

$211,673,425

2025

$60.04

6,294,748

$377,962,649

2026

$33.63

6,294,748

$211,673,425

2026

$60.04

6,294,748

$377,962,649

2027

$33.63

6,294,748

$211,673,425

2027

$60.04

6,294,748

$377,962,649

2028

$33.63

6,294,748

$211,673,425

2028

$60.04

6,294,748

$377,962,649

2029

$33.63

6,294,748

$211,673,425

2029

$60.04

6,294,748

$377,962,649

2030

$33.63

6,294,748

$211,673,425

2030

$60.04

6,294,748

$377,962,649

2031

$33.63

6,294,748

$211,673,425

2031

$60.04

6,294,748

$377,962,649

2032

$33.63

6,294,748

$211,673,425

2032

$60.04

6,294,748

$377,962,649

2033

$33.63

6,294,748

$211,673,425

2033

$60.04

6,294,748

$377,962,649

2034

$33.63

6,294,748

$211,673,425

2034

$60.04

6,294,748

$377,962,649

188,842,440

$5,647,121,437

188,842,440

$8,725,389,020

Totals

SPRING 2005

*Annual
Offsets

Present Value @ 5% Discount
Starting price = $22.63 per MtCO2
Ceiling price = $60.04 per MtCO2
*Annual
Offsets

= Value/Year
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BORDER POWER PLANT WORKING GROUP
V. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
By Kelly Rain*
n a monumental lawsuit recognizing the link between
carbon dioxide and global warming, a United States federal court acknowledged that sometimes you have to
reach across the border to protect the quality of local air and
water. However, the repercussions of the 1993 ruling are still
being felt as Mexico threatens to request an international tribunal to conclude who must pay for the pollution control
equipment for one of the company’s power plants.1
The Border Plant Working Group challenged a federal
permit issued by the U.S. Department of Energy to allow two
utility companies to construct and operate an electric power
transmission line from Mexico across the border to the
United States.2 The power plants are located just three miles
inside Mexico’s border.3 The group seeks to ensure that,
despite being free of restrictions under U.S. law, Mexican
power plants sending electricity to the California market are
not allowed to spew harmful emissions that would impact
both public health and the environment.4 The Border Plant
Working Group would require that environmental impact
statements be completed prior to the issuance of federal permits necessary to allow transmission lines to cross international borders.5 In May 2003, a federal judge determined that
the U.S. Department of Energy violated the National
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) by failing to fully analyze the potential health and environmental impacts of the
power plants before issuing the permits.6
While establishing precedent for future border power
plants, the court also recognized an important link between
the dangers of carbon dioxide emissions and global warming.7 While the defendants emphasized that carbon dioxide is
not classified as a hazardous or toxic pollutant under federal
or California law, the court acknowledged that carbon dioxide emissions are greenhouse gases and that the “failure to
disclose and analyze their significance is counter to NEPA.”8

I

InterGen, which is a joint venture of Royal Dutch/Shell
Group and Bechtel Corporation, was one of the power companies involved in the lawsuit and is now also facing conflict
on the Mexican side of the border.9 InterGen is currently disputing with Mexico over who is responsible to pay for pollution control equipment for the company’s border power
plant.10 InterGen sent Mexico’s Federal Electricity
Commission the bill for the installation of emission control
technology – a bill totaling over $4 million – even though the
equipment is not necessary for the plant to comply with
Mexican environmental law.11 Mexico is in the process of
taking the debate to a tribunal of the International Energy
Agency in Paris.12
The fight for the recognition and regulation of pollutants
contributing to global warming is evident in other pending
lawsuits. For example, a case originally filed by Friends
of the Earth, Greenpeace, Inc., and the city of Boulder,
Colorado, also alleges violations of NEPA.13 As the lawsuit
evolved, the plaintiffs were joined by the cities of Santa
Monica, Arcata, and Oakland, California.14 The complaint
alleges that two U.S. government agencies, the Export
Import Bank of the United States and the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation, illegally provided at least US$32
billion in financing and insuring fossil fuel projects over the
past ten years while failing to comply with NEPA.15 This
lawsuit is of vital importance in the fight to combat climate
change since, combined, these agencies’ projects will ultimately churn out over 32 billion tons of carbon dioxide emissions.16 This lawsuit is also significant given that it specifically identifies carbon dioxide as a cause of climate
change.17
* Kelly Rain is a J.D. candidate, May 2007, at American University,
Washington College of Law.
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SOLAR POWER:
THE JOURNEY FROM NICHE TO MAINSTREAM
By Todd Foley and Kevin Gallagher*
INTRODUCTION
Global climate change is here, and with it comes changes in
the global energy industry. For companies like British
Petroleum (“BP”) that are willing to accept that reality, global
climate change and the switch to a lower carbon economy offer
an opportunity to create profitable markets while reducing society’s negative impact on global climate systems. By moving
quickly and effectively to develop renewable energy sources,
energy companies can diversify their energy portfolios while at
the same time promoting long-term sustainability. From solar
power to biofuels and wind power, low carbon energy solutions
exist but have yet to be successfully integrated into the global
economy. In light of the changes facing the energy industry, how
can energy companies bring these renewable energy sources
into the mainstream? This article explores the current niche
status of today’s sustainable energy markets, particularly solar
photovoltaic power (“P.V.”), and BP’s efforts to develop a viable
solar energy program.

THE SOLAR INDUSTRY TODAY
The U.S. domestic solar power industry has grown significantly in recent years. Helped by over $500 million in government support for a variety of different initiatives,1 P.V. production grew by 32 percent in 2003, resulting in $5 billion in sales
in that year alone.2 In addition, total demand for supplied P.V.
continues to increase at about twenty percent per year.3 Despite
this solid expansion, the U.S. P.V. market remains insignificant
in terms of total energy use. Last year’s total growth of six
hundred megawatts equals the output of just a single natural
gas-fired turbine or less than half of a coal-fired plant.4
The key to the industry’s past growth was successful cost
reduction. Similar reductions will be essential if the industry is
to grow beyond its current niche status. Over the last twenty
years, industry cost reduction efforts spurred a six-fold decrease
in the cost of installed systems.5 However, BP’s recent estimates
indicate that the total installed costs must at least be halved for
P.V. to approach parity with conventional power sources.6
The only way these costs reductions can occur is for the P.V.
industry to grow and gain access to scale economies currently
out of reach.

BP’S ROLE: SUSTAINABILITY AND PROFITABILITY
As the first major energy producer to acknowledge the
urgency of acting on global climate change, BP is taking steps
to reduce its effects and facilitate the movement towards renewable energy sources. BP has already achieved significant reductions in greenhouse gas (“GHG”) production and plans to keep
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its GHG levels the same in 2012 as they were in 2002.7 These
efforts are evidence of BP’s commitment to becoming a major
player in the global renewable energy market and to promoting
the dual goals of profitability and sustainability. In the short
term, BP is working to create partnerships and foster trust with
its stakeholders, including state and federal governments and
consumers.8 In the long term, BP is focused on reducing the
effects of global climate change by developing the capacity to
produce and supply sustainable energy solutions around the
globe. Based on available research, BP has determined that
stabilizing GHG concentrations at 550 parts per million is a
realistic goal that would limit the global temperature rise to
approximately two degrees Celsius.9 Meeting that goal will
require emissions in 2050 not to exceed today’s emission output,
despite a forecasted doubling of energy consumption.10
Solar power’s tremendous potential as an alternative to
GHG-emitting technology will help BP reach its goals.
Researchers at Princeton University recently calculated that a
one thousand fold increase in solar power could reduce total
current GHG emissions by one-seventh.11 BP believes that the
foundations for a successful P.V. market must come from the
developed world.12 As a result, BP has focused on expanding its
production in developed countries on its grid.13 By focusing on
the developed world in the areas of technological innovation
and industry consolidation, BP hopes to achieve the scale
necessary for P.V. to quickly become cost-competitive with
conventional energy sources. To that end, the company has
invested approximately $500 million in P.V. since 2000.14 BP’s
pursuit of a stable and mature P.V. market has led it down
several avenues of market development, including research and
development, operations, and marketing. BP sees these areas as
critical in the effort to bring P.V. into the mainstream.
The future of the P.V. industry depends on technological
development. Without continued innovation, the industry will
not be able to reach cost parity, and future growth will be
severely limited. In an effort to foster technology research, BP
has developed major partnerships and made significant invest-

* This article was compiled for Todd Foley, BP Director, Business Development &
External Affairs, by Kevin Gallagher, J.D. candidate, May 2007, at American
University, Washington College of Law. The article relies primarily on two
speeches by BP employees discussing BP’s approach to the development of the
solar industry. The first speech, titled “Bringing Solar into the Mainstream,” was
presented by John Mogford, Group Vice President, Renewables and Alternatives,
BP p.l.c. at the World Renewable Energy Congress in Denver, Colorado on August
30, 2004. The second speech was given by Mary Shields, Regional President, BP
Solar at Solar Power 2004 on October 20, 2004.
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ments in research and design. Through partnerships with
research institutions such as the University of Delaware, BP can
remain at the forefront of technological innovation while creating competitive advantages for its solar program. In addition to
its partnerships with research institutions, BP has established a
long-term federal research partnership that has invested over
$30 million into research and development.15 One of the
Company’s research areas is “Building Integrated P.V.,” which
it hopes will provide an alternative way for making solar power
systems more of a mainstream consumer product.16 Another
area of recent research has focused on cost reduction through
the use of back surface field and silicon nitride processes.17

From solar power to
biofuels and wind power,
low carbon energy
solutions exist but have
yet to be successfully
integrated into the
global economy.
BP’s growth in operations has involved consolidation and a
shift in focus to major markets. BP has exited from the thin film
market, which it does not see as a profitable business line in the
near future.18 The company has also increased production by
opening a $100 million plant in Spain, expanding its Frederick,
Maryland plant, and launching new product lines in India,
Australia, and the U.S.19 BP Solar is currently the largest solar
silicon wafer producer in North America and its current round of
expansions will build on that status.20 Combined with this
aggressive growth, BP has streamlined operations across the
board by reducing its number of distributors, product lines,
employees, warehouses, and offices.21
BP has also focused on developing a broad marketing program to increase awareness and understanding of P.V. BP has
developed innovative programs such as Solar Home Solutions
in California, where BP has gained a 25 percent market share.22
BP has also created the Solar Neighbors Programs, which grew
out of a partnership between BP Solar and actor Edward
Norton.23 Whenever a participating celebrity purchases a Solar
Home Solution through the Company’s program, BP will donate
a solar home system to a low-income family in Los Angeles,
California.24 Thus far, celebrities participating in this program
include Danny DeVito, Rhea Perlman, Larry Hagman, Don
Cheadle, and Daryl Hannah.25
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BP’s marketing research has shown that fifty percent of all
homeowners interested in solar power decline to purchase a
solar power system because of the poor aesthetics of available
P.V. systems.26 BP has addressed this issue by developing a new
“SunLux” solar power system that has been designed with the
homeowner’s interests in mind.27
BP will continue its focus on sustainability in the future and
sees many opportunities for growth in the solar market. A key
element of BP’s commitment to sustainability is the development of a free-standing P.V. market capable of providing the
economic and social benefits promised, but not yet delivered, by
renewable energy. However, those benefits will not be realized
without greater cooperation between business, government,
and consumers.
Based on its deep involvement in the growth of global P.V.
markets, BP has identified several areas where cooperative
action between interested parties can help lay a foundation for
future growth. First, state and national governments must provide predictable, consistent, and long-term support for the P.V.
market and provide incentives through pro-green policies. This
includes the development of simple and uniform net metering
and interconnection policies. It also requires the establishment
of renewable energy credits and energy offset policies that provide energy customers with the full-value of the retail power
they offset. Similarly, governments need to create performancebased incentives and appropriate assurance mechanisms.
Another essential element to creating a viable P.V. market is
“Real-Time-Pricing,” a strategy that will inform consumers of
their true costs for power. These changes will help governments
recognize that the benefits of a large-scale P.V. market extend
beyond just environmental sustainability, to include energy
security and employment opportunities as well. The P.V. industry needs support now to provide the foundation and stability for
a free-standing P.V. market in the future. For its part, business
must continue to focus on cost-reduction and technological
development. These improvements can best be achieved by
establishing effective partnerships with local industry able to
service local markets.

CONCLUSION
BP is committed to the long-term development of the solar
industry as a feasible alternative to conventional energy sources
and is determined to bring about the day when solar power
achieves parity with other power sources. BP is acting on its
commitment to address the realities of global climate change by
building a strong, global market for solar energy. It is doing so
by developing cutting-edge solar technologies, streamlining its
business operations through consolidation and increased production, and addressing current limitations by improving awareness of consumers and governments. By creating a stable market
for solar power in the developed world, BP hopes to lay the
foundation for a sustainable energy future.
ENDNOTES: Solar Power Continued on page 82
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PROPOSAL FOR A GREEN PATENT SYSTEM:
IMPLICATIONS FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE
By Itaru Nitta*

INTRODUCTION
he patent system is in a unique position to address environmental issues and promote sustainable development.
A society’s environmental practices generally depend on
its affluence and level of technology, and patents are one of the
legal mechanisms involved in increasing wealth and developing
technology. The patent system also allows for the invention and
production of eco-friendly technologies, which enable a society
to increase its wealth while reducing its use of energy and
materials. In practice, however, the existing patent system also
has negative environmental impacts. It contributes to global
environmental degradation by promoting resource consumption
in developed countries and poverty in developing countries.
This article proposes specific changes to create a reformed
patent system called the green patent system. This new system
would internalize environmental externalities by forcing the
patent holder to provide compensation for environmental degradation resulting from the new technology. Because the patent
system allows fines to be levied against violators, this system
simultaneously creates an area of “hard law” in the area of
international environmental law while creating a source of funds
to assist environmentally friendly projects. In particular, this
article will show how a green patent system can help fight
climate change.

T

PLACING A PRICE ON ENVIRONMENTAL
DEGRADATION
Due to lack of regulations, the tendency towards minimizing prices, and the difficulty in measuring actual environmental
impacts, the market rarely factors environmental externalities
into the market price of a transaction. Every product and service
in any market is ultimately derived from natural resources, yet
the market price of all technology excludes some environmental
externalities. If the market prices of natural resources fully
reflected or internalized environmental externalities, developing
countries would be able to obtain the same amount of foreign
currency by exporting fewer natural resources at higher prices.
In this way, internalizing environmental externalities could curb
environmental degradation. For example, the “true cost” of
gasoline in the U.S. is at least $5.60 per gallon when all environmental costs, including compensation and treatment fees for
global warming and air pollutants, are internalized.1 Similarly,
the prices of timber and electricity do not reflect the true environmental costs, such as the treatment fees for global warming
due to coal combustion. However, if resource prices increase to
their true values, including hidden and future costs, economists
predict that market turmoil would occur. For example, a rise in
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gasoline prices to their true cost of $5.60 per gallon would
undoubtedly shock the U.S. economy.
The current patent system also ignores the costs of environmental degradation. While it promotes human welfare through
the progress of technology by building wealth for a patentee by
protecting products and services, the system generates environmental externalities that cause environmental degradation.
The current patent system encourages further consumption
of environmental resources by increasing a patentee’s capital
intensity, which in turn encourages more investment. There are
four ways the patent system increases capital intensity. First,
since the patent system prohibits unauthorized people from
commercializing a protected product or service, a patentee can
monopolize all benefits from that market. Second, a patentee is
free to set a favorable price for the protected product or service
without risk of competition. Third, a patentee can obtain large
license fees or royalties by permitting other people to commercialize the protected product or service. Fourth, a patentee can
receive large amounts of compensation by suing for patent
infringement and winning.
In addition to increasing capital intensity, a patentee is
guaranteed to collect the investment made for developing the
new product. This guarantee of financial rewards stimulates
further investment to develop further technologies. As a result of
the patent system, these further technologies result in further
environmental externalities. To internalize these additional
environmental externalities, the patent system should demand
that a patentee pay for them.
While the market system cannot handle internalizing environmental externalities, the patent system can. A mechanism
that requires a patentee to pay the inherent environmental externalities out of the profits gained by protecting their patented
invention is a way to internalize inherent environmental externalities. This new mechanism would allow the global community to answer the demands of developing nations to shift the burden of environmental protection onto the developed countries,
to allow for harmonization of domestic and international law,

* Itaru Nitta is a senior patent engineer in Wakabayashi Intellectual Property
Law, Tokyo, Japan and M.A. candidate at the American University School of
International Service. The author appreciates the encouragement and support he
received from Professors David Hunter, James Lee, Renee Marlin-Bennett, Judith
Shapiro, Paul Wapner, and Angela Dadack. He also acknowledges permission for
this study from Mr. Teruo Miyazaki, the presidential patent attorney of
Wakabayashi Intellectual Property Law. Moreover, he wishes to thank his wife
and son, Nobuko and Yuki for their understanding. The author can be reached at
itaru100@yahoo.co.jp.
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create a branch of environmental “hard law,” and penalize noncompliance.

SHIFTING THE COST BACK TO DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
Developing countries continue to demand exemptions from
the efforts to protect the global environment because their
priorities are for economic growth rather than environmental
protection. These countries argue that developed countries have
profited from environmental degradation and therefore have a
greater share of the responsibility to protect the global environment. Developing countries further argue that developed countries disproportionately enjoy the benefits resulting from environment degradation and therefore should pay compensation to
developing countries, Finally, developing countries contend that
developed countries have exploited the global environment for
a long time on the path to achieve their wealth, and it is now the
developing countries’ turn to follow the same path.
Developing countries can make arguments that the patent
system promotes further environmental degradation, yet it is
predominately developed countries that benefit from the patent
system. Developed countries entirely dominate the patent
system. Some nations have had patent systems for over five
hundred years, allowing their system to mature with economic
growth. Conversely, the economies of many developing countries are still too weak to support a system that encourages
invention.
Instead of merely asserting that developed countries should
be responsible for all environmental costs, developing countries
would be better served by asserting that global environmental
protections should be incorporated into the patent system.
Developed countries have profited from the patent system and
environmental degradation, while developing countries have
rarely benefited from the patent system and their growth often
hindered by the needs for environmental protection. By tying
environmental protection and the patent system together, the
burden of responsibility for the environment’s protection will
remain with developed countries.

INTERNATIONAL HARMONIZATION OF POLICY
AND PRACTICE
A green patent system would lead to greater harmonization,
which is the incorporation of domestic patent law into an internationally uniform standard of policy and practice. For example,
every member country in the Trade Related Aspect of
Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPs”) Agreement grants
twenty-year domestic patent terms equally to national and
foreign patentees.2 Further harmonization of the patent system
would lend impetus to sustainable development.
The patent system has established its own procedure to
create international consensus. This procedure is based on a
supranational view focused on worldwide benefits that enables
the present patent system to overcome the differences of individual countries. Since the patent system commonly establishes
consensus among countries, utilizing the patent system to
implement sustainable development would be more effective
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than constructing a new treaty for global environmental
protection.
The patent system’s ability to harmonize its laws is evidenced through the international application of the Patent
Cooperation Treaty (“PCT”).3 Under the PCT, while individual
patent administration offices use country-specific documents,
every document must adhere to a uniform format defined by the
international bureau of the World Intellectual Property
Organization (“WIPO”). Moreover, each patent office must use
a standardized Patent Code, called the International Patent
Classification (“IPC”), when classifying inventions. The PCT’s
use demonstrates that the patent system has the ability to handle
technology uniformly and concretely on a global level, a capacity that could be utilized when the patent system encompasses
environmental principles. The patent system would have the
capacity to address environmental problems by imposing international standardized laws worldwide.4
As of January 2005, 125 countries followed the PCT.5 In
2004, applicants from more than one hundred countries filed
one million applications, and all of these applicants were
required to obey uniform international standards.6 Worldwide
uniform behavior is the result of over five hundred years of patent
history, and the system continues to become more harmonized.
Because of its firm foundation, the patent system could provide a
powerful methodology for sustainable development.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF “HARD” ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
The patent system is suitable for promoting sustainable
development, because the system is based on so-called hard law,
a law that is made up of legally binding instruments such as
laws, treaties, and regulations. The lack of hard international
environmental law is a major obstacle to global environmental
protection. Most international environmental conferences develop weaker policy guidelines, rather than binding law. This is
evidenced by the Stockholm Conference, the Rio Summit, and
the Johannesburg Summit, whose resulting treaties do not
include binding regulations. Since existing “soft” legal
instruments contain no penalty provision for breaches of the
treaties, the current system relies solely on a form of environmental ethics as the determining police force of global environmental issues.
In contrast to the treaties produced at these environmental
conferences, hard legal instruments contain penalty provisions,
such as imprisonment or a substantial fine, if an entity neglects
or violates the law. Among the harshest penalties in patent law
is the potential loss of a patent right. In the extreme situation
where a patent law eliminates a patentee’s rights for failure to
adhere to hard laws, other individuals or companies are free to
utilize the invention. Were patent law to include provisions
regarding environmental protection, the hard law punishment
that one’s patent rights could be taken away would force an
applicant or patentee to actively protect the environment in
exchange for their patent rights. This could be accomplished by
requiring the payment of an environmental fee in order to obtain
and maintain the patent right.
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HOW GREEN PATENT SYSTEM WOULD WORK
A green patent system would put a portion of patent-related
money (e.g., official fees, license royalties, and patent infringement compensations) into an environmental trust fund. This
fund would be used to offer technology transfers and financial
aid for countries in order to offset the cost of royalties for ecofriendly technologies and to provide low interest loans or grants
for the purchase and creation of such technologies.

COMPATIBILITY OF THE PATENT SYSTEM
WITH ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

researching new eco-friendly technologies. Through eco-friendly technology transfer aid, the green patent system would pay
royalties for patent-protected, eco-friendly inventions for those
who cannot afford such royalties. This in turn encourages developed countries to develop such technologies even when users
cannot afford to pay royalties. As a result, distribution of patentprotected, eco-friendly technologies is expanded to communities where such technologies do not yet exist.
By offering financial aid and technology transfers, the
green patent system would successfully address two root causes
of environmental degradation: poverty in developing countries
and consumption in developed countries. To curb povertyinduced environmental degradation in developing countries, the
green patent system would promote distribution of eco-friendly
technologies to these areas. The green patent system would offer
loans or grants so that these developing countries could import

A green patent system would utilize money gained through
a pro-patent policy based on internationally harmonized hard
laws. Simply put, if a country or an industry desires eco-friendly
technology but either does not have enough money to invest in
or create the technology, the green patent system would provide
a country or industry the necessary financial
support. Such a fund might be used to pay the
royalty fee necessary for Chinese automobile
EXPENDITURE AS ENVIRONMENTAL INVESTMENT
makers to create hybrid cars, for example.
This system would create a unique comFor developing countries to reduce poverty-induced
promise between economics and environenvironmental degradation
mental protection. Investment by the green
patent system internalizes environmental
Environmental
Purpose
Technology in
Patent right
investments
developed countries
externalities without directly increasing
resource prices, which encourages technologFinancial aid
To distribute ecoExisting and prevailing Effective or expired
ical progress by guaranteeing that a patentee
(Soft loans and grants)
friendly technologies
from developed
can collect his investment for developing a
Technology transfer aid countries to developing Existing and gaining
Effective
new product or service, even in developing
(Royalty payment)
market share
countries
countries.

TABLE 1

USING THE SYSTEM FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL INVESTMENT

For developed countries to reduce consumption-induced
environmental degradation
Environmental

The green patent system promotes susinvestments
tainable development through both revenue
Financial aid
and expenditure.
(Soft loans and grants)
Similar to a tax system, a green patent
system would collect environmental fees as
compensation for environmental degradation
Technology transfer aid
in order to internalize environmental external(Royalty payment)
ities. A patentee who owns one or more patent
rights in a certain industrial or economic field
is an actual market-monopolizer in that field.
Patent applicants would be responsible for paying environmental fees when they submit their application, and a successful patentee would pay environmental fees from their patent royalties
and any compensation gained through infringement actions.
The second aspect of the green patent system is the expenditure of financial resources. Once the green patent system collects environmental fees, it would distribute the new financial
resources as environmental investments, such as financial aid or
technology transfers. Through financial aid, the green patent
system would provide loans and grants in order to spread ecofriendly technologies. Financial aid would support countries and
industries purchasing existing eco-friendly technologies or
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Purpose

Technology in
developed countries

Patent right

To create eco-friendly
technologies in
developed countries

Not existing

Not existing

To nurture eco-friendly
technologies in
developed countries

Existing
but no substantial
market share

Effective

eco-friendly technologies, such as pollution reduction equipment and hybrid cars, from developed countries.
Just as the green patent system would decrease environmental degradation in developing countries, the system would
also curb consumption in developed countries. The green patent
system would provide developed countries financial aid and
technology transfers in order to support eco-friendly technologies. (See the lower part of Table 1). The process would differ
in two respects from that proposed for developing countries.
First, financial aid and technology transfers would be provided
to developed countries in order that eco-friendly technologies
that reduce environmental impact are created or discovered.
While some technologies, such as nuclear fusion energy
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY

production and space photolytic power generation, are so immature that their research has not yet reached patentable levels,
developed countries will be offered financial aid so that they can
be developed. Second, providing financial aid and technology
transfers in developed countries nurtures emerging eco-friendly
technologies until they are strong enough to occupy a significant
share of a market. Generally, these technologies, such as solar
and wind power generators, already exist and are patented in
developed countries, but their practical usage is limited.
The support of financial aid and technology transfers will
effectively promote fledgling eco-friendly technologies in
developed and developing countries because the markets for
these technologies are not yet fertile and because eco-friendly
companies often do not have sufficient capital to invest in them.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE GREEN PATENT SYSTEM
FOR CLIMATE CHANGE
Through financial and technology transfer aid to developing countries, the green patent system can help target climate
change. As of 2002 China was the second largest emitter of
carbon dioxide at thirteen percent of the world’s total emissions.7 A principle reason for China’s emission rate is the use of
heavy coal combustion in outdated and inefficient facilities to
support the country’s rapid economic growth and rush to industrialize.8 Even though the Chinese government offered initiatives to expand eco-friendly technologies,9 it lacked the capability and capital necessary to effectively decrease carbon
dioxide emission.10 In order for China to properly introduce
eco-friendly technologies, it must rely on financial and technological aid from developed countries, such as Japan, amounting
to several hundred million dollars per year.11
While foreign aid has achieved progress in China’s environmental protection, there are still obstacles for introducing
eco-friendly technologies into China.12 Since 2002, the
Japanese International Cooperation Agency (“JICA”) has undertaken the Project for Improvement of Environmental Protection
Technology for Metallurgical Combustion at Beijing in order to
transfer eco-friendly technology to the Chinese steel industry.13
The program’s goal has been to improve China’s energy efficiency in coal combustion by constructing a piole plant in the
State Steel Research Institute of China. JICA also has also
deployed equipment provisions, conducted joint exercises,
invited experts, and held workshops in China in order to
improve their existing technologies.14
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However, several critics predict that applying these ecofriendly technologies on a widespread scale to factories in China
will run into difficulties. Since the technologies were developed
by the Japanese steel industry, some are protected by patents.
This protection means that Chinese industries will be forced to
pay higher, patent-protected monopoly prices. Similarly,
Chinese industries will pay high royalties when they import or
produce these Japanese patent-protected products. Japan is not
able to lower its prices or the royalty fees because doing so
would not allow it to collect development costs for their
technologies.15
Patent-related obstacles to the reduction of carbon dioxide
emissions are potential targets for the green patent system. The
green patent system would encourage the Chinese industry to
import the products for high efficiency coal combustion by
financing a portion of patent-related prices. If the patent system
reduced the burden of royalties on Chinese industries, the
system also would encourage the Japanese industry to develop
further eco-friendly technologies, which would increase the
revenue of the patent system. Increased patent revenues would
therefore enable the green patent system to spread more ecofriendly technologies.

CONCLUSION
Abraham Lincoln once said “[t]he patent system added the
fuel of interest to the fire of genius.” These words are inscribed
in stone at the entrance of the U.S. Department of Commerce,
once home to the United States Patent Office. Throughout the
five hundred years of patent history, people have focused on
the role of the patent system in driving economic growth. This
economic growth-oriented policy is based on the traditional
economic conviction that continuous development driven by
constant economic growth makes a positive contribution to
human welfare. However, air pollution, resource depletion,
deforestation, overfishing, global warming, ozone depletion,
bio-diversity loss, genetically-modified organisms, as well as
other forms of environmental degradation, have shown the
negative side of economic growth. As a central connection
between economic growth and environmental degradation, the
patent system should play a significant role in ensuring that
future development is sustainable. Utilizing revenue generated
from the patent system to create a green patent system trust fund
will allow for the invention and development of eco-friendly
technologies, even in developing countries. Such inventions will
take a successful step toward sustainable development.

64

ENDNOTES: PROPOSAL FOR A GREEN PATENT SYSTEM
1

MICHAEL L. MCKINNEY AND ROBERT M. SCHOCH, ENVIRONMENTAL
SCIENCE: SYSTEMS AND SOLUTIONS 21 (3rd ed. Jones and Bartlett
Publishers, 2003); see also Geoffrey Dabelko and David Dabelko,
Environmental Security: Issues of Conflict and Redefinition,
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, Spring 1995,
at 3, available at http://wwics.si.edu/topics/pubs/ECSP1.pdf (last visited
Apr. 8, 2005).
2 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (“TRIPs”), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm0_e.htm (last visited
Apr. 15, 2005). The TRIPs Agreement is an international treaty for intellectual property intended promote free trade. In 1995, this treaty was
signed as an annex of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization (“WTO”) at the end of the Uruguay Round of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”). The TRIPs agreement contains several remarkable features. Firstly, scholars of intellectual
property call the TRIPs agreement the “Paris-plus” agreement because it
incorporates the most substantial provisions of the Paris Convention, and
the provisions are obligatory for member countries regardless of whether
they are members of the Paris Convention or not. Secondly, Article 4 of
the TRIPs agreement sets the most-favored-nation treatment which establishes that a member country should equally provide the best benefits to
all member countries. Thirdly, the TRIPs agreement created general rules
for domestic enforcement of intellectual property rights.
3 The PCT is administrated by the World Intellectual Property
Organization (“WIPO”), a specialized agency of the United Nations.
Under the PCT, an inventor must file an application in their country, but
there is a single format they must follow. In order to file internationally,
an inventor can file an international application with the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (“USPTO”). The USPTO sends the application to the
International Bureau of the WIPO. The application is then subjected to an
international search. All theses steps, called the “international phase,” are
organized by the International Bureau under the centralized and standardized uniform procedures of the PCT. However, after the international
phase, an inventor must file the translations of the international application in each country’s language in order to forward the application into
that country. This process is called “entering in national phase,” and
requires an inventor to file his applications with each country again.
Furthermore the application in the national phase is separately ruled by
the individual patent office in each member country. In spite of the international search report and the international preliminary examination
report, each country’s patent office conducts a search and exams
patentability of the invention and makes their own decision pursuant to
their patent laws and practice.
4 Japanese Patent Office, Information on Foreign Industrial Property
Systems, Table: “List of Laws and Regulations,” available at
http://www.jpo.go.jp/shiryou_e/s_sonota_e/aippi_e/index.htm
(last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
5 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, PATENT COOPERATION
TREATY NEWSLETTER, Jan. 2005, at 16 (Jan. 2005), available at
http://wipo.int/edocs/pctndocs/en/2005/pct_news_2005_1.pdf (last visited
Apr. 8, 2005).
6 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, PATENT COOPERATION
TREATY NEWSLETTER, Jan. 2005, at 1, available at
http://wipo.int/edocs/pctndocs/en/2005/pct_news_2005_1.pdf (last visited
Apr. 8, 2005).
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ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY RELATED
DATA, available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/env/intlenv.htm (last
visited Apr. 8, 2005).
8 The World Factbook reports that China’s export in 2003 ($436 billion)
was already larger than that of France ($347 billion), the United
Kingdom ($305 billion), Canada ($279 billion) and Italy ($278 billion),
all of which are members of the Group of Seven. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK (CIA 2004). The Factbook also reports
that China in 2003 stood as the second-largest economy ($6 trillion of
GDP) in the world after the U.S. ($11 trillion) and that the annual growth
rate of GDP in China has been nearly 10% since 1978. This suggests that
China could overtake the U.S. and become the world’s largest economy
in only a few decades if its GDP growth continues at the same or higher
rate. See, e.g., Elizabeth Becker, Guess Who’s Invited to Dinner, NEW
YORK TIMES, Sept. 23, 2004 at C1.
9 Since the early 1980s, Beijing and Chinese municipal governments
have advanced environmental protection policies including the reduction
of carbon dioxide emission. These policies have been implemented by
amendment of the constitution and the Basic Law on Environmental
Protection (“BLEP”), enactment of six subsequent national environmental laws, over twenty national environmental regulations, nearly four hundred pollutant discharge standards, approximately six hundred municipal
environmental regulations, and establishment of the State Environmental
Protection Administration (“SEPA”) as a governmental pledge of environmental protection. See, e.g., GREGORY FOSTER AND LOUISE WISE,
CHINA, THE ENVIRONMENTAL DRAGON: THE ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY
IMPLICATIONS OF CHINA’S RISE TO GREAT-POWER STATUS (Industrial
College of The Armed Forces, Fort Lesley J. McNair 2000).
10 The lack of eco-friendly technologies in China is typically
represented by their low number of patent applications; see, e.g.,
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, YEARLY REVIEW OF
THE PCT: 2003 (2003), at 3, available at http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/
activity/pct_2003.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2005). In terms of capital
shortage, while China spent $14 billion in 2002 for environmental protection, about 1.2% of its annual GDP, several estimations suggest that sufficient prevention and treatment for environmental degradation in China
needs around 10% of their GDP. See also PlanetSave.Com, China needs
to boost spending on environment (Mar. 14, 2003), available at
http://www.planetsave.com/ViewStory.asp?ID=3796
(last visited Apr. 8, 2005); AIDAN DAVY, ENVIRONMENT MATTERS 12
(World Bank 1996).
11 See, e.g., THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF JAPAN, JAPAN’S
OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE WHITE PAPER 2002: “STRATEGY” AND
“REFORM”, TABLE: JAPAN’S ODA DISBURSEMENTS TO CHINA, available at
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/white/2002/01ap_ea01.html#CHINA
(last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
12 JAPAN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION PROJECT, JICA PROJECT REPORT
(Japanese), available at http://www.jica.go.jp/china/cooperation/
steel/index.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2005)
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 See, e.g., JAPAN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION PROJECT, JICA PROJECT
REPORT (Japanese), available at http://www.jica.go.jp/evaluation/
end/files/13_1_60.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
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LITIGATION UPDATE
INUIT CIRCUMPOLAR CONFERENCE
V. BUSH ADMINISTRATION:
WHY THE ARCTIC PEOPLES CLAIM THE UNITED STATES’ ROLE
IN CLIMATE CHANGE HAS VIOLATED THEIR FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS
AND THREATENS THEIR VERY EXISTENCE.
By Juliette Niehuss*
INTRODUCTION
In 2003, at a series of climate talks in Milan, Italy, the Inuit
Circumpolar Conference (“ICC”), the main representative body
for over 150,000 Inuit peoples within the Arctic rim, announced
that the Alaskan and Canadian Inuit were developing a human
rights petition against the United States to be submitted to the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (“IACHR”). The
Inuit are claiming that the United States has effectively violated
their fundamental human rights and threatened their very existence by refusing to cut the country’s greenhouse gas emissions
and by reneging on its international commitments to address
climate change.1 The petitioners emphasize the responsibility of
the United States as the world’s leader in carbon dioxide emissions, and the petition is currently being organized with the help
of NGOs such as the Center for International Environmental
Law (“CIEL”) and Earthjustice. The aim of the petition is to
obtain an international declaration recognizing that humaninduced climate change has infringed on the human rights of the
Inuit and to create a new foundation under international law for
linking environmental degradation to human rights claims.2
Moreover, the Inuit hope that an IACHR ruling that the U.S. is
liable for its role in global warming might put other countries on
notice of the human rights consequences of climate change.3

SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND
While the Bush Administration remains generally skeptical
regarding the causes of global climate change, there is evidence
of a growing consensus within the scientific community that
human influences have greatly impacted climate change over
the past fifty years.4 Industrial impacts – largely traceable to the
U.S. – such as heat-trapping smokestacks and vehicle tailpipe
emissions have led to marked increases in greenhouse gases like
carbon dioxide and atmospheric warming.5 A range of scientific studies support the Inuit’s claim that climate change is affected by such human activities and their “modification” of the
Earth’s atmosphere.6 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (“IPCC”), an arm of the World Meteorological
Organization and the United Nations Environment Programme,
SPRING 2005

has concluded that there is international “consensus of scientific opinion that the Earth’s climate is being affected by human
activities” and that “[m]ost of the observed warming over the
last fifty years is likely . . . due to the increase in greenhouse gas
concentration.”7 The National Academy of Sciences has echoed
this consensus, stating that greenhouse gases accumulating in
the atmosphere “as a result of human activities . . . [are] causing
surface air temperatures and subsurface ocean temperatures to
rise.”8 Other American groups, including the American
Meteorological Society, the American Geophysical Union, and
the American Association for the Advancement of Science, have
issued similar statements.9 Most recently, the Arctic Climate
Impact Assessment of November 2004, a study by threehundred scientists authorized by the eight countries of the Arctic
Council has concluded that “human influences” may be the
dominant factor in current climate change patterns.10
The Inuit claim is also grounded in specific scientific data
showing that presently and in the near future, the Arctic regions
will “bear a disproportionate burden of the impacts of climate
change.”11 The Inuit have recently noticed dramatic shifts in
seasonal snows and icing; increased warming of surrounding
ocean waters; a resulting inability to conduct traditional subsistence fishing and hunting; and rapid permafrost melting, a condition that has caused the erosion of housing foundations and
seashore lines as well as the collapse of airports, roads, and local
harbors.12 As CIEL describes it, “if global warming continues
unchecked it threatens to destroy [the Inuit’s] culture, render
their land uninhabitable, and rob them of their means of subsistence.”13 With this new science in hand, the Inuit have begun
collecting videotaped statements by village elders and traditional hunters about the direct effects they have witnessed from the
shrinking northern icecaps.14

* Juliette Niehuss is a J.D. and M.A. (International Affairs) candidate, 2006, at
American University, Washington College of Law and the School of International
Service. Ms. Niehuss wishes to thank Don Goldberg, Attorney for the Center for
International Environmental Law, for his invaluable assistance.
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BASIS FOR THE PETITION TO THE INTERAMERICAN COMMISSION
The Inuit claim that the U.S. is principally responsible for
violating their human rights because the U.S. currently creates
25 percent of global carbon dioxide emissions, yet has refused
to sign on to the Kyoto process or cut its production of greenhouse gas emissions.15 U.S. liability also rests in legal arguments
based on both customary international human rights law and several international agreements that the Inuit claim bind the U.S. to
take on greater responsibility for its role in climate change.
First, the Inuit point to fundamental human rights principles
laid out in the American Declarations of Rights and the Duties
of Man. As a member of the Organization of American States
(“OAS”) and a signatory to the American Declaration, the U.S.
bears certain responsibilities to its northern American neighbors; these include: the right to life (Article I); the rights to
residence and movement (Article VIII); the right to the inviolability of the home (Article IX); the right to the preservation of
health and well-being (Article XI); the right to benefits of
culture (Article XIII); and the right to work (Article XIV).16
Groups like CIEL and Earthjustice argue that the U.S. is
responsible for violating Inuit rights to privacy, residence, and
protection of the home by failing to properly regulate its own
greenhouse gas emissions and refusing to take part in the international process addressing their impact on global warming and
climate change.
Second, the U.S. bears responsibility stemming from its
participation in international negotiations on climate change,
starting with the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change, to which the U.S. is a signatory.17 Despite
President Bush’s recent refusal to take part in the ongoing Kyoto
Protocol round of negotiations, the U.S. acknowledged the
problem of climate change and the need to address its causes
and solutions when President Clinton signed onto the pact.18 By
failing to take any steps in cutting its emissions, the Inuit argue
that the U.S. is threatening their way of life and has obligations
under international human rights law to remedy violations to
their rights to life and personal security, subsistence and food,
travel and freedom of movement, housing, culture, and health.19

POTENTIAL FOR FUTURE LITIGATION
The IACHR has a “record of treating environmental degradation as a human rights matter,”20 and may provide the Inuit’s
best hope at recognizing their human rights claim based on
climate change. The IACHR, a human rights protection body
created by the 1948 American Declaration on the Rights and
Duties of Man and the OAS Charter, has the power to promote
the observance and defense of human rights and analyze specif67

ic cases of human rights violations.21 While the IACHR may
review such petitions and make recommendations to the
states involved, its recommendations are non-enforceable.
Enforcement of remedies for human rights violations is the
ambit of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, created by
the American Convention on Human Rights of 1969, to which
the U.S. is not a signatory and thus not subject to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Inuit’s claims against the U.S. therefore
have the best chance of being recognized through a nonbinding
declaration or ruling by the IACHR. While recognizing that any
finding by the Commission on their petition would not be
enforceable against the U.S., the Inuit hope that a favorable declaration could break new ground in the realm of international
environmental law.22 If the IACHR recognizes the validity of
the Inuit’s claim of a link between global warming and human
rights violations, it could establish a future legal basis for
holding countries and even individual industries or companies
responsible for their roles in contribution to greenhouse gas
emissions. As the New York Times pointed out, a ruling favorable to the Inuit could “lead to a[] . . . stream of litigation,
somewhat akin to lawsuits against tobacco companies.”23 Most
importantly, it could provide the needed motivation for countries like the U.S. to commit to processes like the Kyoto
Protocol and take a more active role in international strategies to
combat climate change.

ENDNOTES: INUIT CIRCUMPOLAR
CONFERENCE
1 See Inuit Circumpolar Conference (“ICC”), Executive Council
Resolution 2003-01: Climate Change and Inuit Human Rights, 2003,
available at http://www.inuit.org/index.asp?lang=eng&num=244 (last
visited Mar. 10, 2005).
2 See Andrew C. Revkin, with Larry Rohter, Eskimos Seek to Recast
Global Warming as a Rights Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2004, at A.
3

See generally ICC Executive Council Resolution 2003-01, supra note
1.

4 Naomi Oreskes, Beyond the Ivory Tower: The Scientific Consensus on
Climate Change, SCIENCE, Vol 306, Issue 5702, 1686, Dec. 3, 2004 (noting a statement by Christine Todd Whitman, former head of the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, in which she claimed that in reviewing a major EPA report on the risks of climate change “there was less
consensus on the science and conclusions on climate change”), available
at http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/306/5702/1686? (last visited Mar. 25, 2005)
5

See Revkin, supra note 2.

ENDNOTES: Inuit Circumpolar Conference Continued on page 82
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY

FOCUS ON AU: GREEN BUILDINGS
by Chris McChesney*
U.S., 137 buildings have been LEED certified and almost
arge buildings are not typically hailed as protectors
of the globe and sustainable in their construction and
two thousand others are seeking certification. The General
maintenance. However, an emerging movement
Service Administration, the federal agency that oversees all
among architects is changing the amount of energy
non-military government construction, has announced that
and resources these concrete monsters require in both their
any new governmental building or renovation of any preconstruction and use. “Green architecture” promotes energy
existing governmental building will meet minimum LEED
efficiency and dramatically cuts the amount of resources
standards.10
needed by focusing on a building’s design, construction,
American University (“A.U.”) has been a member of
and day-to-day use.1 Currently, buildings account for a large
USGBC since September of 200211 and is “committed to
percentage of energy consumpenvironmental responsibility.”12
tion and waste in America,
Part of the campaign AnewAU
including 36 percent of total
is the construction of a new
energy use and thirty percent of
eighty thousand square-foot
2
greenhouse gas emissions.
building for the School of
The move to green buildInternational Service (“SIS”)
ings, the products of green archion the main campus.13
tecture, can cut energy use and
Working with the architects
emissions by up to fifty percent
William McDonough and
when compared with similar,
Partners, recognized for their
3
non-green buildings. The use of
sustainable designs,14 and
natural light and ventilation
architect Quinn Evans, the new
reduce the need for artificial
SIS building will be sustainlighting and the amount of
able and utilize “cradle-toenergy required to regulate a
cradle” design.15 The “cradle4
building’s temperature. Comto-cradle” concept focuses on
puterized blinds can help to
using recyclable materials and
maximize these benefits by
decreasing the amount of
responding to changes in the
products that end up in garbage
weather. Buildings can be built
dumps. One of William
with renewable power sources
McDonough’s philosophies is
A computer-generated image of the planned School of
that supply some of the energy
that
“[p]ollution is a symbol of
International Service Building at American University. See
http://american.edu/anewau/sis.cfm.
required and in some cases prodesign failure.”16
A.U. is likely to find
vide all the power needed during
advantages to green building beyond good environmental
the night.5 Environmental impacts are further reduced by
improving insulation or switching to alternative insulation
stewardship. On average, green buildings use 30 percent less
6
materials such as recycled shredded jeans.
energy than other buildings, meaning decreased costs in runSeveral U.S. organizations are dedicated to promoting
ning the building. Additionally, several studies have shown
green architecture, led by a coalition called the U.S. Green
that green architecture makes a building’s indoor environBuilding Council (“USGBC”) that consists of over four
ment healthier and its people more productive. 17 Several
7
thousand members. The USGBC uses the Leadership in
companies, including Lockheed Martin, that have green
Energy and Environmental Design (“LEED”) Green
buildings report fewer sicknesses, greater job satisfaction,
Building Rating System® as a national standard to promote
and an overall increase in productivity.18 Similarly, some
8
“high-performance, sustainable buildings.” By setting a
studies show students perform up to twenty percent better in
uniform system of standards, the USGBC stimulates compegreen buildings.19 Absentee rates tend to drop and students
tition among green builders and pushes for new scientific
developments in “water savings, energy efficiency, materials
* Chris McChesney is a J.D. candidate, May 2007, at American University,
selection, and indoor environmental quality.”9 Across the
Washington College of Law.
American University
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feel less stressed. Even legal costs can drop in a green building due to fewer lawsuits stemming from environmental
working conditions, otherwise known as “sick building”
lawsuits.20
Constructing the SIS building will make A.U. one of the
few universities nationwide to have a green building. The
University of California at Davis, the University of
Michigan, and the University of Vermont have also implemented green buildings on their campuses.21 The new SIS
building will also join the ranks of green buildings around
the world, such as the future Freedom Tower to be built at
the site of the World Trade Center.22 With the completion of
the new SIS building, which has yet to be named, A.U. hopes
to provide a state of the art facility for its faculty and
students in SIS, and “creat[e] a positive physical environment,” to foster “a sense of community among faculty,
students, and staff.”23

ENDNOTES:
1 The rise of the green building, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 2 2004,
available at http://www.economist.com/science/tq/
displaystory.cfm?story_id=3422965 (last visited Mar. 24, 2005).

8

LEED: Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design,
United States Green Building Council website, at
http://www.usgbc.org/DisplayPage.aspx?CategoryID=19 (last visited Apr.
10, 2005).
9

Id.

10

Supra note 1.

11 About

USGBC: Member List, United States Green Building Council, at
http://www.usgbc.org/AboutUs/MemberList.aspx?CMSPageID=91&Categ
oryID=1& (last visited Mar. 27, 2005).

12

Email from Daniel Yu, Office of Program Development, American
University School of International Service to Chris McChesney, J.D.
Candidate, American University Washington College of Law (Mar. 8,
2005, 10:30, EST) (on file with author).

13 AnewAU:

Facilities, School of International Service, American
University website, at http://www.american.edu/campaign/sis.cfm (last
visited Mar. 27, 2005).

14

Firm Profile, William McDonough and Partners website, at
http://www.mcdonoughpartners.com/index.htm (last visited Mar. 27,
2005).

15 Current Work, Quinn Evans Architects website, at http://www.quinnevans.com/current.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2005).
16

Beyond Recycling: Manufacturers Embrace ‘C2C’ Design, WALL
STREET JOURNAL, Mar. 3, 2005, available at
http://webreprints.djreprints.com/1186091444562.html (last visited Mar.
24, 2005).
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WORLD NEWS
By Jane Garrido, Catherine Landers,
and Cari Shiffman*

AFRICA
POSSIBLE INCREASED ILLNESSES AND
TO PHASE OUT OF LEADED FUEL

DEATHS LEAD

Health experts in Kenya have warned that the continued
usage of leaded fuel in the region could increase the number of
deaths from respiratory illnesses.1 Top environmental scientists
with the United Nations Environment Programme (“UNEP”)
concluded that Nairobi, Kenya is one of the most highly polluted cities in the world, in part due to the vehicles and leaded fuel
used in the city.2 Leaded fuel exacerbates the problem by
destroying the catalytic converters in vehicles, which normally
act as pollution guards.3
As many countries in Africa still use leaded gasoline, the
continent is severely affected by lead poisoning and pollution.4
Moreover, Africa’s pervasive dust formations, which disperse
concentrations of lead and increase the probability of exposure,
exacerbate this problem.5 Lead pollution poses many serious
health risks.6 More people in the region are being exposed to
lead poisoning because of the increased number of vehicles, in
part due to the growth of the urban populations.7 To address this
problem, UNEP has begun a campaign to phase out leaded fuel
in Africa by encouraging drivers to use unleaded fuel.8

FOOD SHORTAGES MAY HAVE SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS
FOR PEOPLE WITH HIV/AIDS
The Zambian National Food and Nutrition Commission
(“NFNC”) has reported that people living with HIV/AIDS in the
region could be severely affected by a food deficit.9
Alternatively, the Zambian government in past years has blamed
food shortages on the HIV/AIDS pandemic.10 Nutrition is
essential for slowing HIV’s progression into full-blown AIDS.11
Additionally, the effects could be very severe for those on antiretroviral therapy because, according to the NFNC, “the build
up of toxins from the medication will not be deterred and this
could be fatal.”12
Zambia is ranked among the countries with a high rate of
malnutrition.13 According to the United Nations Development
Programme (“UNDP”), about sixteen percent of Zambia’s adult
population is living with HIV.14 UNDP stresses that HIV/AIDS
is “the most critical development and humanitarian crisis
Zambia faces today.”15 The NFNC emphasized that maintaining
proper nutrition was crucial for caring for people living
HIV/AIDS.16
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AMERICAS
U.S. CONGRESS VOTES TO OPEN THE ARCTIC
NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE TO OIL DRILLING
By a vote of 51-49, the United States Senate voted on
March 16, 2005 against removing a provision in the 2006 budget resolution that will allow drilling in the ecologically sensitive
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge in Alaska.17 Proponents say
that oil companies will eventually be able to extract up to one
millions barrels of oil a day from Alaska’s northern coastal
plain.18 However, opponents argue that drilling will not significantly reduce the United States’ dependence on foreign oil and
will harm caribou, polar bears, and millions of migratory birds
in the refuge.19 The Senate and House must still agree on a final
version of the budget before the legislation becomes law.20

BRAZIL CAPTURES SUSPECT IN CONSERVATIONIST
SLAYING; PRESIDENT PROTECTS AMAZON LANDS
IN AREA OF SLAYING
Police arrested landowner Vitalmiro Bastos de Moura, the
man accused of ordering the slaying of American missionary
nun Sister Dorothy Stang.21 Stang was shot February 12, 2005
in Para, Brazil, allegedly in retaliation for her outspoken efforts
to protect peasants and wildlife in the Amazon.22
Stang worked with poor farmers in the Amazon to protect
the rainforest from encroachment by wealthy ranchers.23 About
three years ago, Brazilian land reform laws granted approximately 173,000 acres rich in mahogany and cedar to peasant
farmers.24 The land attracted the attention of loggers and corporate landowners, who allegedly made death threats against the
peasant farmers seeking to protect it.25
In an effort to fight deforestation and land conflicts in the
state where Stang was murdered, Brazilian President Luiz
Inacio da Silva signed a decree creating two major protected
areas in the Amazon.26 Together, the 8.15 million acre forest
reserve Terra do Meio Ecological Station and the 1.1 million
acre Serra do Pardo National Park established by the decree
make up an area twice the size of Massachusetts.27

CLIMATE CHANGE WILL IMPACT
GREAT LAKES AGRICULTURE
A new report from the University of Illinois and the Union
of Concerned Scientists (“UCS”) warns that a warming climate
will harm agriculture in the Great Lakes region.28 Impacts on

* Jane Garrido and Cari Shiffman are J.D. candidates, May 2007, at American
University, Washington College of Law. Catherine Landers is a J.D. candidate,
May 2006, at the Washington College of Law.
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Agriculture: Our Region’s Vital Economic Sector, a report
issued by the UCS in March, suggests that changes in precipitation, rainfall, ozone concentrations, and pests and pathogens
will disrupt current farming practices throughout the region.29
Maximum daily temperatures could rise by five to twenty
degrees in the Great Lakes region.30 Drought frequency will
likely increase, and by the end of the century UCS researchers
say Illinois summers could resemble the arid conditions of
east Texas.31

ASIA
ECONOMIC GROWTH IN CHINA HAS IMPLICATIONS FOR
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
China’s Development Research Center (“DRC”) forecasts
that China’s economy will exceed the think-tank’s routine
expectation of a growth rate of seven percent, and forecasts
instead that China will grow at an average annual rate of eight
percent from 2006 to 2010.32 The DRC reports that the principal
factors contributing to this increased growth forecast are accelerated urbanization and higher consumption in houses, cars, and
home appliances.33 However, as China seeks to maintain this
growth, concerns remain that with rapid economic growth there
will be greater pressure on the nation’s resources, energy, and
the environment.34 Economists at the DRC warned that there
could be severe consequences for the environment unless the
country shifts away the present resource-intensive model of
economic growth.35

POPULATION GROWTH IN THE PHILIPPINES
MAY CONTRIBUTE TO FOOD DEFICITS
More people are suffering from hunger in the Philippines
than in most of the country’s East Asian neighbors.36 Recent
statistics show that 23 percent of Filipinos are living below the
minimum level of dietary energy consumption, compared to
nine percent in China, eighteen percent in Vietnam, and six percent in Indonesia.37 The average annual population growth rate
in the Philippines is 2.36 percent, and at this rate the country
will double its size in less than thirty years.38 This rapid population growth is thought to be a key contributor to the food
shortage problem.39
However, researchers at Cornell University concluded that
population growth does not cause hunger, but rather that poverty and inequality were the main contributors.40 Still, a followup study, conducted by an ecologist at the University of
Michigan, showed that inequality and poverty were the key
factors for rapid population growth.41 A slower growing popu71

lation may mean increased savings for basic education and
health services, which could lead to improvements in the rural
sector, especially in agricultural development, which could help
alleviate food shortages.42

EURASIA
SHELL SAYS DANGER TO RARE WHALES WILL NOT
STOP SAKHALIN-2 GAS PROJECT
John Barry, Russia Country Manager for Shell, told Reuters
in an interview on February 25, 2005, that fear for the future of
the endangered Western grey whales will not halt the Shell-led
Sakhalin-2 gas project in Russia from moving forward.43 Shell
expects it will be ready to deliver its first cargo of Liquefied
Natural Gas (“LNG”) on schedule in 2007.44
In response to concerns raised by the International Whaling
Commission that Sakhalin-2 threatens to kill the approximately
one hundred remaining Western gray whales near Russia’s
Pacific Coast, Shell commissioned an environmental report on
the project.45 Barry told Reuters that a recommendation from
the report that Shell stop the project to evaluate its impacts on
the whales had been misconstrued.46 Shell wants to be clear that
the project is going ahead, though it recognizes environmentalists’ concerns and is considering re-routing the pipelines,
amongst other mitigation measures, to avoid damaging the
whales’ habitat.47
Shell had recently announced that it signed up buyers for 70
percent of its planned capacity of 9.6 million tons of LNG, and
plans to sell the remaining volumes before the end of 2005.48
Shell sees Sakhalin-2 as a key project that can help it rebuild
investor confidence after admitting last year that it had exaggerated oil reserves.49 Opponents fear the project will negatively
affect the world’s last remaining Western grey whales, damage
the marine environment, and threaten the livelihood of tens of
thousands of fishermen.50

MIDDLE EAST
WORLD BANK GIVES IRAQ GRANT TO HELP ADDRESS
WATER SHORTAGES IN RURAL COMMUNITIES
In December 2004, the World Bank signed a $20 million
grant agreement with the Interim Government of Iraq for an
Emergency Community Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project.51
The goal of the project is to provide water to low-income rural
communities by improving water supply, sanitation, irrigation,
and drainage systems.52 It will fund repair of water infrastrucSUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY
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ture networks in Iraq’s rural areas through labor intensive,
small-scale, civil works programs.53 The Bank says that the
project will create employment opportunities in poor
communities.54
The agricultural and rural economies of Iraq are responsible
for 87 percent of Iraq’s water use.55 However, only 46 percent
of people in the rural areas have access to potable water.56 Many
in rural communities do not have access to safe sewage facilities
and as a result, rural communities have experienced a dramatic
rise in waterborne diseases.57 Iraq’s Minister of Water
Resources, Dr. Latif Rashid, commented that “[t]his signing is
the first step towards a continuous cooperation with the World
Bank…Iraq is in dire need of development and rehabilitation
and the sooner these projects are off the ground, the better it is
for the Iraqi people.”58
The Emergency Community Infrastructure Rehabilitation
Project is financed through the Iraq Trust Fund, a multi-donor
trust fund administered by the World Bank.59 As of December
2004, donors had contributed approximately $400 million to
the Trust.60

SCIENTISTS HOPEFUL ABOUT RESTORING
IRAQ’S MARSHLAND
The Mesopotamian marshlands of Southern Iraq, home to a
5,000 year-old Marsh Arab culture and once a center of rich biodiversity, are gradually being restored after decades of damming

and draining.61 Surprisingly clean water flowing through the
Tigris and Euphrates rivers to the marshlands is washing away
toxic salts that had built up in the area.62 Curtis Richardson of
Duke University, who is observing the recovery of the marshlands along with colleagues from Canada and Iraq, believes it is
possible to restore 30 percent of the marshland area.63
The marshlands were once the permanent habitat of millions of birds and an important stop for millions of birds that
migrate between Africa and Siberia.64 During the 1990s more
than 90 percent of the marshlands were destroyed by the diversion of water for cities upstream65 and agricultural irrigation.66
Saddam Hussein also had ordered deliberate draining of the area
in retaliation for the Marsh Arab’s uprising after the First Gulf
War, further contributing to the degradation of the area.67
Since the end of Saddam’s regime, Marsh Arabs have
begun to return to the area and have destroyed dams in order to
re-flood the region.68 Approximately twenty percent of the
marshland has now been re-flooded, causing the return of thousands of birds, as well as the smooth-coated otters.69 However,
scientists are still concerned about the future of the marshlands.70 The Iranian government plans to construct a dike on its
border with Iraq, which will divert water away from the marshland area.71
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CAMPUS CLIMATE NEUTRAL
Changing the Campus Climate
To get involved with Campus Climate Neutral, contact the
Executive Director of the National Association of Environmental Law
Societies (“NAELS”), Dan Worth, at dworth_99@yahoo.com.
For more information, visit the Campus Climate Neutral website at
http://www.naels.org/projects/ccn/index.htm.
Imagine the potential of more than two hundred student
task forces made up of professors, graduate students, and
undergrads at major U.S. universities working thousands of
hours on projects to reduce campus greenhouse gas emissions through for credit independent studies.
Campus Climate Neutral (“CCN”) will be a campaign
to aggressively reduce the climate footprint of U.S. colleges
and universities by working with students, faculty, administrators, and campus greening professional groups to run
greenhouse gas audits, create climate neutral action plans,
work with schools to implement reductions, and eventually
push for climate friendly investment of endowments. In the
process, CCN will increase climate-related academic offerings, educate and train the campus community on climate
issues, and mobilize the more than fifteen million students
on today’s campuses in support of public interest climate
solutions.
Today’s students can follow in the footsteps of graduate
students who, in the late 1960s, led bottom-up efforts to
create new fields of study – including African American
studies, and women’s studies – and to inspire new social
movements – including civil rights, free speech, and an end

The Climate Liability Project
Sustainable Development Law & Policy is pleased to
announce the launch of the Climate Liability Project,
available on its website at
http://www.wcl.american.edu/org/sustainabledevelopment.
The Climate Liability Project will serve as a resource for
individuals interested in the legal and regulatory aspects of
climate change. The website will offer background on the
science of climate change, climate change law and policy,
climate change news updates, and climate change litigation
updates. The website will be updated frequently to keep pace
with events related to climate change. Links to other websites
addressing climate change issues will also be provided.
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to the Viet Nam war. In addition, students can use the current
climate crisis to engage key campus decision makers and
ensure that our institutions of higher learning become the
moral and technological leaders in the campaign to address
climate change, the laboratories for the technologies and
management processes to neutralize emissions of greenhouse gases (“GHGs”), and the breeding grounds for future
climate-conscious world leaders, professionals, and citizens.

STEP 1: FIND OUT MORE ABOUT CLIMATE,
CAMPUS CLIMATE NEUTRAL, AND
CLIMATE NEUTRALITY
In order to make this campaign effective, students and
professors will need to make themselves experts on the law,
policy, economics, framing, and science of climate change
as well as campus greening strategies and technologies.

STEP 2: APPOINT A CCN REPRESENTATIVE
FROM YOUR ENVIRONMENTAL
STUDENT GROUP
Appoint a point person to work on CCN efforts and
contact Dan Worth, dworth_99@yahoo.com

STEP 3: PROPOSE A CCN
INDEPENDENT STUDY
If you are a student interested in working on a
CCN project for credit, or a professor interested in
supervising a CCN research project, NAELS can
help you develop an independent study or research
paper proposal, and connect you to resources to
begin your work.

STEP 4: RUN AN OCTOBER 22ND
CLIMATE SUMMIT
On or around October 22, 2005, NAELS will work
with its student groups and other students and professionals around the country to run a series Climate
Action Summits.
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ENDNOTES: THE PROTOTYPE CARBON FUND

Continued from page 34
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